Southeast Asia must Prepare for Trump’s ‘Everything’s on the Table’ Approach to Trade

The nations of Southeast Asia have thus far been spectators as President Trump has rolled out punitive trade actions at breakneck speed. Mexico, Canada, and China found themselves first in the firing line, while a mini-trade war with Colombia flared up and was extinguished within a day or so. Across the Atlantic, Trump has warned his EU counterparts that he would “absolutely” be hitting them with tariffs as well.

Although Southeast Asia has benefitted from benign neglect from Trump during his first weeks in office, that will not continue. The large trade surpluses enjoyed by several countries in the region, especially Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, will inevitably put them on Trump’s radar screen. Vietnam is most exposed; its US$124 billion trade surplus with the US trails only China (US$295 billion) and Mexico (US$172 billion).

While economic issues such as trade balances will undoubtedly be front and centre on Trump’s trade agenda, there is considerably more for Southeast Asian nations to be concerned about.  Countries in the region should be prepared to feel US pressure — frequently in the form of tariff threats — on a much wider set of issues. Trump views access to the US market as a weapon that can be wielded to extract concessions from partners on virtually any issue, however big or small. Trump’s approach to trade is: everything’s on the table.

Consider what we have already seen. Mexico, Canada, and China were targeted first and foremost for illegal immigration and drugs. The mini-trade war with Colombia was launched over a dispute concerning US military aircraft being used to transport Colombian deportees. Trump’s musings over his desire to “acquire” Greenland or reassert control over the Panama Canal have also included explicit or implicit tariffs threats.

The through-line on all these issues is that they have nothing to do with trade.

Regional leaders should understand how Trump’s “everything’s on the table” approach is likely to play out in Southeast Asia.

The high degree of economic integration that Southeast Asian countries enjoy with China could also bring unwanted attention.

Although he most frequently raises this issue in the context of NATO, Trump has made it clear that he views US security arrangements with other countries in similar terms to an organised crime boss: you have to pay for protection. He has even proposed that the US should take control of Ukrainian natural resources as “payback” for US support for its war effort against Russia.

The US of course also has security commitments in Southeast Asia. Naval altercations between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea have grown in intensity. The Philippines is a treaty ally of the US, meaning that the US would be obligated to come to the defense of the Philippines in case of military conflict.

In Trump’s worldview, maintaining this “protection” should require a “payment” from the Philippines, and tariffs — along with pressure on the Philippines to dramatically step up its own defense spending — would be one of the first options considered. Expect Trump to float these ideas the next time there is a skirmish.

The high degree of economic integration that Southeast Asian countries enjoy with China could also bring unwanted attention. Trump’s team harbours real or imagined suspicions that countries in the region are complicit in assisting China’s circumvention of technology restrictions. The recent US probe into the possibility that DeepSeek, China’s breakthrough AI start-up, obtained banned chips through third parties in Singapore could be just the beginning. Other countries could find themselves coming under similar scrutiny. Should compelling evidence emerge, expect a punishing trade response from the US. Southeast Asian participation in BRICS could also heighten Washington’s suspicion about the region’s “complicity” with China.

Perhaps most shockingly, the firewall that has traditionally existed between official US government policy and the private business dealings of a company associated with the US president might no longer be inviolable.

The Trump Organisation signed an agreement last October with a Vietnamese real estate developer on a US$1.5 billion dollar golf course in Vietnam. To be emphatically clear, there is no evident quid pro quo involving preferential treatment for Vietnam. But the appearance of impropriety can be as damaging as the reality. The fact that the development is in the home province of the Vietnamese Communist Party chief and that Trump himself flew to Vietnam for the signing does not ease suspicions. It has also not escaped attention that Trump is the first president who has declined to voluntarily obey a law which bans US government officials from business dealings that could affect government policy.

Southeast Asia was spared in the initial flurry of Trumpian trade actions, but no one should breathe a sigh of relief. Trump is introducing an expansive and unprecedented set of non-trade issues into trade relations. This wider net will inevitably entangle Southeast Asia.

There is much discussion over whether Trump views tariffs merely as a negotiating ploy. This discussion largely misses the point.  Yes, they are a negotiating tactic, but no one should take them any less seriously. Should the desired concessions not be forthcoming, the self-proclaimed “tariff man” will be perfectly happy to aim his tariff cannon at countries in the region.

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