Thai-Cambodian Crisis Has Given the Thai Military a Boost

Despite a fragile July ceasefire, this year’s Thai-Cambodian border crisis enhanced the Thai military’s informal authority over governmental decision-making powers, providing a stimulus for severely weakening Thai civilian control. 

Civil-military relations refer to the distribution of decision-making authority between military and civilian elites in five decision-making areas: elite recruitment (filling political leadership roles), public policy, internal security, national defence, and military organisation. Full civilian control exists when civilians enjoy uncontested power in all five areas.  Civilian control is mandatory for liberal democracy, which, in Thailand, has been hindered by authoritarian institutions, a series of coups, and rendered defective.

The year 2023 and succeeding events appeared promising for civilian control and democracy in Thailand. Then, the military allowed an elected civilian government to take office. Thus far, it has managed to avoid a coup. This, however, obscured power imbalances between civilian and military leaderships, which became most visible in the country’s borderlands.

Thailand’s borderlands have long been effectively under martial law (giving soldiers control over border policy and limiting civilian control), with soldiers only broadly supporting government-formulated National Security Council directives.  Moreover, the military has often claimed security considerations (for example, protecting the monarchy) to undermine civilian authority (for example, ignoring cabinet decisions and the conduct of coups).

The 2024-2025 Thai-Cambodia sea/ land border crisis provided this opportunity. The roots of the crisis stem from a panoply of factors: unfinished border demarcation, nationalism, economic interest, and historical political instability. Though the conflict did not arise from Thai military attempts to undermine civilian authority, it did parallel a gradual weakening in civilian control.

Thailand’s already frail civilian control began diminishing in December 2024 after Thailand’s Navy Commander undermined Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra by rejecting a government-approved 2001 maritime border agreement and stating that the disputed Koh Kood island belonged to Thailand.

Then, February 2025 saw the Thai military undermining civilian control again, when Cambodians sang a nationalist hymn along the Thai-Cambodian land frontier. Instead of consulting the government for direction, Thai Second Army Region Commander Lieutenant-General Boonsin Padklang formally protested against the event.

General Boonsin is particularly powerful because he hails from pre-cadet academy Class 26, as does royally connected Army Commander General Pana Klaeoplodtuk. This indicates  camaraderie between the two generals. Pana’s military faction/ network is loyal only to royalty. The faction dominates Thailand’s military, which is suspicious of Thaksin and his lieutenants. With several coups under its belt, this “Wongthewan (royal progeny)” faction represents a structural threat to civilian control.  

On 28 May, following a Thai-Cambodian border clash that killed a Cambodian soldier, Paetongtarn immediately urged calm and de-escalation. But on 3 June, General Boonsin broke ranks with his prime minister and further undermined civilian control. He announced that he would only recognise a Royal Thai Survey Department border map (which is more favorable to Thailand) and not the one used by the Thai-Cambodia Joint Boundary Commission.

On 5 June, the Thai Army defied the government’s de-escalation attempts by launching a militaristic rhetoric dissemination campaign, entitled “Thais are peace-loving but not cowards when at war.” The media campaign appeared designed to encourage public support for the military, so that it would have a freer rein in its actions against Cambodia.

The next day, Paetongtarn held a National Security Council meeting, afterwards stating, “The military has confirmed readiness for any scenario … but clashes will cause damage, so we will pursue peaceful means. She added that the “government and military (will) work together.” At any rate, Paetongtarn’s entreaties appeared to fall on deaf ears, with the Army’s subsequent announcement of upping readiness “for a high-level military operation.”

Civilian control was again thwarted on 7 June when Thailand’s army began limiting the opening times of several Thai-Cambodian border checkpoints. Amidst the army’s growing assertiveness, Paetongtarn reaffirmed her peace and dialogue commitment between Thailand and Cambodia.

It was at this point that she engaged in her now-(in)famous 15 June phone conversation with Cambodian strongman Hun Sen. The call, which was recorded by the Cambodian government, revealed increasing difficulties in Thai civil-military relations. She told Hun Sen that “people from the opposite side” such as General Boonsin might have made comments that might make him “angry”, but stressed that the Thai general wanted to “look cool”. Paetongarn told Hun Sen that all she wanted was “peace”.

Paetongtarn’s comments were considered traitorous by Thai military elements, right-wing groups, and Hun Sen. Before the clip was revealed, a royal entourage (including a Privy Councillor) delivered gifts to border-based Thai soldiers and met with General Boonsin on 16 June The message seemed clear: the palace supported the military hard line rather than civilian control.

The roots of the crisis stem from a panoply of factors: unfinished border demarcation, nationalism, economic interest, and historical political instability.  Though the conflict did not arise from Thai military attempts to undermine civilian authority, it did parallel a gradual weakening in civilian control.

On 18 June, Bhumjaithai Party resigned from the coalition. On 1 July, the judiciary opened an ethics investigation of Paetongtarn, temporarily forcing her from office until it made a decision.  

Taken together, the military now appears to have more operational latitude; it is also backed by popular legitimacy. When Thai soldiers were injured by landmines along the border on 16 July, General Boonsin threatened military retaliation, stating, “There is no need to wait for orders from the government.” Army Commander Pana supported General Boonsin, stating that the current state of play justified retaliation.

Following a similar incident on 23 July, General Boonsin ordered further closures of border crossings.  On 24 July, hostilities erupted and Thailand’s army proactively assumed effective control over directing the conflict, while civilian leaders became passive.  Thereupon Army Commander Pana readied a war plan against Cambodia and, on 25 July, the Thai army instituted martial law in parts of Chanthaburi and Trat provinces. Though civilians negotiated a 28 July ceasefire, gunfire only ceased following a meeting of Thai-Cambodian senior military brass on 29 July. Clearly, this meant that civilians can broker ceasefires, but the Thai Army has to agree to them for any ceasefire to hold.

Ultimately, 2025 has thus far witnessed enhanced Thai military power vis-à-vis civilian authority, particularly in areas such as border and foreign policy and national defence. In the crisis’ aftermath, Thailand’s military possesses heightened powers and popularity. With allies in conservative political parties and the palace, there are also more opportunities for the military to undermine civilian control. After all, governmental policymaking could be increasingly ignored or dictated by military officers. If proper civil-military relations are premised on civilian control of the military, the current state of affairs does not bode well for the future of the current government or Thai democracy.

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