Thailand’s Defence Budget: Money and Materiel

In 2026, Thailand’s defence budget and procurement purchases increased. This owed much to the Bhumjaithai-led government’s greater willingness to accommodate the military’s preferences on defence spending and procurement. Beyond strategic considerations prompted by border conflict and a shifting regional security environment, however, this shift reflected the political imperative of retaining the armed forces’ support. This support has long proved indispensable to any government’s hold on power, whatever its electoral mandate.

Prior to the border clash with Cambodia in 2025, Thailand’s defence budget had been in recession. The budget declined in 2023, when the civilian-led Pheu Thai (PT) administration replaced the pro-military Palang Pracharat government. In 2024, the budget increased slightly as PT sought to accommodate a military it had long antagonised. The July 2025 Thai-Cambodian border clashes provided a major security rationale for another surge in military spending. Indeed, when Anutin Charnvirakul became Prime Minister in September 2025, his government approved more money for the armed forces. The move was popular and was driven by a wave of anti-Cambodian Thai nationalism and the increasingly close ties between the conservative Bhumjaithai Party (BJT) and the military.  

Following Anutin’s February 2026 election victory, the already heightened defence spending persisted (Table 1)

For fiscal year 2027, Anutin mandated austerity measures across the national budget to navigate the current global uncertainty. Nevertheless, he stressed that such belt-tightening would have little effect on the defence budget. In June 2026, Anutin asked Parliament for a 203.4 billion baht (US$6.10 billion) defence budget for FY2027. The amount represented a small 0.47 per cent decrease from FY2026’s 204.4 billion baht. Thailand’s fiscal year runs from 1 October to 30 September.

Given that the FY2027 defence budget will remain largely unchanged from the preceding year, this has translated into continued military procurements. Estimated cross-service procurement allocations are: 48 per cent to the Army, 21 per cent to the Navy, and 18 per cent to the Air Force. A strategic imperative underpins these procurement decisions. Following the Thai-Cambodian border clashes, the Army has sought enhanced capabilities to shore up border security. There was a clear desire to balance procurement between Washington and Beijing (Table 2). The Navy, by contrast, has veered toward China, owing to affordability and tactical calculations (Table 2). The Air Force is tilting toward Europe (Table 2). Its preference for European over American or Chinese aircraft owes partly to a reluctance to antagonise Washington and Beijing. In the case of the Gripen, the calculation is also one of quality and cost. Chinese equivalents are deemed to be inferior, and American ones too expensive, while Sweden has guaranteed technology transfer and access to its Link-T data system (this enables Gripen aircraft to work with Link 16 networks used by US and NATO forces).

Following Cambodia’s successful use of drones during the 2025 border clashes, Thailand’s Army, Navy, and Air Force have each drafted plans integrating drone and anti-drone warfare into FY2027 procurement. The broader expansion in defence spending and procurement appears to rest not only on immediate security needs, but also on adherence to the National Security Strategy’s emphasis on modernisation. This seeks to reduce reliance on defence imports through the development of a domestic defence industry and technological advancement.

Yet whatever their strategic logic, both the expansion of the defence budget and these procurement decisions ultimately reflect the preferences and power of a military which has twice fomented coups since 2006. Though the country has an elected government with civilian leadership formally at the helm, the military remains independent of civilian control and continues to have substantial say over its own budget and procurement. This rings truer under the current Anutin administration, which, seeking military support, has acquiesced to the armed forces by giving it the money and materiel it wants.

The acquiescence extends to appointments which ultimately shape how the defence budget and procurement are directed. Anutin has catered to the preferences of Army Commander Lt. General Phana Khlaeoplotthuk and at least eight other generals, by appointing Class 26 member, the retired Lt-Gen Adul Boonthamcharoen, as Defence Minister (the generals are alumni of Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School Class 26). These senior officers have continuously pushed for more defence funding and procurement. Anutin has approved their requests, such as funding for a Volunteer Soldier Program, supplemental funding for developing the domestic defence industry, and even a secret defence budget that eludes parliamentary scrutiny.

For Anutin, there are manifold benefits to such an approach. It affirms BJT’s conservative tilt, allows him to piggyback on the armed forces’ popularity, guards against potential coups and may secure his political capital for a full term in office.

There are institutional reasons why Thai governments find it difficult to override military preferences regarding the defence budget. This owes to Articles 42 and 43 of the Ministry of Defence Organisation Act (2008), enacted by the 2006-2008 military junta. Article 43 states that “The Minister of Defence’s actions on the following matters must be in accordance with the resolution of the Defence Council.” One of these “matters” is the “consideration of the military budget and allocation of the Ministry of Defence budget.” Article 42 mandates that the council shall be composed of the 23 most senior military officials alongside six civilians, including the Defence Minister. The military’s control over the Defence Council has ensured that all post-2008 Defence Council resolutions have quite understandably supported higher defence spending.

Though the Prime Minister can overrule the Defence Council, doing so would create enormous friction between the civilian leadership and the military establishment. Since 2008, successive Thai governments have negotiated defence budget allocations with the Defence Council gingerly, and even resisted legislative attempts to slash it. This means that since 2008, the military has invariably received what it wanted for the defence budget.

Policy Implications

The Anutin government’s appeasement of the military through increased defence spending and procurement is the latest iteration of this dynamic. For Anutin, there are manifold benefits to such an approach. It affirms BJT’s conservative tilt, allows him to piggyback on the armed forces’ popularity, guards against potential coups and may secure his political capital for a full term in office.

Yet the implications of such a close relationship between the civilian leadership and the military run deeper than the calculus of any one government. Where the military can obtain its preferred budget and procurement regardless of elected leaders’ wishes — or because those leaders accommodate it to survive — there is no financial accountability to the Thai people. This stymies democratisation and leaves defence policy — including the strategic hedging between foreign powers it entails —beyond meaningful civilian and parliamentary oversight. Such is the case in Thailand.

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