Thailand’s State Welfare Card Reform: New Phase, Old Challenges

The Anutin government is implementing a new phase of Thailand’s social assistance programme. Many of the eligibility criteria for the State Welfare Card (SWC) Scheme, which is the country’s largest ever, have been revised to reduce inclusion errors (when ineligible individuals are included as beneficiaries) and exclusion errors (when eligible persons are excluded) from the previous phase. Such efforts are laudable. However, the changes are unlikely to produce significant improvements without a realistic strategy for identifying those most in need.

A closer look at the SWC’s background and mechanisms clarifies the context of these recent reforms. From October 2017 to June 2026, around 13.17 million Thais received benefits under the scheme. In the latest phase, the government is using two main mechanisms: existing cardholders have to register with the Ministry of Finance; in addition, the databases from the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security will help identify new beneficiaries. Local officials, including district chiefs, their deputies, subdistrict chiefs and village headmen, will also conduct household surveys to identify eligible individuals who might be left behind. This totals approximately one million people.

The updated mechanisms are paired with new eligibility criteria. The main income criterion now applies to individuals, not households. Applicants cannot own most classes of vehicles, except motorcycles, tricycles, minibuses, and agricultural vehicles (classes used largely by lower-income Thais). Previously, housing debt of up to THB 1.5 million (USD 46,000) and vehicle debt of up to THB 1 million were allowed. Now, total outstanding formal debt recorded by financial institutions must not exceed THB 100,000. For assessment, the government will rely on information from the National Credit Bureau. The Bank of Thailand has raised concerns that this could disqualify low-income households who borrowed under the COVID-19 pandemic or disaster relief programmes.

The debt criterion seeks to screen out individuals who might have access to credit and are therefore less likely to be poor. However, the holding of debt is an imperfect indicator of economic well-being. For example, about 46.7 per cent of households classified as not being poor were indebted. This implies that well-off households have the ability or collateral to get loans from financial institutions. For many low-income households, they tend to borrow to support consumption or cope with shocks; hence, for them, indebtedness might reflect vulnerability rather than prosperity. About 40 per cent of poor households had debt in 2023, suggesting that indebtedness is not uncommon among the poor. The current rule is unlikely to induce behavioural responses in the current application round (for example, resorting to informal borrowing channels) because eligibility is based on debt recorded before registration. It might, however, affect borrowing decisions in future rounds. Households might gravitate towards informal borrowing if they perceive their holdings of formal debt as reducing their eligibility for assistance.

The difficulties surrounding eligibility criteria, database integration, and survey coverage suggest that Thailand’s welfare system remains fragmented and heavily dependent on periodic registration rather than a continuously updated system of beneficiary identification.

Instead of focusing only on outstanding debt amounts, policymakers could consider whether debt (formal and informal) is persistent over time. Persistent indebtedness, defined as debtors servicing their loans for extended periods without becoming delinquent, may better capture financial vulnerability than a simple debt threshold. Households with such debts should not be excluded from the programme.

The government has also tried to improve targeting accuracy by linking the SWC database with other administrative records. One controversial rule initially disqualified elderly parents whose children claimed parental care tax deductions, assuming that they were financially supported by their children. However, the rule sparked a public backlash because many elderly parents received little or no support even after their children had claimed the deductions. As a result, Anutin quickly ordered its cancellation.

The eligibility debate is especially relevant given that older persons account for about one-third of SWC recipients – or 4.8 million elderly people in 2022. In addition to SWC benefits, they also receive the old-age allowance of THB 600-800 per month. This controversy also underscores a broader policy problem: the government is trying to support the poor and the elderly. A more coherent approach would be to strengthen old-age assistance and make poverty-targeted programmes like the SWC more focused. The latter could involve increasing the wage ceiling used to calculate Social Security contributions and benefits. Another approach is to adopt a more redistributive pension system in which benefit levels vary according to an individual’s economic circumstances.

Operational challenges further complicate the SWC rollout. The Ministry of Interior’s survey, scheduled for 4-21 June 2026, faces resource constraints and an unrealistic timeline for identifying poor households which have not been registered. According to the Community Development Department, the number of households surveyed is roughly the same between 2023 and 2026. This amounts to 13.2 million households, or roughly half of all households nationwide. Expanding survey coverage is a resource-intensive process that requires sustained resources and effort. Rather than relying on a survey conducted over a few weeks, the government should develop a long-term strategy to expand coverage and reduce exclusion errors. This could involve establishing a continuous registration system, increasing the number of local officials responsible for outreach and regularly updating the beneficiary database through administrative records and field verification.

Taken together, these operational challenges highlight broader, systemic issues that go beyond the immediate concerns of the SWC registration exercise. The registration process represents an important test of the Anutin government’s approach to identifying and supporting low-income households. However, the challenge extends beyond the design of any single programme. The difficulties surrounding eligibility criteria, database integration, and survey coverage suggest that Thailand’s welfare system remains fragmented and heavily dependent on periodic registration rather than a continuously updated system of beneficiary identification. Improving social assistance requires developing an integrated social registry that supports multiple programmes rather than operating as a stand-alone reform effort. In this regard, the SWC case underscores the need for broader institutional reform of Thailand’s social protection system.

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