The Humanitarian Costs of Starlink’s Policy

The US tech giant SpaceX has announced that its Global Roam service will be discontinued for existing customers as of 17 August 2026. Although SpaceX offered no specific reason beyond regulatory compliance, few would dispute SpaceX’s move, given the need to clamp down on increasing numbers of cybercrime networks which tap into Starlink services globally. The Starlink move, however, is a two-edged sword. In Myanmar, the civil conflict has prevented people from accessing conventional digital communications. SpaceX’s measure means that many conflict-affected communities that depend on Starlink would be disconnected from the Internet.

The move thus risks reinforcing the Myanmar military’s (and the current military-backed regime’s) long-standing strategy of governing through information control and disruption of humanitarian services. Recently, for example, Mr Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the military-backed regime, noted that Starlink connections were being used by the online scam industry.

The regime leader failed to mention that many areas in Myanmar, including those held by anti-government forces, need access to the Internet via Starlink. Today, nearly 40 per cent of the townships in Myanmar experience intermittent or complete internet shutdown every month. Since the 2021 coup, the military has weaponised the Internet, with mobile network and internet shutdowns in conflict-ridden areas across the country. In the ensuing civil war, telecommunication towers were severely affected, causing mobile data blackouts and isolating people in conflict-ridden areas. An estimated 13 million people, or nearly a quarter of the total population in Myanmar, rely on Starlink for digital access because no viable alternative exists in conflict zones.

In much of the Sagaing, Kachin, Karenni, Chin, and other contested regions, healthcare providers, community-based organisations, schools, and local administrative bodies depend on Starlink terminals to coordinate emergency medical referrals, organise humanitarian relief, conduct remote education and communicate security warnings. Different local authorities and communities in Myanmar operate at least 6,000 schools, which mostly operate online due to the ongoing civil conflict. Thousands of healthcare facilities in mixed-control and conflict areas also rely heavily on Starlink technology for daily coordination and operations. At a relatively low price of approximately USD120 per month, one terminal can accommodate about 100 users. Most of them are humanitarian/ community-based organisations and local residents from conflict zones.

Myanmar’s tech dependency dilemma represents a stark reality of contemporary conflict where the scam economy and the provision of humanitarian services collide: both of them require access to the Internet, but curtailing access to the two places a heavier load on the latter.

Myanmar is not officially licensed for Starlink operations. Starlink requires official regulatory approval from the Myanmar authorities — something which the military is not inclined to do, given the use of Starlink by scam centres and opposition groups. Many terminals have reportedly been registered through other countries. Starlink’s announcement, therefore, has huge implications for the millions of people in Myanmar who rely on the roaming satellite service for emergency healthcare support, education, and essential digital connectivity.

When the Internet goes dark during armed conflict, fear spreads faster than facts. Violence and human rights abuses become increasingly difficult to document, verify, investigate, and hold accountable. In locations such as Saw township, where people experienced the military’s airstrikes and bombing significantly since April 2026, the absence of reliable information allowed rumours to spread rapidly. In panic, villagers fled in multiple directions, even toward dangerous zones. Only with satellite Internet access were emergency medical teams and humanitarian workers able to connect with affected victims of war and provide immediate first-line support.

With Global Roam’s discontinuation and stricter guidelines for international use across other Roam tiers, local communities and humanitarian organisations in Myanmar are now looking for other options. According to a local community worker in Myanmar’s dry zone, community-built mesh or radio networks for local communication would be temporary solutions, but no alternative could replace Global Roam’s affordability, portability, ease of deployment and scale. There are other options, such as Geostationary Earth Orbit Satellites or upgrading to Starlink’s Global Priority tier. But they are not realistic. Their hefty price tags and limits on data usage put them out of reach for financially struggling local community organisations and people in conflict zones.

There is another dimension here. Since 2025, Starlink has reportedly been under investigation by the US Congress for providing Internet access to scam centres in Myanmar. This resulted in the shutdown of more than 2,500 terminals seemingly associated with scam compounds in Myanmar. Even before the recent policy change, users in Karenni (Kayah) and Rakhine states, and townships in Sagaing region, had experienced Starlink access blockage as a result of crackdowns on scam operations. In the past five years, cybercrime syndicates along the Thai-Myanmar border have proliferated, using satellite Internet to evade law enforcement. Despite crackdowns, they have sustained billion-dollar scam networks targeting victims worldwide. SpaceX’s recent policy change shows that the US tech giant and US lawmakers are stepping up efforts to combat the growth of criminal online enterprises exploiting satellite technology globally.

Local insiders anticipated that scam syndicates with far greater financial resources have already shifted to alternative, higher-quality connectivity services such as Starlink’s pricier Global Plan or are able to use in-country internet services within Myanmar since they have moved from the borderland to the inland. This is not the first time they have survived crackdowns. In 2025, China teamed up with the Thai and Lao authorities to launch a massive multinational crackdown on cross-border scam networks along the Thai-Myanmar border area. Thailand has also cut off scam centres’ access to landline internet, fuel and electricity. Last year, Starlink shut down devices used by the scam centres. Nonetheless, they have adapted to new regulatory environments: changing their mode of operation from industry-scale to small-scale, moving from the border to inland locations, and shifting their targets from Chinese nationals to Americans. These centres grew exponentially in 2025 and 2026.

Over 300 civil society organisations operating in Myanmar have urged the US government, SpaceX, and the international community to consider establishing a ‘targeted restrictive mechanism’ and provide Internet access for civilians. This would seek to curtail scam centres’ access to services such as Starlink, yet provide civilians with access to such services. Myanmar’s tech dependency dilemma represents a stark reality of contemporary conflict where the scam economy and the provision of humanitarian services collide: both of them require access to the Internet, but curtailing access to the two places a heavier load on the latter. The challenge, therefore, is not whether governments and technology companies should combat cyber-enabled crime. They should do so. Rather, the question is how such measures can be designed without unintentionally undermining humanitarian operations and civilian resilience.

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