Thailand’s Deep South Policy: The Need for Justice

October 2024 marked the 20^th anniversary of the Tak Bai massacre in Thailand’s Deep South. With the 20-year statute of limitations set to expire on 25 October, the perpetrators of Tak Bai are likely to walk free, leaving behind wounds of injustice. This could undermine the reforms of the Pheu Thai (PT)-led government aimed at resolving the problems in the country’s south.

On 25 October 2004, seven protestors were killed by security forces, while 78 others suffocated or were crushed to death after being detained and crammed into army trucks. Twenty years on, Tak Bai remains part of the larger quandary that defines the conflict in the Deep South, which has continued to deteriorate despite past efforts at peacebuilding. Since its accession to office, the current PT-led government has attempted some reforms. Yet, these efforts have been and would continue to be compromised by persistent military resistance and unresolved grievances over cases like Tak Bai, which could spark further violence in the region.

Since January 2004, Thailand’s Deep South, a mostly Malay-Muslim-populated area consisting of the provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and parts of Songkhla, has been plagued by an upsurge in violence between insurgents and Thai security forces. Between 2004 and October 2024, there have been 22,737 incidents, including 7,632 dead. To date, the conflict has continued.

The overall insurrection, a secessionist rebellion and a reaction to the state’s attempts at forced assimilation, has lasted well over a hundred years. Yet in 2024 the situation in the south is mired in a stalemate. Currently, most of the Deep South is administered under an emergency decree, in effect since July 2005. The government is preparing to extend the Emergency Decree yet again — until January 2025. The decree gives soldiers enormous latitude to use force against and detain whoever it wants in the Deep South with almost complete legal impunity.

When the PT-led government took office in September 2023, it sought to make reforms in the state’s Deep South policy. Other leading political parties in Thailand’s Lower House of Parliament, such as the Move Forward Party (MFP, now People’s Party), did likewise. The state increased dialogue with the BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional) insurgent group, succeeding in establishing a framework for a Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace (JCPP) in 2024. This allowed for the negotiation of a cessation of hostilities and reducing violence; a public consultation process, and discussions towards an eventual political solution to the Deep South conflict.

Meanwhile, led by PT and the People’s Party, the Lower House of Parliament unanimously approved the revocation of Order No. 14/2016 by the 2014-2019 junta. This expanded the role of the army-dominated Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) over the Southern Border Provincial Administrative Centre (SBPAC). Established in 1981, the latter monitored the work of civilian government agencies and coordinated with security forces in the area. The Lower House also restored an advisory board from civil society which had allowed the public in the Deep South to voice their opinions directly to SBPAC. The 2014-2019 junta had taken away this council, placing the SBPAC directly under the military. Without local participation, SBPAC has lacked in-depth knowledge of the region’s problems.

To its credit, the government has sought to reform Thailand’s Deep South policy, making it more beholden to the people.  But those reforms could be incapacitated if the judiciary fails to convict the suspects in the Tak Bai case.

Amid the violence, the Narathiwat Provincial Court approved a request in August from families of the victims of the Tak Bai massacre to file a criminal lawsuit against 14 officials suspected of responsibility for the deaths, including ex-high-ranking military and police officers. However, there is fear that the defendants will not show up for the trial, with the Statute of Limitations on the case set to expire on 25 October. One of those charged was General Pisan Wattanawongkiri, the former 4^th Army Commander and now a PT MP. Shortly after the Narathiwat court ruling, Pisan and another defendant rushed abroad. This was allegedly for medical treatment but conceivably they could stay abroad until after the statute of limitations expires. Former prime minister Chuan Leekpai has warned that if PT did nothing about Pisan, there would be an uptick in Deep South violence. In late October Pisan resigned from PT, but he has remained abroad.

There has also been growing military resistance to any PT reforms in Deep South policy.  This was manifested suddenly, on 1 October 2024, when General Paisan Nu-sang became the new 4th Army Commander, a position tasked to lead the Deep South counterinsurgency.  Paisan Nu-sang is known as a hardline hawk, and will likely diverge from the more reformist PT Deep South policy. This could sabotage the implementation of revised policies on the ground.

To its credit, the government has sought to reform Thailand’s Deep South policy, making it more beholden to the people.  But those reforms could be incapacitated if the judiciary fails to convict the suspects in the Tak Bai case.  Indeed, the court case is linked to reforms in the PT-led government’s Deep South policy because convictions in that case would be perceived as transitive justice and thus a reform of judicial policy in the area. Without convictions in the Tak Bai case, Deep South Muslims (including the BRN) may blame PT for appearing to have backed down from moderation in the face of the army’s preferred hardline policy. In effect, PT is little different than the right-wing, elite-led governments which supported repression in the Deep South in the past.

The policy implications of such a situation are significant. There could well be an end to the JCPP process, a breakdown in conflict resolution and even an upswing in violence.  Whatever happens is likely just around the corner.

2024/326