The Lure and Lore of Southeast Asia: Understanding the Dynamics of Soft Power

Mass media has commonly portrayed Southeast Asia as an exciting, adventure-fuelled, culturally rich but often exoticised region for its inhabitants and visitors alike. The final section of the State of Southeast Asia (SSEA) 2026 Survey contributes to the abundant evidence of the “soft power” of regional countries based on respondents’ “relocation preference and travel choices”. Soft power, coined by American political scientist Joseph Nye in 1990, is widely understood in international relations as a fundamental aspect of a country’s attraction, alongside its military and economic might (that is, ‘hard power’).

Nye defined soft power as the “ability to obtain preferred outcomes by attraction rather than coercion or payment”. There are now varying definitions and measures of this concept, as evident in global indices, with the main pillars being a country’s culture, political values and foreign policy. How attractive a country is as “a place to invest, trade, work, study or visit” is key. In Southeast Asia, the latter aspects of soft power are now woven into the region’s flourishing “creative economy“, even though certain inadequacies of national and regional infrastructure remain problematic.

At first glance, the SSEA 2026 findings seem to reflect long-standing relations among these countries, but the averages mask nuances which are important for understanding the dynamics of soft power in the region. (Other than the 11 ASEAN countries, respondents could choose “an EU member state”, Australia, Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the US.) Many respondents chose “an ASEAN member state” (AMS) as their most preferred country to live or work in. This option which ranked first for respondents from Malaysia (32.0%), Brunei (28.4%), Singapore (23.2%) and Vietnam (17.9%). Japan ranks first for respondents from Indonesia (25.0%), the Philippines (23.7%), Thailand (22.8%) and Myanmar (17.5%). As a region, an AMS is the top choice for respondents (19.0%), while Japan is a close second (16.8%).

Among those who selected an AMS as their preferred relocation destination, Singapore leads by a big margin (39.6%) over second and third-ranked Thailand (16.2%) and Malaysia (9.3%). These percentages include those who prefer to stay in their own countries (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam), with Singapore as the second-most preferred choice for non-Singaporean respondents. Alas, these preferences reflect uneven regional development, with Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia also having some of the region’s highest Gini ratios (measuring inequality). Singapore is the top choice for respondents from Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar and the Philippines. Singapore’s attraction is attributed to its business-friendly environment; high standards of education, healthcare and transport; low crime levels and political stability, among other factors.

The factors which pull or push people to certain countries are complex and dynamic.

Similar factors for relocation preference can be applied to respondents’ travel choices, though these are more sensitive to factors such as fluctuating currency exchange rates or tourism marketing campaigns. Japan has long been a highly preferred choice as many Indonesians, Filipinos and Thais have found employment in various sectors of Japan’s economy amidst its ageing population. Japan’s large investments in human resource development, trade and aid in these countries have meant that its soft power endures. Further, Japan’s intense tourism promotion efforts and weaker currency have plausibly contributed to its position as a top destination, not just for ASEAN citizens. Within ASEAN, Thailand is the top travel choice; interestingly, Thais overwhelmingly chose their own country as a preferred destination (85.7%). Singapore is the top choice for Filipino and Indonesian respondents, perhaps reflecting the sizeable communities of their fellow nationals in the island-state, as students and foreign or migrant labour.  

Taken together, the soft power of regional countries – as framed in this annual survey – has maintained a predictable pattern in the past few years, although The State of Southeast Asia is not a longitudinal survey (of the same respondents over time) but a series of snapshots in time. The factors which pull or push people to certain countries are complex and dynamic. For instance, the evolving aspirations of the emerging middle-class to cross national borders and the differential impact of these movements on their home and destination countries (such as brain drain or over-tourism) can provide more granularity on the patterns of change. Separately, global or regional soft power indices, where a country’s relative ranking can fluctuate even as its absolute score improves, may adversely impact nascent efforts at promoting regional commons such as a shared heritage.

On the relationship between respondents’ most preferred country to live or work in and to visit, the differences in choices could reveal the nuances of “soft power” that might depend on whether one is just visiting or lives in a country, and what it might mean for that country’s economy when crises such as pandemics or conflicts happen. The top four most preferred countries respondents would visit in ASEAN (Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam) are the same four, ranked differently, as the most preferred relocation choices (Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam). Domestic tourism choices are high for the largest five countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, according to the survey.

What does it mean if a country is preferred for domestic tourism (such as Indonesia and the Philippines), but not as a top choice of its own nationals to live or work in? Conversely, what does it mean if a country is preferred by its own nationals for living and working but not for domestic tourism (Brunei and Singapore)? What can we learn from Thailand, which does well in both aspects?

These responses suggest a need for greater ASEAN integration that would facilitate complementarity between its countries based on geographic realities, towards a more collective form of soft power. Looking ahead, the movement of people within and across borders will increasingly be shaped by demographic and economic realities, with varied implications for individual AMS and ASEAN collectively. Can the region’s soft power dynamics hold, or will new factors emerge to shift the balance?

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