Thailand’s Grand Compromise Tested, or Back to Square One?

When important political events coincide, they inevitably seem intertwined. A case in point is Thaksin Shinawatra’s return to Thailand from self-imposed exile on 22 August 2023. Just hours after Thaksin landed at Don Mueang, Srettha Thavisin was elected as Prime Minister, endorsed by both establishment-leaning political parties and a significant number of junta-appointed senators. It is now a foregone conclusion that a grand compromise was made to facilitate Thaksin’s safe return and Srettha’s rise to the premiership. In exchange for keeping the Move Forward Party (MFP) out of power, Pheu Thai (PT) was allowed to govern, although the exact terms and conditions remain largely opaque to most of the Thai public and possibly many elites as well.

A similar effect was observed on 18 June 2024, when four high-profile court cases converged on the same day — a political D-Day of sorts. Each case carried the potential to determine the fate of a sitting prime minister, lead to the dissolution of the election-winning MFP, annul the selection of Senators, and reverse the grand compromise between Thaksin and his former opponents. Although only one of these court proceedings yielded immediate results, with the Constitutional Court upholding the legality of the Senate’s selection process, there remains a prevailing impression that these cases are interconnected and, collectively, reflect the state of the grand compromise. According to a poll conducted by NIDA a day later, more than two-thirds of respondents reported believing in the existence of a secret deal, while nearly half believed there was an attempt to topple the Srettha government.

Under normal circumstances, the wisdom of the crowd and the simplest explanation would turn out to be accurate: the grand compromise is collapsing or being renegotiated. This is presumably due to Thaksin overstepping the boundaries set by the initial agreement — for example, by failing to stay at home and remain uninvolved in politics or by encroaching upon the military’s authority and control over promotions and appointments. Consequently, Thaksin and Srettha are either being punished or held hostage to ensure that PT adheres to its end of the agreement. To leave PT without the option of defecting and forming a new coalition with MFP, the threat of dissolving Move Forward will remain ever-present, throwing any future coalition that includes the party into disarray. This allows the conservatives to keep Pheu Thai in check and extract more concessions from the current alliance, including changing the prime minister if necessary.

However, there is an alternative interpretation: these court proceedings have little to do with one another and, individually, they reveal that the grand compromise between Thaksin and the conservative establishment remains durable even in the face of legal challenges and political pressures.

Ultimately, the significance lies not in whether these overlapping cases are coincidental, but in what they suggest about the nature of last year’s grand compromise and its evolution.

Thaksin was formally indicted by the Criminal Court on charges of lese majeste and computer crime, due to a comment he made during a 2015 interview with South Korean media. However, rather than interpreting this as a deliberate attempt to undermine Thaksin, it could also be viewed as a crucial step towards resolving his pending legal issues. These charges were brought against him by the then attorney-general, Pongniwat Yuthapanboripan, when Thailand was under military rule and Thaksin was in exile. It would not be a stretch to assume that the current attorney-general has an interest in upholding a decision made by a former office head. Thaksin would also be well-advised to clear the charges while he still has some leverage, rather than wait until the tide has turned against him. If anything, the fact that Thaksin made an appearance and was released on bail, despite a history of fleeing to avoid criminal conviction, signals his confidence in a favourable outcome and the possibility that he has received an assurance of legal protection that extends the leniency he has been granted since he returned to Thailand.

Srettha is facing charges in the Constitutional Court that could result in his removal as Prime Minister. These charges concern alleged ethical violations linked to his appointment of Pichit Chuenban, known for a history of bribing court officials, as a cabinet minister in a recent reshuffle of ministers in Sreetha’s government. However, considering that the 40 senators who petitioned the case with the Constitutional Court have ties to Prawit Wongsuwan, with whom Thaksin allegedly failed to honour a deal during government formation, it can be inferred that these charges were brought forward by a vocal minority within the establishment-leaning forces who felt marginalised by the grand compromise or saw their influence wane after the junta-appointed Senate completed its term and is no longer empowered to participate in selecting a new prime minister. These charges are unlikely to result in Srettha’s dismissal as prime minister, especially when there is no other viable candidate acceptable to both Thaksin and dominant figures in the establishment.

Finally, the dissolution case against MFP may have little to do with preventing a coalition between PT and MFP, or even with safeguarding against the possibility of Pita remaining a viable candidate for Prime Minister, should the House select a new premier. The primary concern might instead be to ensure the long-term credibility of judicial interventions and party dissolution as key instruments for checking the power of elected forces in Thailand since 2006 — especially against a party that, according to the Constitutional Court verdict on 31 January, attempted to overthrow the democratic system of government with the king as the head of state (a royal speech in 2006 was interpreted by the courts as a green-light to take down the Thaksin-led government at the time). This will, of course, be weighed against the cost of disenfranchising the 14 million voters who supported the party in the 2023 general elections. Regardless, the decision to dissolve or not, and when to do so, will likely be based on broader considerations, with anticipating PT’s movements being only one of many factors.

Ultimately, the significance lies not in whether these overlapping cases are coincidental, but in what they suggest about the nature of last year’s grand compromise and its evolution. The results of these cases will reveal which interpretation is accurate — whether the grand compromise is unravelling or not. Until then, there is no evidence to suggest that the grand compromise is weakening due to a conservative backlash against PT, Thaksin, or Srettha. In other words, we are still at square one.

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