To Lam’s Consolidation of Power: Implications for Vietnam’s Political and Economic Prospects

On 7 April 2026, Vietnam’s new National Assembly unanimously elected To Lam, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), as state president, making him the most powerful leader in the country in decades. By holding both top positions, To Lam has effectively become Vietnam’s strongman, marking a significant shift from the country’s tradition of collective leadership, where the general secretary was seen as first among equals rather than a dominant supreme leader. This centralisation raises an important question: Is To Lam’s concentration of power good or bad for Vietnam’s political and economic future?

To Lam’s rise to power is rooted in his role as the chief executor of the late General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s extensive anti-corruption campaign. To Lam did so during his tenure as head of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) from 2016 to 2024. The campaign eliminated or sidelined numerous senior politicians, many of whom could have become his political rivals. As the former MPS Minister, To Lam continues to wield significant influence over the ministry, allowing him to maintain considerable leverage over the country’s top politicians and government officials, thanks to the ministry’s extensive investigative powers. This leverage has enabled him to neutralise opposition and allow him to steer Vietnam gradually toward a more centralised governance model with minimal resistance.

Power is now firmly in To Lam’s hands. Beyond holding the dual top positions, he has strategically placed key allies in influential roles at both central and local levels. For example, Le Minh Hung, a former central bank governor with close connections to the MPS, was elected Prime Minister on the same day. Luong Tam Quang, from To Lam’s home province of Hung Yen, serves as Minister of Public Security. Tran Luu Quang, another close ally, was appointed party secretary of Ho Chi Minh City, the country’s main economic engine. Meanwhile, Nguyen Duy Ngoc, a former MPS general, served briefly as party secretary of Hanoi before assuming leadership of the powerful CPV Central Commission of Organization.

Under To Lam, the influence of the public security sector and the “Hung Yen faction” is particularly notable. At the CPV’s 14th National Congress in January, politicians from Hung Yen secured 20 seats, or 10 per cent, in the Party’s 200-strong Central Committee. This is a disproportionately large share given that post-merger, Hung Yen is the smallest province by area and accounts for just 3.5 per cent of the country’s population. Moreover, three leaders from the MPS were elected to the all-powerful, 19-member Politburo (15.7 per cent), and seven were elected to the Central Committee (3.5 per cent), highlighting the ministry’s growing power and influence.

The implications of To Lam’s concentration of power for Vietnam’s political and economic prospects will ultimately depend on how he wields this unprecedented authority.

This concentration of power has positive and negative implications. On the positive side, “Team To Lam” is anticipated to be more united, coherent, and efficient. With reduced obstruction from rival factions, faster and more efficient policy adoption and execution should become the norm. This should expedite the necessary reforms to meet Vietnam’s ambitious GDP growth targets of at least 10 per cent in the coming years to help the country achieve high-income status by 2045.

More importantly, officials with close ties to To Lam will benefit from greater political protection, allowing them to implement policies without the constant fear of future investigations or purges. This is particularly significant: Vietnamese officials, including those in ministerial and provincial leadership roles, have reportedly refrained from making key decisions due to concerns about political and legal repercussions, especially during Nguyen Phu Trong’s intense anti-corruption campaign. With the political cover provided by To Lam, leaders in key ministries and local governments are now more willing to make bold decisions to promote economic growth. This trend has been evident: since To Lam became general secretary in August 2024, numerous projects, both public and private, have been licensed, reactivated, or accelerated. This includes those in the real estate and infrastructure sectors, many of which had faced long delays.

However, the downsides are equally significant. The reduction in space for policy deliberation and critical internal debate risks creating an “echo chamber”, increasing the likelihood of major policy errors. The disruption of the traditional balance of factions, with the public security establishment and the “Hung Yen faction” dominating the political scene, could undermine the CPV’s intra-party democracy and unity. Simultaneously, the MPS and businesses linked to it are leveraging To Lam’s unchallenged power to expand their economic footprint and influence rapidly, raising concerns about increased cronyism and corruption. A succession crisis could also loom if To Lam retires or faces health issues, as the system now relies heavily on one individual rather than institutionalised collective mechanisms. This could lead to intense political infighting and long-term systemic instability.

The implications of To Lam’s concentration of power for Vietnam’s political and economic prospects will ultimately depend on how he wields this unprecedented authority. If used wisely to advance national interests and implement meaningful reforms, it could propel Vietnam toward its development goals and enhance the country’s political and economic resilience. However, if this power is misused to entrench personal or factional interests, it risks undermining Vietnam’s economic dynamism, eroding investor confidence, and threatening the regime’s long-term legitimacy and stability. Vietnam’s future success, therefore, hinges on whether To Lam’s centralised power becomes a tool for bold, effective governance or a source of new vulnerabilities.

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