Thai-Cambodian Spat: Private Pathways to State Conflict

The roots of the 2025 flare-up between Thailand and Cambodia will never be fully known. Different interpretations of the border position, overlapping historical territorial claims, and ethnonationalist emotions are all permissive causes that offered the potential for mishap at the tactical level and escalation at the strategic level. However, these conditions prevailed for 14 peaceful years following the International Court of Justice’s 2011 intervention in the case of the temple of Preah Vihear/Phra Viharn. So why did the dispute remilitarise in July 2025?

Another explanation for the resumption of conflict revolves around the commercial ties between Thaksin Shinawatra and Hun Sen. The relationship between the two men is known and pivotal. A rupture was triggered on 15 June, when a leaked clip showed Thaksin’s daughter and then Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn attempting to resolve border tensions through her family’s personal channels with Hun Sen. About 10 days later, on 26 June, while speaking to displaced Cambodian citizens in Preah Vihear Province near the border, Hun Sen spoke of an alleged betrayal by the Shinawatra family. Thereafter, Hun Sen and Thaksin had a bitter and public row. Amidst a sharp deterioration in official relations and angry nationalist sentiment, the Thai military took control, leading to the outbreak of conflict on 24 July. 

Why did Hun Sen feel short-changed by Thaksin? The pair had a long history of political and economic collaboration. This could have raised expectations which were subsequently left unmet. This fuelled some anger. One possibility is that there were unmet kleptocratic goals. After all, there is a precedent of disagreement over cross-border illicit trade morphing into a shooting war. A pertinent example here is the 1987–88 disagreement between Thai rangers and Lao militia over the commission Thai loggers were being charged to access Lao timber. This probably helped spur the Thailand-Laos conflict at Ban Rom Klao.

This possibility must be considered because cross-border business has long been a part of Thaksin’s style. When he was prime minister (2001–2006), his foreign policy was characterised by an “interlocking of business and politics”, especially regarding neighbouring countries. For example, in 2003, Thaksin signed air travel agreements with Cambodia, Singapore and Brunei. His government subsequently approved the commencement of budget airline AirAsia’s operations in Thailand. Only after the deal was done was it revealed that Thaksin’s own company, Shin Corp, had a 50 per cent share in what became Thai AirAsia. Consequently, suspicions that Thaksin, and later his proxies, were seeking personal enrichment through various joint initiatives with Cambodia, mobilised the anti-Thaksin Yellow Shirts who flocked to the temple and propelled the 2008-2011 conflict. The initiatives included the demarcation of the Thai-Cambodian maritime boundary and the joint UNESCO World Heritage registration of the Preah Vihear/Phra Vihear temple.

Hun Sen was reported to be angry.  After all, the Cambodian had been the first official visitor to Thaksin’s residence after Thaksin had returned after a 17-year exile in August 2023, and Thaksin’s party PT had just won government.

In recent times, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) regime has also combined foreign relations and business, with its patronage network increasingly dependent on the proceeds of crime, mostly from Chinese-origin transnational criminals. Consequently, Cambodia has become home to new business communities that have developed symbiotic relations with the CPP system.

Thailand is also part of this picture. In 2025, journalist Tom Wright exposed a money trail connecting ill-gotten profits from Cambodian criminal enterprises, including scam centres, with Thai financial institutions. Wright’s investigations compelled the October resignation of Thai deputy prime minister and former banker Vorapak Tanyawong. 

Two figures were central in engineering these cross-border machinations, and they link Hun Sen and Thaksin. One of them is Yim Leak, son of powerful CPP Vice-Chair and Deputy Prime Minister Yim Chhaily. Yim has access to elite Thai circles via his marriage to Visnie Thepcharoen, a Thai real estate scion. The other figure is Leak’s Thai-based partner Benjamin Mauerberger, a South African–born businessman who had settled in Thailand after the 1997 financial crisis. Thaksin likely met Mauerberger in Dubai. When Thaksin returned to Thailand, Mauerberger became an unofficial advisor to the Pheu Thai (PT) government cabinet, providing advice on crypto and casino policies. In 2024, Mauerberger was appointed an adviser to Hun Sen. Mauerberger and Leak are partners in the scam centre business, including the one at Long Bay.

Potentially relevant to the Hun Sen–Thaksin breakup and descent into war was Mauerberger’s conniving around the Thai energy company Bangchak in 2024. He used a Singaporean fund management firm to buy US$100 million in shares, about 20 per cent of Bangchak, and then sold them to another company he controlled. Then, the plan was to buy the Thai government’s 35 per cent share and wait for the PT government to secure a Thai-Cambodian treaty for joint development of maritime resources in the disputed area of the Gulf of Thailand. The plan was unsuccessful because the Thailand Social Security Fund, which owned a 14 per cent stake in Bangchak, refused to sell. 

Hun Sen was reported to be angry. After all, the Cambodian had been the first official visitor to Thaksin’s residence after Thaksin had returned after a 17-year exile in August 2023, and Thaksin’s party PT had just won the government. Hun Sen might have expected more from the confluence of events, and was ultimately disappointed. This cannot be ascertained conclusively. But the broader lesson is that amongst patronalistic states, such as those in mainland Southeast Asia, there are feasible pathways for private interests to lead to state conflict.

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