Thailand’s Post-Authoritarian Praetorianism

The border skirmish between Thailand and Cambodia has underscored underlying historical tensions between the two neighbours. It has also demonstrated that the Thai military retains strategic dominance in a putatively democratic structure — a state of affairs known as post-authoritarian praetorianism. Although the 2023 election ended direct military-backed rule, the elected civilian government remains too institutionally weak to exert authority over the armed forces. The military continues to act autonomously in national security matters, often bypassing elected leadership.

The relationship between Thailand’s civilian leaders and their military counterparts continues to evolve against the backdrop of the border conflict. This is happening within the context of a structural imbalance biased towards the military, a crisis narrative led by the armed forces, and public endorsement of military primacy. The ruling Pheu Thai (PT) Party, which failed to win a landslide victory in the 2023 election, came to power by striking a deal with the establishment elite, which is essentially a nexus between the monarchy and the military. The deal was done largely to facilitate the return of its patriarch, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, after over a decade of exile. As part of this power arrangement, PT refrained from appointing any of its loyalist ex-military officers to the post of defense minister.

Two civilian politicians from the party, Sutin Klungsang and Phumtham Wechayachai, barely implemented any policies aligned with the reform agenda, such as downsizing the armed forces or abolishing compulsory conscription (the military said it would carry out these tasks on its own). In the past two years, the ruling party has failed to pursue structural changes within the Ministry of Defence that would have empowered the civilian government vis-à-vis the military establishment. This was due to resistance from the armed forces and their allies.

The latest cabinet reshuffle on 1 July following the withdrawal of the conservative Bhumjaithai Party from the coalition left the position of defence minister vacant. It was widely speculated that the role was being kept for former Supreme Commander Chalermpol Srisawat, who has close ties to General Apirat Kongsompong, a former army chief and former deputy secretary general of the Royal Household Bureau. The reshuffle left General Nattaphon Nakphanit, the deputy defence minister, solely in charge. It also allows the armed forces to wield considerable authority over border and security affairs. This shift underscores the deteriorating relationship between the ruling party and the military establishment. Nattaphon — a former deputy chief of staff of the army and former Secretary General of the National Security Council (NSC) — is a close associate of former Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, who led the 2014 coup against the civilian government of Yingluck Shinawatra. Nattaphon was appointed to the post under the quota of Prayut’s proxy, the United Thai Nation Party. In the cabinet, he represents the military rather than an electoral constituency.

This revised discourse effectively serves as a challenge to the military reform agenda proposed by civilian politicians, notably the opposition People’s Party.

On 28 May, a brief military clash at Chong Bok resulted in the death of a Cambodian soldier. This allowed the military to reassert its dominance under the guise of protecting national integrity. On 7 June, the military was fully authorised by the NSC to enforce strict border controls along the entire 798km boundary in a bid to pressure Cambodia into readjusting troop deployments in disputed areas.

On 8 June, Lieutenant General Nat Sri-In, Deputy Commander of Thailand’s 2^nd Army Region, met Lieutenant General Srei Duek, Deputy Army Chief of Cambodia. This resulted in an adjustment of troop positions to avoid confrontation and de-escalate tensions. However, this redeployment failed to resolve the conflict. Thailand maintained its border restrictions, but did so under a new pretext of seeking to suppress scam centres along the border. The border restrictions reportedly provoked frustration among Cambodian leaders, notably former Prime Minister Hun Sen.

The release of the leaked 17-minute phone conversation between Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Hun Sen regarding border control further strained civil-military relations. During the call, the Thai premier appeared to label Lieutenant General Boonsin Padklang, the 2nd Army Region Commander, as an opponent. Paetongtarn was subsequently suspended from her premiership. She now faces the risk of being removed from the position.         

In the absence of a prime minister and a defence minister, the military-dominated Special Operations Center for the Thai Cambodian Border Situations Management (SOC-TCBSM) took control of the crisis. This ad hoc body, which is chaired by Nattaphon, authorised the 1^st and 2^nd Army Regions to command military operations along the eastern and northeastern regions respectively. The body also authorised the Navy Marine Corps to oversee the coastal provinces of Chanthaburi and Trat. Martial Law has since been enforced across all border districts.      

Through the SOC-TCMSM, the military has centralised operational command and monopolised the strategic narrative. It actively shaped public perception by positioning itself as the sole institution capable of defending national security and sovereignty. The military utilised its vast media apparatus — including state broadcasters and social media channels across multiple platforms — to disseminate information, reinforce opinion, and conduct strategic communications.

Amid the escalation of the boundary disputes and rising border tensions, a poll conducted by the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA) in June revealed that a majority of Thai citizens placed greater trust in the military than in the civilian government to handle the conflict with Cambodia. Of the 1,310 respondents, 62.5 per cent said they had the most confidence in the armed forces, compared with 12.0 per cent who expressed a high level of trust in the government.

When the first shot was fired on 24 July, the military quickly moved to consolidate its legitimacy, launching a social media campaign under the hashtag #CambodiaFiredFirst to frame the narrative and justify its actions. Public reaction on social media followed quickly, with many citizens expressing support for Thai soldiers. Pro-military public figures, celebrities, and online influencers seized the moment to reaffirm the necessity of the armed forces. Taken together, these narratives countered the provocative question, “Why do we need the military?” posted by the late historian Nidhi Eoseewong in 2016 during the unrest under the Prayut regime. This revised discourse effectively serves as a challenge to the military reform agenda proposed by civilian politicians, notably the opposition People’s Party. The discourse reinforces the idea that the military remains critical in defending national interests. In this sense, the border skirmish not only reflected regional tensions; it functioned as a political theatre through which the military re-legitimised its central role in Thai public life.

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