The Intangible Yet Unmistakable Costs of Myanmar’s Political Crisis

As the Gaza crisis seemingly draws to a close, actors within and outside of Myanmar are looking to end their own crisis, with or without external help. One way is through the conduct of elections, which Myanmar observers have decried as a “sham”. The ruling junta hopes to use the conduct of elections to legitimise its rule and gain the recognition it seeks. With only six – all military-linked – of the country’s pre-coup 71 political parties taking part and large swathes of the country’s electorate left out, however, the planned first round of elections on 28 December 2025 will be anything but open, free, and fair.

That is the State Administration Council’s (now renamed as State Security and Peace Commission or SSPC) hoped-for exit strategy. Presumably, the panacea to the SSPC’s lack of legitimacy and recognition is the formation of a democratically elected government. The SSPC expects to get away with this strategy because of ASEAN’s principle of non-intervention in a member state’s (AMS) domestic affairs. In the SSPC’s calculations, Myanmar should not be singled out among other AMS that have gone through cycles of coups, elections, and re-elections. The main difference, however, is the SSPC’s use of lethal force against civilians: the relentless airstrikes and violence against Myanmar civilians have resulted in at least 3.5 million internally displaced persons, 1.4 million refugees and asylum seekers, and over 6,700 civilians killed since the 2021 coup.

ASEAN’s mistake is in assuming that Myanmar’s problems are Myanmar’s alone.

An example of how one troubled sub-region’s problems became ASEAN’s, and consequently the world’s, problem was the 1978-1991 Third Indochina War. ASEAN’s most complex political and humanitarian challenge of the time sent the then five founding AMS, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia, scrambling to set up refugee processing centres to handle the exodus and seeking external assistance to resettle or repatriate the masses of “boat people” to third countries. In that period, over 1.3 million Indochinese refugees sought asylum and were resettled in 15 countries. This was an example of ASEAN’s active diplomacy in getting international cooperation to work for the region.

Today, Myanmar’s problems may appear more contained within its borders than the Third Indochina War, but the regional security implications have already been enormous. This is mainly due to the rise of illicit economies and crime in Myanmar’s borderlands between China, Thailand, Laos, India, and Bangladesh.

Illicit economies, which flourished under COVID-19 pandemic conditions and are now powered by the conflicts between different state and non-state actors, have most famously led to the proliferation of scam centres in Myanmar. These scam operations are how non-state entities fund their operations against the military junta, and vice versa.

The United Nations has called Southeast Asia “ground zero” for the global scam industry. Costs to society and community caused by the scourge of scam centres may never be fully quantifiable but these costs have clearly passed from the state level to institutions and individuals. At the state level, for instance, countries with capacity like Singapore have created dedicated campaigns, such as using Jaga, the cybersecurity hedgehog, across traditional and social media platforms to raise public awareness of scams. The onus of monitoring, compliance, and enforcement is borne by financial institutions, which must increase their due diligence. States without capacity simply let the problem be.

Another regional geopolitical implication is the export of critical minerals in certain ethnic armed organisation (EAO)-controlled states in Myanmar. The discovery and mining of rare earth elements (REEs) in Kachin state, controlled by the Kachin Independence Army, have brought China into the theatre. Meanwhile, REE mining sites have proliferated in eastern Shan state, backed by the United Wa State Army and Chinese operators. China has become one of the most dominant forces in the REE refining space. Both China and the EAOs have become captive sellers and buyers because the ongoing conflict makes it possible for EAOs only to sell across the border to China due to logistical obstacles to selling further afield. China needs to satiate demands for its manufacturing base. The discovery has also drawn Indian interest to Kachin state in a bid to reduce India’s own dependence on China. Countries outside the immediate region, such as the US, have also been enticed. The extractive industry’s damage to the environment and social networks is as yet undocumented, but there are reports of cross-border environmental pollution affecting Thailand and signs that agricultural commodities sold across the China-Myanmar border are being rejected on grounds of contamination. 

What is clear is that while the political and diplomatic dialogue must continue with the junta, a paradigm shift is needed to engage non-state actors including the EAOs, PDFs and civil society to fix regional security problems arising from this crisis.

ASEAN has been severely criticised for its lack of leverage over the Myanmar crisis. So far, ASEAN has focused on using the Five-Point Consensus to bring the intransigent military back to the table. In January, ASEAN stated categorically that cessation of violence should be the priority for Myanmar, not elections, and again emphasised the importance of a ceasefire in July, with an offer of good offices by Malaysia. The Malaysian foreign minister Mohamad Hasan’s recent visit to Naypyidaw “in his capacity as ASEAN Chairman for the year 2025” repeated the call for a cessation of violence, unequivocally stating ASEAN’s position that elections must be “conducted in accordance with the principles of freedom, fairness, transparency and credibility” and “held nationwide with the participation of all political parties and stakeholders”.

The AMS may or may not fully appreciate that these intangible costs are being passed on to their populace. What is clear is that while the political and diplomatic dialogue must continue with the junta, a paradigm shift is needed to engage non-state actors, including Myanmar’s EAOs, People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), and civil society, to fix regional security problems arising from this crisis. In the absence of a single authority, ASEAN pragmatism must prevail to engage at the non-state level to muster regional and international efforts to address Myanmar’s problems. Malaysia, as Chair, has continued the engagement with Myanmar stakeholders, which started under previous Chairs, but continuity must be ensured from Chair to Chair, lest costs compound.

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