Can Prabowo-Gibran Win Outright Against a Ganjar-Anies Alliance?

Just days to go until Indonesians vote in their presidential and general elections, it appears that the Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar pair (Team AMIN) has decided to concentrate on West Java, Banten, and Jakarta — three provinces where they hope to secure significant votes. Winning a majority of votes in these provinces would suffice for Team AMIN to advance to the run-off against Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka, unless the Ganjar Pranowo campaign receives a tailwind.

Prabowo-Gibran are focused on winning in the critical provinces of Central Java and East Java. This strategy has led them to engage in tough ground battles against Team AMIN and team Ganjar-Mahfud.

In East Java, the Prabowo-Gibran campaign has made a concerted effort to secure the votes of traditional Muslim voters, especially those associated with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). On their part, Team AMIN is trying to attract votes from the NU base as well: Anies’ running mate Muhaimin chairs the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), which is often considered to be NU’s political embodiment. However, there are indications that NU, like many mass organisations, might be split in its electoral allegiances. (Editor’s note: See forthcoming Fulcrum by Hasyim Syafiq.) 

Meanwhile, Ganjar-Mahfud are striving to retain their votes in Central Java and Yogyakarta, where they have Ganjar’s party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), supporting their campaign. PDI-P carried both provinces with 30 per cent of the votes in 2019 (when Joko Widodo ran against Prabowo). Ganjar-Mahfud also hope to gain votes in East Java and North Sumatra. Together, these four provinces are considered PDI-P strongholds. Central Java is particularly critical given Ganjar’s two-term tenure as the province’s governor although Gibran’s entry into the fray has complicated the picture.

The final stage of the campaign has been affected by two distinct dynamics. First, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) is now an important force, not only as a kingmaker but as a blatant player. He has openly thrown his support to Prabowo-Gibran, stating that he is allowed to take sides even as a sitting president.

This has given rise to a countering force, the second dynamic, which involves a growing mass of opposition and resistance from civil society organisations, university campuses and academics, and some sectors of public opinion. These groups are now openly criticising Prabowo-Gibran / Jokowi, expressing their resistance through various means. These include an online movement with the hashtag #AsalBukan02 (“as long as it is not 02”), signifying their opposition to Prabowo-Gibran, whose team number is “02”.

We are at less than a week from election day with the race too close to call. If the moves by civil society and Prabowo’s two opponents are successful, it is entirely possible that Team Prabowo-Gibran will not win outright on 14 February.

Another noteworthy movement is the new “4 Finger Salutation Movement”, initiated by a Green Party activist who is not participating in the general election. This concept aligns closely with #AsalBukan02: holding up one’s “four fingers” represents “1+3”, which means supporting Team 01 (Anies-Muhaimin) or Team 03 (Ganjar-Mahfud) and not voting for Prabowo-Gibran.

The last of the key movements is initiated by academics from prominent universities across Indonesia, now numbering in the thirties and growing. The academics are concerned about Jokowi’s and Prabowo-Gibran’s dubious ethical standards and the perception that constitutional norms have been violated, leading to Gibran’s nomination as vice-presidential candidate last year. This is coupled with criticism that some police and local officials, who are supposed to be politically neutral, have sided with Team 02 and intimidated campaign staffers from the opposing campaigns.

These resistance movements, even this late in the game, might affect President Jokowi. His reputation is at threat as his critics scrutinise his behaviour. He has been accused of creating a political dynasty and bending the rules to allow his son to become Prabowo’s running-mate.

Now, people question whether Prabowo-Gibran will be able to win the election in one round. An outright victory on election day, which is still plausible, now seems slightly more fragile.

A presidential candidate must secure more than 50 per cent of the total national vote and win at least 20 per cent of the votes in 19 provinces, before being declared the outright winner. Various polls indicate that Prabowo-Gibran have yet to surpass this threshold even if some newer surveys this week show that they might have risen above the 50 per cent electability rating.  

As a response, Prabowo has intensified his campaign efforts in West Java, Banten, and Jakarta, where he previously emerged victorious. In 2019, he secured victories in Banten and West Java but narrowly lost to Jokowi in Jakarta. (Voters that previously supported Prabowo in 2019 are believed to have shifted predominantly to Team AMIN.)

The key battleground is set in Central Java and Yogyakarta. In 2019, Jokowi carried Central Java with 77 per cent of the votes and Yogyakarta, 69 per cent. Prabowo-Gibran is banking on Jokowi’s influence and Jokowi has actively engaged the ground. Between 30 December 2023 and 31 January 2024, Jokowi spent nine days in these two provinces during which he inaugurated local infrastructure projects and distributed social assistance (Bansos) to the underprivileged.

Jokowi’s actions pose a significant challenge to Ganjar-Mahfud and more specifically, the PDI-P. He is not only working to boost Prabowo-Gibran’s electability in these regions but is also securing critical pockets of PDI-P votes for the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), which his younger son Kaesang Pangarep has headed since last October. PSI did not receive sufficient votes to join the national Parliament (DPR) in 2019 but there is a chance this assist from the president may tip the balance this year.

Challenges to Prabowo-Gibran have also come from their two opponents who since last December have appeared to be coordinating at least some of their campaign strategies. One way of indicating this informal alliance is their refraining from attacking each other, especially during the three debates where the presidential candidates spoke. Anies and Ganjar warmly greeted each other at the final debate round on 4 February. There have been minimal confrontations between the two camps. Furthermore, the two camps are not aggressively competing in each other’s strongholds.

Team AMIN has not heavily campaigned in Central Java or Yogyakarta, while Ganjar-Mahfud have not conducted intensive campaigns in West Java, Banten, or Jakarta. In a face-off, Team AMIN will conclude its campaign with a rally at Jakarta International Stadium (JIS), built during Anies’ governorship while Prabowo-Gibran will end their campaign at Gelora Bung Karno (GBK) stadium, also in Jakarta.

Ganjar-Mahfud will conclude their campaign in Solo (Surakarta), which has deep symbolism as it is not only Jokowi’s hometown and where he used to be mayor but also Gibran’s turf, since he is now Solo mayor. Solo is a PDI-P stronghold: in 2019, the party carried the city by gaining 59.54 per cent of the vote. This allowed PDI-P to control 30 of the 45 seats in Solo’s local parliament.

We are at less than a week from election day with the race too close to call. If these moves by civil society and Prabowo’s two opponents are successful, it is entirely possible that Team Prabowo-Gibran will not win outright on 14 February.

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