Democrat Party prime ministerial candidate and former Thailand prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2nd R), campaigns alongside parliamentary candidate Jesada Lertthanasarn (R) and prime ministerial candidate and former finance minister Korn Chatikavanij (L) ahead of the general election, in Bangkok on 24 January 2026. (Photo by Lillian Suwanrumpha / AFP)

Democrat Party prime ministerial candidate and former Thailand Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2nd R), campaigns alongside parliamentary candidate Jesada Lertthanasarn (R) and prime ministerial candidate and former Finance Minister Korn Chatikavanij (L) ahead of the general election, in Bangkok on 24 January 2026. (Photo by Lillian Suwanrumpha / AFP)

Thailand’s Democrat Party: A Political Institution Survives

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The Democrat Party has made a comeback from a near-death experience. But there are still key challenges to overcome.

An institutionalised party, the political scientist Angelo Panebianco once wrote, “slowly loses its character as a tool: it becomes valuable in and of itself”. By this test, few parties in Thailand have become institutionalised. Most are merely the vehicle of a leader or a family; once their use is exhausted they are discarded. For decades, the exception to this norm has been the Democrat Party.

In its eighty years of existence, the Democrats have survived nine leadership successions, with no leader related by blood or marriage to any family network. It remains one of the few parties with internal democratic procedures for leadership selection.  The next two oldest extant parties that still won seats in 2023 have both long been dominated by two families. Both announced that they would no longer field candidates in 2026.

Yet just a few months ago, the Democrat Party was also widely thought to be near death. Directionally, they were adrift. Once the embodiment of Thailand’s conservative camp and the main opponent against Thaksin Shinawatra, in recent years the Democrats have found itself squeezed by military-aligned parties on its right and progressive parties on its left. Successive decisions to join a coalition with Prayut Chan-o-cha in 2019 (whom the party had initially pledged not to support) and the Thaksin-aligned Pheu Thai Party in 2024 (its longtime bitter foe) have put the Democrats in a deep identity crisis.

Consider the numbers. Over 11 million people voted for the Democrats on the party-list ballot in 2011; by 2023 that number was reduced to a little under a million. In 2011, the party held 159 seats; this was reduced to 25 in 2023. The party escaped extinction in 2023 mainly because the party still had a sizable contingent of strong incumbents with extensive local networks in the southern region, the party’s historical stronghold. Towards the end of the 2023–2025 Parliament, even these MPs also began defecting to the Bhumjaithai Party (BJT) and Kla Tham parties. By the dissolution of Parliament, only eight constituency MPs remained with the Democrats.

Most Thai parties in such a comatose state would have been left for dead. In a testament to the Democrats’ institutionalisation, several party leaders who had previously resigned from the party returned to the party in a bid to rescue it. Key among them was former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, who declared that his return to the party in early February was “to ensure that this party will remain with Thailand forever”.

In a testament to the Democrats’ institutionalisation, several party leaders who had previously resigned from the party returned to the party in a bid to rescue it.

Abhisit’s return immediately re-energised the Democrats. The party’s election campaign put Abhisit front and centre and sought to win back former fans who had voted for Abhisit in the past. The Democrats featured footage of excited fans eagerly welcoming him back to politics in its rallies and used the slogan “trust Abhisit” as part of its final campaign message. The party also marketed itself nationally as a “safe option”, charting the middle ground between the overt nationalism of BJT and what is often perceived as the radicalism of the People’s Party (PP). Branding itself a clean party fighting against “grey capital”, the Democrats became the first party to announce that it would refuse to join a government coalition with the controversial Kla Tham Party. In the south, the Democrats appealed to the region’s ancestral loyalty to the party, reminding voters that it is the “elders’ treasure”.

At first glance, the party’s 22-seat haul from the recent 2026 elections is not particularly impressive. The hollowing out of the party’s local base and insufficient preparation time between Abhisit’s return and Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s early dissolution of Parliament led to a lacklustre performance in constituency races. However, on the party-list vote, the Democrats won 3.6 million votes — a clear recovery which came close to its 2019 performance. In most southern provinces, the party won the most party-list votes. This is a clear indication that many of its former supporters did indeed return home, even if a late push to get voters to cast both ballots for the Democrats faltered.

Despite these signs of recovery, the party will need to navigate two key challenges as it takes itself off life support.

The first is its centrist orientation. The Democrats have long perceived themselves as a liberal party, exemplified by its membership of Liberal International, a global federation of parties that uphold democracy, human rights, and free trade. However, the Democrat party brand shifted increasingly rightwards during its long battle against Thaksin between 2001 and 2014. In 2026, the Democrats effected a course correction to market-oriented centrism that charts the middle ground between nationalist conservatism, strident progressivism, and Thaksinite populism. In a highly polarised environment, however, the Democrats have still been unable to break through with its current brand. It has confounded former conservative supporters while failing to convince younger progressive voters. How the party will persuade voters that a middle ground still exists in Thai politics remains an open question.

The second is the risk of over-personalisation. The election campaign marked a clear paradox: out of all the major parties, Thailand’s most institutionalised party ran perhaps the most personalised campaign, focused almost solely on Abhisit. To avoid being seen as merely Abhisit’s party, however, the Democrats will likely be leaning more on its new faces in the months and years ahead, such as digital economy expert Karndee Leopairote who ran as the party’s first female candidate for prime minister, and rising TikTok star Jury Numkaew who became one of the party’s only newcomers to win a constituency seat. The hope is that Abhisit’s return reinvigorates its front bench and strengthens the party in the long-term, instead of simply providing a temporary band-aid on its decline. This would be a genuine testament to the Democrats’ institutionalisation.

If the goal of the Democrat Party in 2026 is to live to fight another day, this has been accomplished. But it needs to overcome the aforementioned challenges to set it on the path towards genuine national relevance. This will be no less daunting.

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Mathis Lohatepanont is a Ph.D. student at the Department of Political Science, University of Michigan.