Thailand’s “Conservative” Turn?

Thailand’s Bhumjaithai Party (BJT) became the first openly pro-establishment, pro-conservative party in recent memory to win the most seats in an election held alongside a constitutional referendum on 8 February 2026. Yet this outcome should not be read as a broad-based ideological shift among Thai voters towards conservative elements. Rather, it reflects the successful consolidation of a national electoral machine that cloaks itself in nationalist and technocratic rhetoric while drawing its real strength from localised patronage networks, elite backing, and privileged access to the state apparatus.

At first glance, BJT’s victory over the progressive People’s Party (PP) boils down to a single observation: this was not a reprise of the 2023 polls. That election was exceptional, coming after nine years under former junta leader General Prayut Chan-o-cha and in the immediate aftermath of an unprecedented youth-led pro-democracy movement that demanded sweeping reforms. In an election that effectively served as a referendum on the royalist-military status quo, Move Forward (MFP), PP’s predecessor, won by pledging to amend the lèse-majesté law and categorically ruling out any alliances with military-backed parties.

That reformist momentum was absent this time. Not only that, aside from an eleventh-hour royal audience that anointed Anutin Charnvirakul as Prayut’s legitimate conservative successor, the once-salient divide over the role and status of the country’s pillar institutions had faded. This shift resulted partly from the narrowing scope of permissible reform following MFP’s dissolution in 2024 over its proposed amendment to the lèse-majesté law, and partly from a series of elite compromises that hollowed out the ideological commitments parties once claimed to represent. Most consequential was PP’s vote to install Anutin as prime minister in 2025. Framed as a necessary “grand compromise”, the decision gutted the party’s reformist credentials by elevating a leader who embodies the very establishment interests the party had opposed.

But any attempt by PP to reinvigorate its base with another reformist platform would likely have proved futile. In the wake of the Thailand-Cambodia conflict, national security concerns had crowded out calls for reform. In this context, PP’s previous commitment to military reform became an outright liability as the armed forces it had openly criticised surged in popularity as the guardians of national sovereignty.

BJT, by contrast, positioned itself as a reliable partner of the military and struck a far tougher tone toward Cambodia than its rivals. At the party’s final rally, BJT leaders vowed to “restore Thailand’s pride and dignity on the world stage,” and Anutin went so far as promising to scrap the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding with Cambodia. The thrust of the campaign was clear: the previous Pheu Thai-led government had compromised Thailand’s sovereignty and standing, and only Anutin could set it right.

Nationalism, however, was merely one facet of BJT’s carefully curated image. Throughout Bangkok, campaign banners featured Anutin alongside technocrats he pledged to re-appoint to his cabinet — Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Ekniti Nitithanprapas, and Suphajee Suthumpun. Long dismissed as little more than an amalgam of provincial power brokers, the party had reinvented itself as a platform to give experts meaningful roles in shaping the country’s policy direction. This positioning likely made BJT more palatable to self-identified Thai conservatives who might otherwise have been reluctant to support a party still reliant on patronage and baan yai (powerful families which dominate politics at the local level).

Ultimately, Thailand’s conservative turn was less a wholesale ideological shift to the right than a reconfiguration of loosely assembled local alliances now unified only in their subordination to the country’s conservative establishment.

This shift is most clearly reflected in its party-list vote, which traditionally serves as a more reliable barometer of national appeal than the constituency tier, where outcomes are often shaped by candidate-centred campaigns and local dynamics. BJT’s vote share on the party list rose sharply from roughly 3 per cent in 2023 to nearly 19 per cent in 2026, a sixfold increase according to preliminary results. While significant, this remained well below PP’s 30.6 per cent of the party-list vote. In seat terms, the surge yielded only around 19 seats, a modest return compared with the 174 constituency seats it won. BJT became more popular at the national level, but not overwhelmingly so. Indeed, BJT became the first party in Thai history to win a general election without winning the party-list vote, underscoring a clear discrepancy between the party’s national popularity and the strength of its local candidates (See Figure 1).

Figure 1. Gaining Ground on National Appeal

One might argue that a rise in BJT’s national appeal was what boosted its performance in constituency races. But if that were the main driver, BJT would be expected to win constituency seats primarily where its party-list support was also strong. Instead, 116 of its 174 constituency victories came in places where another party topped the party-list vote. Its winning candidates averaged 53.31 per cent of the constituency vote, while the party’s average vote share in those same constituencies was just 25.65 per cent — a difference of 27.66 percentage points. In every constituency where it won, BJT’s constituency vote outpaced its party-list vote (See Figure 2).

Figure 2. BJT Leverages Strength of Constituency Candidates

BJT’s gains at the polls thus owed less to party popularity than to the strength of its candidates, most of whom campaigned on local rather than national issues. Indeed, as many as 61 incumbent MPs had switched in from other parties, and 44 of them succeeded in retaining their seats under BJT’s banner. The real achievement, then, lay in BJT’s ability to coordinate and consolidate local power bases — either by bringing baan yai figures under its umbrella or by striking accommodations with other parties to avoid fragmenting the constituency vote.

More broadly, whether BJT’s electoral success owed in part to the incumbency advantages effectively handed to Anutin by PP remains an open question. What is clear is that, ahead of the election, Anutin oversaw sweeping personnel appointments and transfers across the Ministry of Interior, specifically targeting provincial governors, deputy provincial governors, and district chiefs who comprised the exclusive pool from which election commission chairs were drawn across all 400 constituencies. Alongside widespread reports of electoral irregularities, these developments suggest that control over key administrative levers were not only exercised in organising and mobilising vote-canvassing operations, as is often the case, but may also have tilted the playing field in favour of the governing party.

Ultimately, Thailand’s conservative turn was less a wholesale ideological shift to the right than a reconfiguration of loosely assembled local alliances now unified only in their subordination to the country’s conservative establishment. Whether this proves to be a fragile or robust foundation will soon be tested as BJT confronts inevitable conflicts over the distribution of ministerial portfolios, policy concessions, and competing interests.

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