The Search for Emerging Middle Powers: ASEAN-Türkiye Relations

Türkiye quietly became ASEAN’s 12^th Dialogue Partner (DP) at the 59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on 21 July 2026, making it the first country from the Middle East region to join ASEAN’s family of Dialogue Partners. There was no fanfare, no media blitz.

Speaking in Manila, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan hailed the admission as “another significant outcome” under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s leadership. Turkish media assessed Türkiye’s elevation from Sectoral Partner to DP to ASEAN as an extension of the country’s Asia Anew Initiative, a foreign policy strategy launched in 2019 which was designed to deepen and anchor Türkiye in the Asia-Pacific.

Türkiye’s admission unofficially breaks ASEAN’s long-standing moratorium on accepting new Dialogue Partners. The moratorium was only briefly lifted in 2021 under Brunei’s ASEAN Chairship to admit the United Kingdom (UK) as full DP, which was arguably an exception on account of Brexit and the strength of the UK’s historical trade and defence relations with this region.

Procedurally, Türkiye’s admission should have been preceded by a complete review of ASEAN’s moratorium, but the ASEAN ministers only tasked their senior officials to review it in July 2025, explicitly linking the review to its new ASEAN Community Vision 2045 and to the need for external partnerships that were strategic, mutually beneficial, and could enhance ASEAN centrality and respond to geopolitical challenges.

Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim reportedly championed Türkiye’s admission in 2025, when Malaysia was ASEAN Chair, and the ASEAN leaders at the 47th Summit gave their in-principle approval, “subject to the finalization of the review on the issue of the moratorium”. The review is to be finalised by end-2026, with a revised list of indicators and criteria for assessing new DPs.

However, with several interested parties knocking on ASEAN’s door, there is a sense among some ASEAN member states (AMS) that ASEAN should not be pressured into accepting all and sundry. A more proactive and invitation-based approach to external relations would put ASEAN back in the driver’s seat.

Türkiye’s association with ASEAN began with its accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2010 (a requirement for any country wishing to establish relations with ASEAN) followed by sectoral dialogue partnership in 2017. A list of issues ranging from transnational crime, counter-terrorism to cybersecurity and sustainable development has been framed as ‘practical cooperation’ areas but with no core substantive focus on particular areas that can leverage both sides’ strengths. To date, both sides have held seven ministerial meetings which only involved the ASEAN Chair, Türkiye and the ASEAN Secretariat to “exchange views on matters of common interest”.  

Türkiye’s admission unofficially breaks ASEAN’s long-standing moratorium on accepting new Dialogue Partners.

The strength of a DP’s relations with Southeast Asia (the region) and with ASEAN (the regional organisation) can be assessed in two ways. First, it means accreditation to the ASEAN Secretariat and reciprocal diplomatic presence in respective capitals: Türkiye accredited a Permanent Mission to ASEAN in Türkiye in 2011. However, it has yet to establish a diplomatic mission in Timor-Leste, whereas Laos and Myanmar are the two AMS that have not established a diplomatic presence in Ankara, which can be rectified over time.

Second, and more importantly, is the level of economic and political-security cooperation between Türkiye and Southeast Asian countries, bilaterally and regionally. Despite the official ASEAN Secretariat assessment that Türkiye and ASEAN enjoy “considerable trade and investment relations despite recent fluctuations”, the numbers tell a different story. According to Mr Fidan, between 2010 and 2025, two-way trade increased from USD6.5 to USD16.1 billion, but a jump that is comparatively modest. By comparison, ASEAN-Russia trade, Russia being one of the region’s smallest trading partners, stood at slightly over USD18.1 billion in 2024.

The ASEAN-6, with Singapore being the top export destination, tend to dominate trade. Of these, Türkiye has bilateral FTAs with Malaysia and Singapore, but no Southeast Asian country counts among Türkiye’s top 10 trading partners. (Türkiye’s exports are predominantly precious stones and mineral fuels.)

Türkiye is, however, emerging as an important defence partner for several AMS. Arms sales have become an important part of Ankara’s Asia-Pacific strategy; not only do they generate an important revenue stream, they help deepen economic, political and security ties with regional states. Türkiye has become an attractive arms vendor for several Southeast Asian states as its defence companies offer hi-tech, NATO-compatible equipment at competitive prices, some of which can be manufactured in the buyer country. In an era of escalating great power competition, Türkiye offers AMS an additional hedging option that de-risks US sanctions.

Over the past decade, state-backed Turkish defence companies have sold tanks, helicopters, short-range missiles and warships to Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Turkey’s combat-tested drones have become a bestseller. Most importantly, in 2025, Indonesia became the first foreign country to sign up for the jewel in the crown of Türkiye’s defence industry: the 4.5 generation Kaan fighter aircraft. Malaysia could be Türkiye’s next Southeast Asian customer.

Impressive though Türkiye’s arms sales have been in Southeast Asia, its ambitions to play a bigger role faces hurdles. Turkish arms manufacturers must compete with larger competitors in the US, Europe and East Asia, especially South Korea. Türkiye is still reliant on certain kinds of imported defence technologies (such as the US-made engines for the Kaan, though it is working on a domestic alternative), while its arms industry suffers from supply chain problems and industrial bottlenecks. If Türkiye can resolve these problems, its importance as a defence partner to Southeast Asian countries will only increase.

The main attribute Türkiye brings to the DP table with ASEAN is its perceived strategic weight as an emerging middle power. Türkiye is embedded in different security and economic architectures regionally and globally through its membership in NATO, G20, OECD, OSCE, MIKTA, Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), OIC and as an aspiring BRICS partner country.

Looking Ahead

Despite its status as a US treaty ally, Türkiye’s multi-alignment foreign policy strategy, that relies on clever hedging and leverages its geographical crossroads status, would be quite familiar to ASEAN countries. ASEAN has been ruminating over the idea of expanding its strategic relations with partners that can anchor its centrality in the global security architecture. Türkiye’s admission brings a new dimension of diversifying ASEAN’s strategic networks and purpose of focusing on sharper strategic selectivity of ASEAN’s external relations.

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