Rule by ‘Good People’ or Rule by Political Dynasties? Ethics and Moral Politics in Thailand

A new Cabinet under Paetongtarn Shinawatra has been sworn in but behind the notable shifts in portfolios, such as the inclusion of ministers from the Democrat Party and the exclusion of figures linked to Prawit Wongsuwan’s faction in the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP), a striking pattern of dynastic succession has emerged. This has earned the new Cabinet the nickname “sueb sandan” (hereditary cabinet), a term borrowed from the Netflix Thai drama “Master of the House”.

Chada Thaised, formerly a deputy interior minister, withdrew himself from the list proposed by Bhumjaithai and put forward his daughter, Sabeeda, as his replacement. Similarly, PPRP secretary-general Thammanat Prompao, formerly the minister of agriculture, was succeeded by his younger brother, Akkara Prompao, now deputy agriculture minister. In another instance, PPRP’s Atthakorn Sirilatthayakorn, the former deputy agriculture minister, was replaced by his father, Itthi. As the full Cabinet list (Figure 1) shows, no fewer than 11 of 36 ministers have relatives who were past cabinet appointment holders.

Figure 1. Familial Ties in the New Thai Cabinet

This wave of dynastic succession — the transfer of power or position within political families connected by blood or marriage — appears to be a direct response to new legal precedents set by the Constitutional Court’s verdict on 14 August. Then, the court ruled against then Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin for proposing Thaksin Shinawatra’s former lawyer and ex-convict, Pichit Chuenban, for appointment as Minister to the Prime Minister’s Office. Pichit had served six months in jail and was delisted by the Lawyers Council of Thailand for contempt of court related to an attempted bribery. Citing sections 160(4) and (5) of the Constitution, the court found Pichit’s nomination seriously breached or failed to comply with ethical standards, and that this reflected poorly on Srettha’s honesty and integrity, ultimately warranting his removal from office.

Yet, Srettha’s actions — and even Pichit’s questionable background — pale in comparison to the controversies surrounding Chada and Thammanat. Chada was arrested in 2003 on charges related to the murder of the secretary to former Pheu Thai MP Prasaeng Mongkolsiri, though he was acquitted two years later. Thammanat was arrested in Australia in 1993 for his involvement in a heroin smuggling case, served four years in prison, and was deported upon release. In 2021, the Constitutional Court dismissed a complaint challenging Thammanat’s fitness for office, ruling that his conviction in Australia was not recognised under Thai law. As for Atthakorn, after Pheu Thai decided to exclude the PPRP and reject its nominations, he had to field his father, Itthi, who is not formally affiliated with the PPRP, as his replacement.

The problem is not so much that these individuals would be deemed ineligible for office due to having served a sentence (Thammanat), been arrested (Chada), or potentially violated party regulations (Atthakorn). It is rather that the court may view their actions, as it did in Pichit’s case, as demonstrating a lack of honesty and integrity or as breaching ethical standards, for which the court has now come to serve as the final arbiter.

It is important to recall that Pichit’s imprisonment in 2008 alone did not automatically bar him from a cabinet appointment because he met two key conditions under the relevant sections of the Constitution: more than ten years had passed since his release and his imprisonment was for contempt of court, not a criminal sentence. Nevertheless, the Court still deemed Srettha’s nomination of Pichit inappropriate due to Pichit’s failure to meet the moral and ethical standards stipulated in two other clauses. Therefore, if Paetongtarn were to nominate individuals with similar issues, she could be at risk of meeting the same fate as Srettha. In such cases, appointing these individuals’ relatives instead helps to bypass formal restrictions and avert potential legal challenges, and ensures that power remains within the family.

The new premier Paetongtarn may be the perfect embodiment of this phenomenon, standing in for her father, who is no longer eligible to hold public office or join a political party, yet seems to maintain influence over the direction of her party and government.

Once again, dynastic politics has proliferated as an unintended consequence of formal rules and institutional arrangements designed to impose a moralistic vision of politics and rule by “good people”. In what some critics have described as a coup by technocrats, the 1997 constitutional reform aimed to cleanse Thai politics of corruption, violence, and money politics. The Constitution’s drafters sought to achieve this by introducing the party-list system, theoretically designed to allow morally upright and capable individuals to enter politics without resorting to vote-buying and other unsavoury practices. Independent agencies, including the Election Commission, the National Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Constitutional Court, were established to scrutinise politicians. Finally, the Senate, whose members were barred from joining political parties, was created to ensure the impartiality of these agencies and exercise paternalistic oversight over the lower house.

However, as political scientist Yoshinori Nishizaki pointed out in Dynastic Democracy, not only did these constitutional reformers fail to eradicate the ailments afflicting the Thai body politic, but they also inadvertently set the stage for their continuation through dynastic politics. The party-list system ended up being dominated by leaders of patronage factions and prominent political dynasties, while Senate positions were reserved for these leaders’ spouses. When dynastic politicians were struck down by independent agencies, whether through disqualification by the ECT or political bans following party dissolutions, their family members stepped in to fill their roles. Ironically, this arrangement often spared the politicians from public scrutiny and accountability, allowing them to continue exercising influence from the shadows and reaping undue rewards from offices held by their relatives.

The new premier Paetongtarn may be the perfect embodiment of this phenomenon, standing in for her father, who is no longer eligible to hold public office or join a political party, yet seems to maintain influence over the direction of her party and government. This phenomenon should serve to highlight the dangers and unintended consequences of enshrining vague and contested concepts like “evident integrity” and “ethical standards” into the Constitution as eligibility criteria for holding political office. This is especially when the criteria’s interpretation is left to judges who themselves may not meet these standards or the judicial code of conduct. Such practices undermine the separation of powers and erect barriers that, paradoxically, can only be overcome through dynastic and money politics, to the detriment of democratic pluralism and accountability.

It is no fault of Paetongtarn and her government that they must navigate Thailand’s current climate of judicial overreach, especially on matters of politicians’ alleged ethical violations barring them from holding office. Yet no one forced them to resort to family ties as a solution. “Nepo baby leaders” and dynastic successors are already rising due to the inherent advantages bestowed upon them by their family networks and legacies — why give them extra motivation to speed up this process?

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