The Myanmar Military’s “New” Narrative: Caveat Emptor

A ‘new’ military administration has taken office in Myanmar, asserting legitimacy and seeking an end to international isolation since the military conducted a coup in 2021. Of the 30 cabinet positions, 24 are held by former generals. The administration is headed by the same person, former Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who led the 2021 coup and led the military regime in Naypyidaw thereafter.

In his inaugural speech, Min Aung Hlaing stated his intent to promote stability, revive foreign investment and strengthen international relations. This narrative belies the economic devastation and instability in the country caused by the coup, the Myanmar military’s continued atrocities and escalating violence against civilians.

Naypyidaw’s narrative may seem plausible to those in several capitals, including Washington, with less contextual knowledge of Myanmar. Former Congressman Dave Brat recently weighed in, urging “American engagement” fashioned as strategic recalibration. His article, republished by the Myanmar regime’s propaganda vehicle, frames Myanmar through the lens of great-power competition, claims that the US strategy has expanded China’s leverage and encourages engagement with the military.

Such calls from Brat and regime lobbyists come amid a Myanmar policy review in Washington that began nearly a year ago. The argument presented to the Trump administration leans heavily on short-term economic concessions (such as a recent soybean agreement), containing the immigration spillover effects of the Myanmar conflict on the US and steering the conflict towards a resolution that serves American interests. This approach is at odds with the US Congress, which maintains bipartisan support for Myanmar’s resistance movement but has little influence over executive policy.

Given its limited leverage in Myanmar, the US is unlikely to achieve these objectives. Naypyidaw will use its US engagement to build international legitimacy, while maintaining its alignment with Russian and Chinese interests.

Furthermore, the Myanmar military’s survival strategies sustain the very problems Washington wants solved. The regime in Naypyidaw offers economic incentives to anti-junta resistance forces to enter into ceasefires. This has only led to the rise of illicit economies, creating permissive conditions in which scam compounds, trafficking and narcotics production thrive. The military has employed a “Four Cuts” counterinsurgency strategy on civilian communities, cutting food, funds, information and recruits against forces resisting military rule. This has generated mass displacement, and a humanitarian and migration crisis that burdens Myanmar’s regional neighbours foremost. This also carries immigration implications for other countries, including the US.

The recent appointment of Intelligence Chief Ye Win Oo as commander-in-chief indicates continuity rather than change in Naypyidaw’s approach. The Myanmar military also depends on Chinese support for military equipment, diplomatic protection, direct financial assistance and coercive pressure on anti-junta forces. Despite mutual suspicions, the depth of Naypyidaw’s dependence on Beijing renders unlikely the possibility of any meaningful pivot toward Washington.

Naypyidaw’s “new” narrative presents the military as a stabilising force while seeking to obscure the reality that the Myanmar military remains the country’s primary source of instability.

Meanwhile, there is little evidence that current US policy has enabled China to achieve its goals in Myanmar despite Beijing operating there without a peer competitor. Conflict persists along the Myanmar-China border. China’s large economic projects in Myanmar — including the Kyaukphyu port, Myitsone Dam and the Muse-Mandalay rail project — remain stalled, but an American engagement strategy with the junta may accelerate their revival.

Myanmar’s resistance movement, particularly members of the new Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF), has incentives aligned with reducing conflict spillovers that harm American interests. These groups rely on support from communities that are harmed by scam economies and militia predation. They need stable governance systems to anchor resistance operations and to make their political objectives credible. Conversely, they rely comparatively little on China and need to limit the criminalisation that funds the junta and corrodes its political project. A resistance-led political reform process offers the only viable path to stability.

Naypyidaw’s “new” narrative presents the military as a stabilising force while seeking to obscure the reality that the Myanmar military remains the country’s primary source of instability. The Myanmar military has repeatedly reneged on commitments, and defied regional and personal diplomacy efforts seeking to deploy leverage and persuasion to maintain power. Since the 1940s, five failed major peace processes show that such processes have functioned less as pathways to settlement than as arenas in which the military reshapes political and economic arrangements in its favour. Ceasefires have historically delivered illicit economic concessions without resolving political grievances, creating legal cover for conflict-economy expansion.

This does not mean Washington should reject dialogue in principle. Rather, it should pursue conditions in which dialogue could work and avoid short-term or bilateral ceasefires, which would worsen fragmentation and help the military to consolidate power. One such condition would involve enforceable agreements, with regional partners retaining leverage over consequences of violations. Another condition would be a critical mass of resistance actors which are aligned and able to negotiate collectively. Absent those conditions, any engagement with Naypyidaw may be counter-productive to American interests.

Critics argue that the resistance is too divided or has peaked. The relevant question is whether there is adequate cohesion and capacity on priority issues where US engagement is plausible. Though not without challenges, resistance-area governance systems are slowly improving and are already showing the ability to serve US interests. The State Department’s US$10 million reward for intelligence on the Tai Chang scam centres in Karen state came from resistance-held information, not the regime in Naypyidaw. The same applied to intelligence that led to the recent indictments by the US Department of Justice. The Karen National Union, not the junta, seized the Shun Da scam compound that was targeting Americans.

Public support for the movement also appears to be stable. The military’s recent election illustrates this further: after a year of costly offensives, it could only stage voting in about half the country’s territory and won just 44 per cent of the actual vote share.

Under current conditions, any deal-making with Naypyidaw, whether by Washington or other capitals, requires careful consideration. This should be carried out based on a patient strategy that strengthens subnational governance capacities, reduces spillover harms, and holds diplomatic and economic tools for moments when they would matter more.

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