Thailand’s Army White Paper: Heat is on to Supply the RTA

In July 2024, the Royal Thai Army (RTA) published its first White Paper, which has the potential to influence its procurement strategy and spur competition among military hardware suppliers. Already, it has motivated feuding for contracts abroad and at home. Nevertheless, the Paper is unlikely to affect Thailand’s military alliances or reshape its geopolitical positioning with major powers such as China and the US.

Notably, the Paper was not guided by civilians but rather by Army Commander General Jaroenchai Hintao and Chief of Staff General Pana Klaewblaudtuk, who succeeded Jaroenchai in October 2024.  The two are close to the palace. Their royalist security proposal became an “RTA 5.0” vision for a new Royal Thai Army Development Plan (2025-2037), meant to confront domestic instability (such as riots) and geopolitical threats by developing 19 capabilities as a means of establishing the RTA as “a powerful, modern army”, “trusted by the people”, and “one of the leading armies in the region”. The 19 capabilities require state-of-the-art equipment to vastly strengthen the RTA against vaguely worded internal/external security threats until 2027. To address these threats, the Paper sought a laundry list of military kit: modern attack and patrol helicopters, tanks, armoured vehicles, transport aircraft, cutting-edge drones, territorial monitoring systems, communication/intelligence hardware, and advanced radar.

The White Paper’s publication and ambiguous wording have accelerated competition, which has already been growing for the past few years among international sources to provision the RTA, including China, the US, and others. In a three-decade period (1957-1987), the US was Thailand’s military procurement patron. The RTA bought multiple M48 and M60 main battle tanks, V100, V150, and M113 armoured personnel carriers and UH-1N Twin Huey helicopters.

But as the Cold War wound down in 1987, cheaper prices, expedited delivery terms (despite lower quality), and hedging trends in Thai foreign policy led Thailand to partly shift towards China for weaponry. This resulted in the RTA’s procurement of Chinese Type 59 main battle tanks and Type YW-531H (Type 85) armoured personnel carriers. Thirty years later, this equipment was obsolete. Thus, by 2021, Beijing had delivered 111 VN-1 armoured infantry fighting vehicles, and, by 2023, 60 VT-4 main battle tanks to the RTA. In 2023, the RTA became the first purchaser of four Chinese-made military drones. In 2024, the RTA adopted Chinese QBZ-195T rifles, making Thailand the first state outside China to do so. Traditionally, Thailand had mostly used US M16A4 and M4 rifles, but its decision to purchase Chinese small arms reflected a move towards diversifying sources.

Meanwhile, the US, to counter Chinese influence and strengthen ties with the RTA, has sought to continue satisfying the RTA’s procurement preferences. This has come principally through Washington’s sale of 130 Stryker M1126 Infantry Carrier Vehicles (ICVs) from 2019-2021 at a cost of 9.1 billion baht (US$261.1 million). Of the 130, the US gave 23 Strykers “for free”. The Stryker deal offset the RTA’s interest in China’s VH1s.  Similarly, in 2024, the RTA began receiving eight US Boeing AH-6 Little Bird light attack helicopters, which were meant to replace ageing AH-1F Cobra helicopters.

The RTA has other options besides purchasing hardware from China and the US. It relies on smaller international procurement suppliers like Germany, Russia, Sweden, and the UK. Moscow sold the RTA four Ka-32A11BCs and 10 Mi-17-V5 helicopters, though the procurement stopped following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet the RTA wants to keep China and the US at the top of its list of procurement sourcing partners, if only to boost ties with them.

Beijing has an advantage over Washington in supplying the RTA because of lower costs, quicker delivery, and lack of conditionality. However, the Pentagon has longer ties with the RTA, which has tended to prefer US hardware.

A second option is to further develop a domestic army industry, a policy championed by the Pheu Thai-led government and Thailand’s principal opposition party, the People’s Party. This would increase the number of jobs and boost economic self-reliance at home. The leading Thai weapons company is multi-billion-dollar Chaiseri Metal and Rubber Company. Another Thai company, Sahapipatthanakua, joined Israel’s EMTAN, under a DTI joint venture called Weapons Manufacturing Industry, producing multiple small arms in Thailand.

These two arms procurement options were likely motivated by RTA security interests and the interests of some senior RTA officials in obtaining commissions.

Ultimately, the publication of the 2024 RTA White Paper is important, clarifying to senior RTA officers, Thai politicians, and procurement providers exactly what Thailand’s army will be purchasing in upcoming years. The document has also encouraged competition to source procurement abroad and at home.

But in the future, China and the US will likely remain leading arms suppliers. As one journalist puts it, the RTA feels “compelled to prioritise purchasing ‘war toys’” from its two patrons, if only to keep them content. Moreover, RTA standard operating procedures in procurement have long been integrated with Washington and Beijing. Lastly, and allegedly, overpriced US and Chinese hardware benefits certain senior army officers in terms of kickbacks. In 2017, for example, it was reported that there was complicity in the acquisition of a US-made surveillance blimp.

Beijing has an advantage over Washington in supplying the RTA because of lower costs, quicker delivery, and lack of conditionality. However, the Pentagon has longer ties with the RTA, which has tended to prefer US hardware. Meanwhile, as the RTA is unencumbered by outside oversight, it can easily partner with domestic businesses to advance Thailand’s defence industry. As a result, opportunities for profit-making and malfeasance among RTA officers could grow.

Over the next three years, RTA procurement will likely soar, paralleling growth in its budget and size. Still, high levels of procurement do not necessarily produce operational effectiveness against threats to the crown or kingdom. Though under de jure civilian control, the RTA will likely remain a mostly autonomous, well-armed regional security actor (ranked third in ASEAN) and an arch-royalist guardian of the status quo.

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