Flags from the member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on display at the ASEAN Solidarity Exercise Natuna 2023 in Batam, on 20 September 2023. (Photo by Bay ISMOYO / AFP)

The State of Southeast Asia Survey

State of Southeast Asia Survey 2024: ASEAN’s Rise to Leadership Amid Global Uncertainties

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The report card for ASEAN according to the latest State of Southeast Asia Survey is mixed, but in a difficult global climate, the regional organisation is seen to be making progress even as several areas need improvement.

ASEAN faces criticism on multiple fronts, including its perceived slow or inadequate responses to regional problems such as the Myanmar crisis, the South China Sea disputes, and transboundary haze. Additionally, it struggles with managing disparities in wealth and development among ASEAN member states (AMS) and lacks enforcement mechanisms to advance many of its groundbreaking regional agendas, including liberalising trade and facilitating the legal movement of people.

However, amidst these harsh critiques, Southeast Asia’s opinion leaders appear more optimistic about ASEAN’s potential ability to navigate today’s complex global uncertainties.

The latest State of Southeast Asia Survey 2024 (SSEA 2024) by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute sought respondents’ evaluation of ASEAN’s performance over the past year. SSEA 2024 canvassed 1,994 respondents from all ten AMS. Instead of narrowly focusing on ASEAN’s performance across different dimensions of political-security, economic, and socio-cultural cooperation, the survey assessed ASEAN’s performance relative to other major players based on opinion leaders’ perceptions. The survey results highlight one crucial observation: when compared to other countries/regional organisations, ASEAN performs relatively well. In fact, it enjoyed a significant rise in positive perceptions this year.

Although China remains the most influential economic power for the majority of Southeast Asian elites (Figure 1), 67.4 per cent of respondents expressed concerns about its expanding regional influence. Only 16.8 per cent of respondents considered ASEAN the most influential economic power, but this is a slight improvement from 15 per cent in the 2023 survey. Within the group that chose ASEAN, the majority (59 per cent) welcome ASEAN’s growing regional influence.

Figure 1. In your view, which country/regional organisation is the most influential economic power in Southeast Asia?

Source: The State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey Report, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

The regional respondents harbour hope that ASEAN can balance China’s growing influence against the looming spectre of fragmented international trade. This is particularly true as the respondents think that ASEAN is the most prominent actor in championing global free trade (Figure 2), with 29.7 per cent expressing confidence in its leadership. This marks a clear increase from 23.5 per cent in the 2023 survey, reaffirming the region’s support for an ASEAN-led robust and open multilateral trading system.

Figure 2. In whom do you have the most confidence to champion the global free trade agenda?

Source: The State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey Report, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

ASEAN’s endeavours for deeper economic integration and development within the region through initiatives such as the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework (DEFA), are perceived positively. By fostering intra-regional trade and investment and diversifying trade agreements, ASEAN reduces AMS’ reliance on a particular trade partner and provides greater stability in a more unpredictable future global market. ASEAN’s neutral stance amidst the escalating economic rivalry between the US and China also seems to have benefited the region. Both superpowers have increased trade with the region and are competing to provide development finance and technological access.

A similar pattern is observed in responses to the question regarding which country or regional organisation is the most influential political and strategic power (Figure 3). China retained its status at the top this year, but its growing influence continues to concern regional opinion leaders. ASEAN surprisingly marked a notable improvement this year, with 6.9 per cent increase in respondents choosing it.  

Figure 3. In your view, which country/regional organisation has the most political and strategic influence in Southeast Asia?

Source: The State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey Report, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

One plausible explanation for ASEAN’s improvement could be its adept response to global challenges post-pandemic. 2023 was characterised by notable global developments, including sharper shifts in geopolitical dynamics, a more fragmented global economy, and security challenges with the wild card of the Israel-Gaza conflict thrown in after 7 October 2023. Throughout these trying circumstances, ASEAN demonstrated its moderating role in mitigating tensions. For instance, it continued to work towards an open multilateral trade system by adopting more trade agreements, embarking on a regional digital agreement, respecting international law, and bolstering regional resilience against external threats. One notable collective signal was the first ASEAN joint military drill in the Natuna Sea conducted last September. Such actions likely contributed to the respondents’ improved perception of ASEAN’s strategic importance and regional position.

Given the increasing confidence in ASEAN’s emergence as a reliable player in the regional arena, it becomes imperative to examine its prospects critically.

Another factor could be traced to the US’ decline in strategic influence within the region, down from 31.9 per cent last year to 25.8 per cent this year. The escalating US-China rivalry has prompted American protectionism, as evidenced by measures such as the Inflation Reduction Act, the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act, the imposition of tariffs on Chinese automobile imports, and restrictions on certain semiconductor chip exports to China made with US equipment. Given the interconnectedness of ASEAN’s supply chain with China’s, opinion leaders in ASEAN expressed concerns that US protectionism may have serious spillover effects in the region.

The US’ pro-Israel stance in the conflict in Gaza has led to a perceived decline in US strategic influence in the region. This is true especially among ASEAN’s three Muslim-majority countries, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. With over 40 per cent of ASEAN’s population being Muslim, many in the region strongly support the Palestinian cause. This perceived imbalance in the US’ position on the ongoing conflict could further negatively impact perceptions of the US’ strategic role in the region.

However, the US still maintains its status as the region’s preferred advocate for maintaining a rules-based order and upholding international law, with a steady approval rating of 27.9 per cent, consistent with the 2023 survey. Meanwhile, confidence in ASEAN’s leadership to maintain the rules-based order has significantly increased, rising from 21.0 per cent (2023) to 26.9 per cent this year. This positions ASEAN as the second favoured choice and second most trusted partner to lead in maintaining the rules-based order, displacing the European Union which was second-placed last year (Figure 4).

Figure 4. In whom do you have the most confidence to provide leadership to maintain the rules-based order and uphold international law?

Source: The State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey Report, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Given the increasing confidence in ASEAN’s emergence as a reliable player in the regional arena, it becomes imperative to examine its prospects critically. If ASEAN is perceived as a “life raft” in a more troubled world, then more realistic assessments of its role are necessary. On the economic front, the region must evaluate whether it can evolve into the new production powerhouse of the world, to influence global companies’ diversification of supply chains, and stimulate sluggish intra-trade and regional investments to hedge against global economic uncertainties. Equally significant is the push for finding workable responses to mitigate the Myanmar crisis and the South China Sea dispute, and develop contingency planning for potentially affected ASEAN countries in a Taiwan conflict scenario. The geopolitical challenge is harder to surmount: when ASEAN is scrutinised on its overall performance, the SSEA 2024 results highlight that ASEAN elites are still discontented with the organisation’s sluggish and ineffective responses to dynamic developments.  

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Melinda Martinus is the Lead Researcher in Socio-cultural Affairs at the ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.