Russia’s Critical Military Role in Myanmar’s Civil War

Given China’s outsized influence over the Myanmar government and the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) pitted against it, it is unsurprising that its intervention in the Southeast Asian country’s civil war has received much scrutiny.

Moscow may lack Beijing’s political influence, but its military assistance to Naypyidaw far outweighs that of China’s.

In particular, Russian-supplied air power, intelligence and tactical advice learned the hard way from its four-year war against Ukraine has contributed to the Myanmar military’s recent gains on the battleground.

Russia’s crucial role in Myanmar’s civil war was underscored in early February when Sergei Shoigu, President Vladimir Putin’s close confidant, paid a visit to Naypyidaw.

Shoigu, the former defence minister who oversaw Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, is currently Secretary of the Security Council. The council advises Putin on defence and security issues. He is increasingly the Kremlin’s point man on Asia, having made more trips to Asia than Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

Shoigu’s visit was important for Myanmar’s ruling junta, the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC), for two reasons.

First, he was the first high-level foreign official to visit the country since sham elections were conducted last December and January 2026 (the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party won an overwhelming victory after many opposition parties were banned from participating). In contrast to Western countries, Shoigu praised the elections and criticised those who sought to “impose false narratives about Myanmar’s isolation on the international stage”. He also thanked Myanmar for its “understanding” of its military campaign in Ukraine.

Second, the signing of a four-year military cooperation agreement consolidated Russia’s role as the SSPC’s most important defence partner.

The details of that agreement are secret. But given Russia’s past military assistance to the regime since the 2021 coup, it is not difficult to surmise its contents.

The most important area of bilateral defence cooperation is “military-technical assistance”, which is Russian shorthand for arms sales.  Since the early 2000s, Myanmar’s military has procured its most advanced weapon systems from Russia. It will want more, especially fighter jets and helicopters which have enabled it to maintain air superiority over anti-junta forces since the civil war erupted in 2021.

The military’s fleet of six Su-30 Flanker jets constitutes its most powerful aircraft. The last batch was delivered in December 2024. The Myanmar Air Force (MAF) has used these aircraft (as well as some provided by China) to bomb both military and civilian targets.

According to the opposition National Unity Government, the number of aerial attacks perpetrated by the military increased from 2,471 in 2024 to 4,881 in 2025.

Last year, the MAF became the first export customer for Russia’s new Mi-38 assault transport helicopters. These rotary-wing aircraft, together with other Russian-supplied helicopters, enable the Myanmar military to attack enemy forces and quickly insert reinforcements.

New fighter aircraft and helicopters are undoubtedly on the SSPC’s shopping list. But whether it can afford to pay for them, and whether Russia can spare them from its military operations in Ukraine, remains to be seen.

The most important area of bilateral defence cooperation is “military-technical assistance”, which is Russian shorthand for arms sales.

Drones are much cheaper than fast jets and helicopters, and here too, Russia has also been assisting Myanmar. Since launching its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has become a world expert in drone and anti-drone technologies.

Russia has equipped Myanmar with surveillance, combat and suicide drones.  These military grade drones are technically superior to the off-the-shelf hobby drones used by anti-government forces, which can easily be disabled by Russian-supplied anti-drone systems. Russia’s allies, China, Iran and Belarus, have also supplied the Myanmar military with drone technology.

But weapon systems are only part of Russia’s contribution to the SSPC’s recent military successes. Intelligence and tactical advice have also played a crucial role. These areas of cooperation will also have been on Shoigu’s agenda.

In 2025, Russia established a satellite imagery centre in Naypyidaw. Together with surveillance drones, satellite images provided by Moscow have given the military a much clearer picture of where to target enemy forces.

It also appears that Russia has been providing Myanmar’s military with tactical advice.

This has been transmitted from the Russian armed forces to its Myanmar counterpart through joint exercises. Last November, for instance, the Russian and Myanmar navies held their third round of exercises. According to one military observer, these drills have helped Myanmar’s navy learn how to resupply troops by sea and practice naval landings and offshore bombardments.

Myanmar’s army also appears to have adopted the Russian army’s use of “meat assaults”: waves of infantry attacks on Ukrainian defensive positions which have resulted in astonishingly high casualty rates among Russian troops (the 325,000 Russian soldiers estimated to have been killed in the conflict is twice that of Ukrainian casualties, and five times bigger than all Russian/ Soviet casualties suffered since World War II). Myanmar’s use of human wave attacks has been made possible since the introduction of conscription in 2024, which has swelled the army’s ranks by nearly 100,000 soldiers.

But as coup leader and SSPC chairman General Ming Aung Hlaing has acknowledged, a meat grinder approach to the conflict will not ensure success on the battlefield. As he exhorted the graduating class at the country’s Defence Services Academy last year, above all, victory depends on “air superiority, electronic warfare dominance and the precision of modern weaponry”.

In return for military contracts, labour, investment opportunities and support for its war of aggression against Ukraine, Russia stands ready to help the SSPC in the pursuit of its brutal vision of victory.

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