The Philippines’ Engagement with Japan: A Steady and Deepening Strategic Partnership

INTRODUCTION

In a speech delivered in August 2025, President Ferdinand R Marcos Jr reiterated his earlier observation that amidst the evolving “multipolar world”, the “continuing strategic competition” among the great powers has permeated the “evolving regional landscape and creates dilemmas that weigh on the strategic choices of regional states”. Such rivalry is “contributing to a more tense geopolitical landscape, with regional flashpoints potentially serving as tinderboxes for conflict”. In this context, the Marcos Jr government has placed the dispute in the South China Sea (SCS) as a top security concern.

From having a largely conciliatory approach towards China under the Duterte government, the Marcos Jr administration has become more vocal against what it calls Beijing’s “illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive” (ICAD) actions in the SCS. This “transparency initiative” is accompanied by the adoption of the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defence Concept (CADC) which serves as the overall framework of the Philippine defence establishment in modernising the armed forces and shifting its focus towards external security operations (ESO).

As the Philippines faces a more complex strategic environment, security cooperation with like-minded countries is critical. This article seeks to examine the strategic partnership between Japan and the Philippines, particularly under the Marcos Jr administration.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Formal diplomatic relations were established between Japan and the Philippines as early as in 1956. It was only at the turn of 21^st century that building blocks for a stronger bilateral relationship were laid. In 2006, Manila and Tokyo signed the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA). In the aftermath of the 911 attacks in the US, the two countries committed to holding a Political-Military Dialogue, which was first convened in 2006 alongside the Military-to-Military Dialogue.

In 2009, Manila and Tokyo issued a joint statement establishing a strategic partnership between their two countries. Two years later, under President Benigno S. Aquino III, the two agreed on a “comprehensive promotion” of that partnership. Unlike the 2009 declaration, the 2011 statement included more provisions on bilateral security cooperation. Nearly four years later, the Philippines and Japan elevated their ties to a “Strengthened Strategic Partnership” in a joint declaration accompanied by an action plan that outlined specific areas of cooperation, including maritime domain awareness, information sharing, and capacity-building, among others. In addition, complementary agreements, specifically on defence cooperation, and the transfer of defence technology and equipment, were also signed.

Within the framework of a strategic partnership, the two countries strengthened cooperation in the realm of capacity-building. In 2013, it was announced that the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) would acquire ten multi-role response vessels (MRRVs) under the “Maritime Safety Capability Improvement Project” (MSCIP)-Phase I. What would eventually be known as the Parola-class patrol vessels, all ten 44-meter MRRVs, were to be launched between 2016 and 2018.

In March 2016, President Aquino III announced that Manila would lease five Beechcraft TC-90 King air advance trainer aircraft. Later, Japan announced that it would also train the navy pilots who would use the leased assets. In 2017, Tokyo declared that the 5 aircraft would no longer be leased but would instead be donated to Manila. By 2018, all of the assets were turned over to the Philippines.

In June 2016, Aquino III was succeeded by Rodrigo R. Duterte, who came into office with an agenda to upend Philippine foreign policy anchored on forging closer ties with China and distancing from the US. Nevertheless, the Duterte administration did sustain the Philippines-Japan strategic partnership. Indeed, the Duterte government signed the MSCIP-Phase II for the procurement of two 97-meter MRRVs for the PCG. The two ships were both commissioned in 2022 as Teresa Magbanua-class patrol vessels shortly before Duterte left office.

Duterte’s effort to reorient Philippine foreign policy culminated in 2020 when he abrogated the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the US. However, the realities of geopolitics and China’s continued aggressive stance forced Duterte to recalibrate his foreign policy and restored the VFA in 2021. Two months before the Duterte presidency ended, Manila and Tokyo convened the first Japan-Philippines Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting (2+2) in April 2022. During the gathering, the two countries underscored their commitment to discuss “frameworks to facilitate reciprocal visits as well as reciprocal provision of supplies and services in order to enhance further and facilitate cooperation such as exercises between the JDSF and the AFP”.

PHILIPPINES-JAPAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP UNDER MARCOS JR

Elected in May 2022 with nearly sixty percent of the votes cast, President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr came into office when the U.S.-China strategic competition had intensified, and when China was becoming more assertive in the SCS. Initially expected to share President Duterte’s foreign policy views, the Marcos Jr administration appears to have recalibrated Philippine strategic policy. In his keynote address at the 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), President Marcos Jr underscored that strategic competition between the United States and China is “permeating the regional landscape” – a rivalry that “is constraining the strategic choices of regional states. This contest is exacerbating flashpoints and has created new security dilemmas.” Japan shares a similar view. In its 2022 National Security Strategy, Tokyo stressed that the “free, open, and stable international order, which expanded worldwide in the post-Cold War era, is now at stake with serious challenges amidst historical changes in power balances and intensifying geopolitical competitions”.

Cognisant of their shared security interests and challenges, Philippines-Japan security relations have further deepened under the Marcos Jr administration, particularly on three fronts: situational awareness, capacity-building, and regional security architecture.

In other words, the shared interests articulated by both countries in 2011 and 2015 remain largely the same. Indeed, both countries have legitimate interests to protect against China’s aggressive behaviour in the maritime domain. The Philippines and China have overlapping maritime and territorial claims in the SCS, while Japan and China have a territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China) in the East China Sea. Both Japan and the Philippines also have shared concerns over a contingency in the Taiwan Strait and its potential to escalate to a region-wide conflict. More broadly, Japan and the Philippines – along with Taiwan – are part of the first island chain which China seeks to dominate to alter the power equilibrium to its favour.

Cognisant of their shared security interests and challenges, Philippines-Japan security relations have further deepened under the Marcos Jr administration, particularly on three fronts: situational awareness, capacity-building, and regional security architecture.

Even before Marcos Jr came to power, Manila and Tokyo had initiated efforts to advance situational awareness. In 2020, under the Duterte administration, the Philippine Department of National Defense (DND) signed a contract with Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (MELCO)  for the provision of long-range air surveillance radars and a mobile air surveillance radar under the Horizon 2 Air Surveillance Radar System Project. These equipment – three fixed FPS-3ME and a mobile TPS-P14ME – has been transferred to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) in 2023.

In 2023, Japan unveiled its Official Security Assistance (OSA) initiative under which Tokyo will provide “equipment and supplies as well as assistance for infrastructure development to partner countries with a view to strengthening their security and deterrence capabilities.” The Philippines became the first country to be the recipient of the OSA. Through an Exchange of Notes, Tokyo will provide Manila with coastal radar systems of the AFP. In 2024, the Philippines again received an OSA from Japan. The package included additional coastal radar systems, and other equipment for the Philippine Navy.

Another major area of cooperation between Japan and the Philippines is capacity-building, particularly in terms of the acquisition of more assets, as well as training and exercises. In 2024, the strategic partners signed the Exchange of Notes for the Maritime Safety Capability Improvement Project (MSCIP) Phase III; under this, Manila would acquire five additional units of the 97-meter offshore patrol capable Teresa Magbanua-class MRRVs for the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). These are the same type of ships acquired under the MSCIP Phase II. In addition, under Japan’s OSA for FY 2024, the Philippines would acquire Rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIBs).

Under the Marcos Jr administration, there has also been an increase in training and exercises involving the Philippines and Japan, as well as other like-minded countries. These exercises can be categorised into three. First, Maritime Cooperative Activities (MCAs), which refer to a range of joint efforts between or among the militaries of concerned nations. Conducted either bilaterally or multilaterally, MCAs may have various exercises such as communication, manoeuvre, photo, maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, and passing.

Second, Japan’s participation in Philippines-US led exercises, such as: a) Balikatan (“shoulder to shoulder”) Exercises, the largest annual military exercises between Manila and Washington, in which Japan has been participating since 2012 as observer before becoming a full participant in 2025; b) the KAMANDAG (“Kaagapay ng mga Mandirigma ng Dagat”), an annual military exercise between the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) and the US Marine Corps (USMC); and c) Sama-Sama (“Together”), an annual military exercise between the Philippine Navy (PN) and the US Navy (USN).

Third, there are the Japan-Philippines-US trilateral coast guard exercises. In June 2023, the coast guards of the three nations held exercises off the coast of Mariveles, Bataan, in the Philippines. The exercises involved communication, manoeuvres, photo, maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, and passing. In June 2025, another iteration of this trilateral coast guard exercise was conducted, focusing on a search and rescue exercise (SAREX).

In 2023, Japan unveiled its Official Security Assistance (OSA) initiative under which Tokyo will provide “equipment and supplies as well as assistance for infrastructure development to partner countries with a view to strengthening their security and deterrence capabilities.” The Philippines became the first country to be the recipient of the OSA.

To institutionalise the security cooperation between the strategic partners, Manila and Tokyo signed the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) in 2024. Coming into force in 2025, the RAA is the counterpart of the Philippines-US Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the Philippines-Australia Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA).

The Philippines-Japan strategic partnership has also played a role in enhancing the relations between two treaty allies of the US. Indeed, US alliances in the Indo-Pacific are bilateral in nature, not a multilateral alliance such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus “linking the spokes” of the US-led “hub-and-spokes” system of alliances is critical in addressing challenges in the region.

Efforts to link the US alliances in the region culminated in April 2024 when the first Japan-Philippines-US trilateral summit was convened. Among the initiatives announced by then-Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Philippine President Marcos, and then-US President Joseph R Biden Jr is the Luzon Economic Corridor. The initiative aims to support connectivity among Subic Bay, Clark, Manila, and Batangas in the Philippines.

In addition, the Marcos Jr administration has also participated in the convening of the Australia-Japan-Philippines-US defence ministerial meeting. Dubbed the “SQUAD,” the gathering of the defence ministers has taken place in June 2023, May 2024, and May 2025. In November 2024, a SQUAD meeting expanded to include Seoul, thus marking a historic gathering of the US and all of its allies in the Indo-Pacific at the defence ministerial level.

ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

Based on developments in the first three years of the Marcos Jr administration, the Philippines-Japan strategic partnership is on an upward trajectory and would likely continue in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, as the Philippines expands its engagements with its security partners, its capacity to do so may be put to the test. Corollary to this concern are the potential maintenance issues over its new assets and equipment.

From a broader perspective, potential challenges to the Philippines-Japan strategic partnership may emanate from domestic political factors. Indeed, the last three Philippine presidential administrations have witnessed swings in the foreign policy pendulum. Although there is little indication that this could happen in the case of the Philippines-Japan strategic partnership, the possibility of such a shift in political attitude cannot be fully discounted.

Moreover, the Philippines-Japan strategic partnership could potentially be derailed by Chinese malign influence operations. As the RAA is implemented, more exercises and other cooperative activities can be expected. As was the case with the Philippines-US alliance, China may attempt to derail initiatives. Indeed, there was the case of a former governor of Cagayan, who opposed the conduct of Balikatan exercises and implementation of Philippines-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in his province. He was concerned over the impact of these security initiatives on Chinese investments in the province.

To conclude, Japan has emerged not just as a development partner, but also as a close and reliable strategic partner of the Philippines. Shared interests and concerns have served as a strong impetus towards security cooperation between the two countries in the first island chain. Under the Marcos Jr administration, the Philippines-Japan strategic partnership has been sustained and enhanced, particularly on three fronts: situational awareness, capacity-building, and regional security architecture. Indeed, the Philippines-Japan strategic partnership has thus far been an area of consistent foreign policy among Philippine administrations.

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This is an adapted version of ISEAS Perspective 2026/20 published on 24 March 2026. The paper and its references can be accessed at this link.