Sino-Japan Spat: Triple Dilemma Needs Trust-Building ASEAN Response

The dispute between China and Japan has intensified, after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks in November, saying that Japan might intervene in a Taiwan contingency. In January, China slapped sanctions on 20 Japanese companies and organisations over dual-use technologies. It has criticised Japan’s deployment of Type-03 surface-to-air missiles (SAM) on the southwestern island of Yonaguni, which, at 100 nautical miles from Taiwan, is Japan’s nearest territory to the island that China considers a rump province.

From a military-technical standpoint, there are few immediate security reasons for China to kick up a fuss over the Type-03 SAMs, given that they are defensive weapons. The missiles, with estimated ranges of 50km, will not threaten Chinese military forces engaged in operations against Taiwan. China’s broader concern, however, is that these missiles will form part of a growing Japanese defensive system in the country’s sprawling southwestern islands.

Indeed, the Type-03 SAMs and a vast network of other anti-ship and anti-air assets in Japan’s southwest island chain could potentially curtail and deter Chinese forces involved in any military operations against Taiwan in a contingency. Takuya Matsuda and Elliot S. Ji note that this would complicate China’s “operational planning by denying a quick and decisive victory”. The PLA would need to contend with Japan’s anti-ship and anti-air capabilities in any amphibious assault of Taiwan.

These concerns have also been intensified by China’s recent irritation over PM Takaichi’s remark on a Taiwan contingency, particularly her suggestion that Japan could activate its military in defence of an ally — the US — if US forces come under attack in such a scenario. Although Takaichi’s comments were not entirely new, Chinese officials and scholars have told one of the authors that Beijing takes offence as PM Takaichi gave her remarks in her capacity as a sitting prime minister, while other Japanese leaders gave their Taiwan remarks when they were no longer prime minister. Moreover, the remarks were delivered publicly in the Japanese Diet.

Altogether, Japan’s deployment of the SAMs intensifies Chinese perceptions that Japan has returned to militarism. Speaking recently, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi noted that Japanese militarism once used the pretext of a ‘crisis of survival’ to launch aggression against other countries.

This Chinese perception may be deeply rooted in the immense suffering it endured under Imperial Japan during World War II. That said, many Southeast Asian countries do not share China’s take on the issue. In successive editions of ISEAS’ State of Southeast Asia Survey, Japan has consistently been perceived by the region’s thought leaders as a trusted and reliable partner of ASEAN. Speaking at the 60th anniversary of Japan-Singapore relations, Singapore PM Lawrence Wong took a measured tone on Japan and the issue of wartime history. His perspective is reflective of Southeast Asian views.

… while ASEAN member countries understand China’s perspective on Japanese militarism, they have a more nuanced view: Chinese concerns about Japan’s return to militarism do not preclude ASEAN states from working with and engaging Japan.

Differences in perceptions between China and Southeast Asian countries notwithstanding, the spectre of Sino-Japanese tensions — and the possibility of conflict — would affect Southeast Asian countries. While Southeast Asia has been deeply integrated economically with both China and Japan, particularly through regional supply chains, Taiwan straddles major sea lanes connected to the region. It is estimated that more than 700,000 Southeast Asians live and work on the island.

And the dispute is unlikely to fizzle out anytime soon. There are three dilemmas here. First, there is the security dilemma between China and Japan, whereby defensive preparations undertaken by one are seen to be offensive by the other, leading to arms buildups and a vicious cycle. Second, Japan’s alliance with the US means that in the event that the US does decide to intervene in a Taiwan contingency, Tokyo has little choice but to support its long-standing ally. Third, the US’s strategic intentions towards Taiwan are ambiguous, leaving allies uncertain about the trajectory of the US in a Taiwan contingency.

In the context of rising geostrategic tensions over Northeast Asia, ASEAN chalked up a historic first in 2022, in the wake of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island. The visit led to large-scale PLA exercises around the island, sparking tensions. In a first-ever communique on the issue, ASEAN called for restraint on all sides. Nonetheless, ASEAN can do more.

For one, it should underscore to China that, while ASEAN member countries understand China’s perspective on Japanese militarism, they have a more nuanced view: Chinese concerns about Japan’s return to militarism do not preclude ASEAN states from working with and engaging Japan. Put differently, it is necessary to draw a clearer distinction between Japan’s historical legacy and the rationale for its current strategic trajectory. In the long run, this could help China and Japan take an initial step toward building strategic trust.

At the same time, ASEAN has little to offer if China takes the road of offensive operations against Taiwan. The resolution of the Taiwan question is largely in the hands of bigger powers such as China, Japan and the US. Even so, ASEAN should do its utmost to impress upon China and Japan that any shot fired in anger across the Strait would have incalculable impacts on the region. In a sign that the dispute is unlikely to peter out anytime soon, China has reportedly been trying to get Southeast Asian countries to take its side. This makes it more important for Southeast Asian countries to convey to Beijing their more nuanced perspectives on the Taiwan issue.

At a time when wars are raging in Europe and the Middle East, another conflagration in the Asia-Pacific is the last thing ASEAN countries need.

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