Thailand’s Defence Budget in 2024-2025: Appeasing the Military?

During the election campaign which brought the Srettha Thavisin-helmed Pheu Thai (PT) government to office in August 2023, the party vowed that if elected, it would enact military reforms, among them a 10 per cent cut in the defence budget. But as Premier Srettha’s government continues in office in mid-2024, the country’s military cannot complain about the overall defence budget. PT, a party dominated by ex-Premier Thaksin Shinawatra and seen as a foe of the arch-royalist military, has shifted to a policy of appeasing the armed forces instead.

Under the 2001-2006 Thaksin Shinawatra government, the defence budget was reduced. Yet from the 2006 coup until 2023, the defence budget almost always grew on an annual basis in terms of percentage of GDP, percentage of national budget, and in current US$ dollars. During this period, budget cuts only occurred following the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. During these years the armed forces held enormous power, either with junta-led regimes (2006-2008; 2014-2019), frail civillian control (2008-2014), or an elected government dominated by former junta leaders (2019-2023).

The progressive Move Forward Party (MFP, Gao Glai) surprisingly won the May 2023 election but did not gain enough seats to establish a government.  As a result, PT formed an alliance with smaller conservative parties, backed by the monarchy and military, and created a ruling coalition. Seeking to retain close ties with the senior military brass, PT’s earlier promises of military reform — including with regard to the budget — mostly faded away.

Initially, defence minister Sutin Klangsaeng sought to head up a reformist agenda. A civilian and a novice in defence matters, he was welcomed by senior military officials, if only because many of them knew that his greenhorn military knowledge would prevent him from reining them in. Sutin’s strategy was to use “a charm offensive” to convince officers to support diminished military overspending. By mid-October, Sutin was still emphasising the need for a “worthwhile, transparent, and verifiable” defence budget, albeit with “no further cuts.” He had positioned himself as a centrist — between the MFP reformers in Parliament on one side and the military on the other.

Despite a persistent economic downturn in Thailand and notwithstanding its campaign promises to reduce the defence budget, the Srettha government in January 2024 pushed for Parliament to approve a 198.3 billion baht (US$5.5 billion) defence budget for the fiscal year 2024 (1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025), a two per cent increase over FY2023 (see table).

Thai Defence Budget (Fiscal Year 2024)

Added to this amount was 660 million baht in secret, opaque and off-budget funding. Sutin claimed that the budget increase was due to inflation but opposition MPs were not convinced. In March 2024, MFP MPs, viewing the original defence request as “Grandma’s Money Buying Grandma’s Sweets”, approved the defence budget but with reductions of 2.485 billion baht (US$68.6 million), including a particular onus on navy appropriations.

Planning for the defence budget in fiscal year 2025 has already begun. In June 2024, Sutin’s Defence Ministry, again seeking to appease the military, requested a budget of 200.9 billion baht (US$5.55 billion), 2.6 per cent higher than the defence budget in 2024 and representing 5.3 per cent of the national budget. In addition to this budget, the armed forces are seeking increases in secret, off-budget slush funds. FY2025 secret funds would be disbursed across the three services as follows: 290.1 million baht (US$8.0 million) for the Army, 30 million baht (US$830,000) for the Air Force, 62.6 million baht (US$1.7 million) for the Navy and 54 million baht (US$1.5 million) for the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters. Given the history of such funds, the lack of transparency for such large sums of money could facilitate malfeasance.

According to a source connected to the palace, a reduction in the military budget is unlikely to be implemented soon. Advisors to the palace do not favour military reform, given that Thaksin and MFP are seen as tangible threats to the arch-royalist aristocracy.

From these funds, in 2024, the Army is content to receive US Stryker infantry personnel carriers, Chinese VN-1 armoured personnel carriers, as well as Israeli military drones. Meanwhile, the Air Force has prioritised the updating of its fighter aircraft fleet either with Swedish Gripens or US F-16s. The Navy was upset that it might not be able to obtain a long-sought-after Chinese submarine. As an alternative, the MFP had backed the Navy’s desire to acquire a naval frigate instead of the submarine, partly because the frigate would be built in Thailand and use local labour. However, perhaps because Pheu Thai did not want MFP to get credit for the frigate proposal, PT MPs scuttled the frigate proposal. In fact, later, Sutin again endorsed the Navy chiefs’ preference for the Chinese subs (at the expense of the frigate). The government placated the Navy by agreeing to its request for a Chinese-built Yuan-class S26T submarine though it will have only a Chinese-made CHD620 engine. The navy had preferred a Chinese sub with a German sub engine but had been unable to obtain the German engine.

The manoeuvrings between the political masters and the generals underscore an incremental trend. Since the 2014 coup, the defence budget came under the exclusive purview of senior military officials. Since the 2023 election, it has come under the authority of PT reformers in the Cabinet and PT /Move Forward reformers in the legislature.

That said, civilian control over military appropriations has strengths and weaknesses. The opposition Move Forward has succeeded in diminishing the 2024 defence budget in the second reading and even threatened to reject any unnecessary 2025 budget proposals. Senior military officials, however, have succeeded in pressuring the PT-led government to ensure that if any defence budget cuts are made, they will be miniscule — if they are made at all.

According to a source connected to the palace, a reduction in the military budget is unlikely to be implemented soon. Advisors to the palace do not favour military reform, given that Thaksin and MFP are seen as tangible threats to the arch-royalist aristocracy.  Moreover, the lack of any meaningful defence budget cuts underscores Pheu Thai’s and Thaksin’s appeasement of the military. After all, it was the military which overthrew the civilian governments led by Thaksin in 2006 and his sister Yingluck in 2014. In addition, the PT-led government can also combine its appeasement strategy with a clever ploy of using growing PT control over the police to balance against the military. Overall, the PT-led government’s strategy represents the tactic of a weak civilian government — a pro-Thaksin government which nevertheless seeks to finish a complete term in office without another coup.

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