To Lam’s Foreign Policy Leadership in the “Era of National Rise”

INTRODUCTION

Since assuming office as General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in August 2024, To Lam has approached the role as “a man with a mission”, tying his political destiny to the broader project of national transformation. He has launched institutional and economic reforms aimed at propelling Vietnam into a developed high-income economy by 2045. While this goal has long been set, To Lam infuses it with great urgency and determination. His flagship “Streamlining Revolution” has consolidated ministries from 22 to 17 agencies, merged 63 provinces down to 34 and eliminated district-level governance, targeting a 20% reduction in government workforce (400,000 people), while his economic reforms emphasise private sector empowerment through streamlined laws and improved access to capital, land, and government contracts. Breaking from the heavily ideological role of the General Secretary, he exercises hands-on, pragmatic, and results-driven political stewardship, pursuing his strategic vision through decisive time-bound action to accelerate the country’s transformation.

The same drive and decisiveness shape To Lam’s approach to foreign affairs, where he takes direct charge to navigate complex international dynamics and safeguard national interests. Drawing on his long tenure as minister of public security, he leverages the ministry’s intelligence and strategic analysis apparatus to read both opportunity and risk in a rapidly changing world. Unlike his predecessors, who traditionally exercised power at home while leaving international representation to the president and prime minister, To Lam asserts himself at the forefront – demonstrating that Vietnam’s paramount leader is not just the guardian of the Party, but the face of the nation on the global stage. This article examines To Lam’s foreign policy leadership, framing it within the context of his bold domestic reforms and the new norms he sets as the Party chief in steering Vietnam’s global engagement.

TO LAM’S FOREIGN POLICY LEADERSHIP

Foreign Policy as a “Crucial and Regular Task”

Enhancing the quality and reach of international integration to make Vietnam a “wealthy people, strong nation” is a central priority in To Lam’s vision. Since Vietnam’s launch of Doi Moi (Renovation) in the late 1980s, strengthening foreign relations to serve national construction has been a consistent policy. What is new under To Lam is the elevation of foreign policy from an enabling instrument to the very core of national strategy. In January 2025, the CPV Central Committee adopted Resolution 59-NQ/TW, codifying “proactive international integration” among the four strategic pillars driving Vietnam’s leap into a “new era”, alongside Science, Technology, Innovation and Digital Transformation; Institutional Reform: Lawmaking and Enforcement; and Private Sector Development as the Engine of Economic Growth. Significantly, Resolution 59 designates “external affairs and international relations” as a “crucial and regular task” (“trọng yếu và thường xuyên”), a status previously reserved for security and defence. In earlier Party documents, foreign relations were recognised as playing a “pioneering role” (“vai trò tiên phong”).

The new designation of “a crucial and regular task”, alongside “pioneering role”, elevates the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to a standing ostensibly comparable to that of the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of National Defence in the domestic hierarchy. At the same time, the institutional overhaul has consolidated foreign policymaking and execution within state agencies, subsuming Party and parliamentary external relations under the MFA’s lead. This centralisation has streamlined decision-making and coordination in foreign affairs, accelerating the translation of Party resolutions into concrete policy and action.

At the core of To Lam’s vision for Vietnam’s international integration is the imperative of economic diplomacy; while a longstanding component of Vietnam’s foreign relations, it now carries an urgent, results-driven mandate that reflects foreign policy’s elevation to a “crucial and regular task”, harnessing international cooperation to accelerate economic restructuring and recalibrate Vietnam’s growth model through technological upgrading and higher-value participation in global supply chains. As To Lam has cautioned, “Vietnam cannot be allowed to remain just an assembly and processing base, a technological dumping ground for the world, while its domestic firms gain no know-how.” He has called for “a new mindset, position, and approach to international relations,” linking the “new era” of the nation with profound ongoing transformations in the global landscape.

A sense of urgency permeates this vision, which views the narrowing window of opportunity leading up to 2030 as a decisive phase, cognizant of the risk of falling behind if Vietnam does not act strategically. To this end, To Lam has highlighted two sets of priority sectors to leverage international resources: (i) new drivers of growth linked to digital transformation, including ICT, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence; and (ii) critical infrastructure, especially high-speed rail, airports, and nuclear power plants.

Two imperatives consistently emerge in his external engagements: facilitating the transfer of technology, technical skills, and governance expertise; and pursuing diversification to avoid overdependence on any single partner.

General Secretary’s Foreign Policy Activism

According to Vietnam’s 2013 Constitution, the president represents the Vietnamese state internationally; the prime minister coordinates government foreign affairs, executes economic diplomacy, and negotiates and concludes international treaties; and the Party – headed by the general secretary though not explicitly stated in the Constitution – sets the strategic direction for the country’s foreign relations. Traditionally, these roles were rather distinct: the president’s was largely ceremonial, the prime minister’s executive, and the general secretary’s strategic and political. Under To Lam, these functions have converged as he combines international representation, economic diplomacy, and strategic guidance into a highly visible foreign policy leadership.

 No previous Party chief has travelled so extensively and pursued so intently a substantive, economics-focused agenda. Within one year, he has visited 16 countries spanning multiple regions…

Traditionally, VCP general secretaries confined their external engagements to fellow communist countries, immediate neighbours Laos and Cambodia, and countries with which Vietnam had forged special bonds during the Cold War, notably China, Russia, India, and Cuba. Nguyen Phu Trong, To Lam’s predecessor, made a historic breakthrough by engaging directly in high-level diplomacy with the US. His official visit to Washington in 2015, where he was received by President Obama, remains one of his defining foreign policy legacies. Yet, aside from balancing ties with Washington and Beijing, Trong largely kept to tradition, focusing on partners bound to Vietnam by history and ideology.

By contrast, To Lam has moved swiftly to cover a far broader global footprint. No previous Party chief has travelled so extensively and pursued so intently a substantive, economics-focused agenda. Within one year, he has visited 16 countries spanning multiple regions: neighbouring Laos and Cambodia; major powers such as China, the US, Russia and South Korea; key ASEAN partners including Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore; European states such as Ireland and France; and traditional friends like Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Mongolia and Cuba. His itinerary also encompassed major multilateral platforms, including the UN, ASEAN, and the Francophonie.

During these visits, To Lam’s foreign policy activism was on full display, blending the domestic authority of a Party leader with the global stature of a head of state and the economic diplomacy of a prime minister. He addressed the 79^th UN General Assembly in September 2024, and the 19^th Francophonie Summit in October 2024, during a period when he also held the office of president. He delivered policy speeches at the ASEAN Secretariat and leading universities in the US, Malaysia, Singapore, Russia, and South Korea. Across these platforms, his messages reaffirm Vietnam’s commitment to proactive international integration, and project Vietnam’s determination to embark on a “new era of national development” through industrialisation, modernisation, and economic restructuring. He also called for international support and collaboration in these endeavours. Beyond the content, what stands out is the confidence of a leader comfortably engaging with international audiences, reflecting an openness to dialogue, and outward-looking leadership.

Economic Diplomacy at the Front and Centre

As To Lam drives economic restructuring at home, he actively pursues economic diplomacy abroad. Economic objectives are integrated into all of his international engagements, reflecting his conviction that Vietnam’s international integration must serve the country’s ambitious agenda of high-quality growth and structural transformation. His state visit to China in August 2024 underscored this results-driven approach, resulting in 14 agreements spanning sectors such as railway connectivity, agriculture, artificial intelligence, and industrial development. One key outcome was the resolution of technical discrepancies to enable China’s support in upgrading the Lang Son-Ha Noi and Mong Cai-Ha Long-Hai Phong rail lines in Northern Vietnam to standard gauge, along with a feasibility study for a new Lao Cai-Hanoi-Hai Phong railway. Once completed, these corridors will not only boost Vietnam-China cross-border trade and but also link Vietnam to China’s rail system, which further extends to Central Asia and Europe.

Beyond trade and infrastructure, To Lam’s engagement with China’s technologies underscores his vision of placing innovation at the heart of Vietnam’s growth strategy. In Beijing, he visited Megvii Technology, a Chinese leading AI company, and discussed with Chinese corporate leaders, focusing on talent development and data management. Acknowledging China’s strides in science and technology, he stressed Vietnam’s determination to similarly harness innovation as a key driver of economic transformation and highlighted the pivotal role of human capital in advancing technological progress.

This emphasis on technology soon became a hallmark of To Lam’s diplomacy. During his working visit to the US in September 2024, he attended a seminar on semiconductor and AI, and addressed a business forum where he urged US companies to invest in Vietnam’s high-value sectors, including science and technology, innovation, R&D, chip manufacturing, AI, finance, biotechnology, and healthcare. He also met with leaders of major US corporations in energy, satellite, and technology, including AES Corporation, SpaceX, and Google, to enlist their cooperation in moving Vietnam up the global technological value chain. At the policy level, To Lam’s meeting with President Joe Biden focused on implementing the two countries’ joint statement to deepen cooperation in trade, investment, high technology, and human resources development.

During his official visit to Singapore in March 2025, To Lam delivered a policy address at the National University of Singapore, highlighting scientific innovation and digital transformation as the “golden key” for Vietnam to become a modern industrial country by 2030 and a developed, high-income country by 2045. The visit witnessed the signing of an MOU on integrating new technologies and green energy solutions across 20 Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Parks (VSIPs) in Vietnam. While in Singapore, he also met with business leaders – a practice that has become a regular feature of his overseas trips.

Technology cooperation also featured prominently during To Lam’s state visit to South Korea in August 2025, as Seoul may be Vietnam’s most promising partner for technological upgrading in the near future. South Korea has long been a leading foreign investor in Vietnam, helping to transform the country into a global hub for electronics manufacturing. Yet much of the value remains locked in Korean firms: despite soaring exports, Vietnamese suppliers are largely confined to low-value assembly, with limited presence in design, R&D, or component manufacturing. Seeking not only to sustain investment flows but also to recalibrate the terms of cooperation, To Lam called for a shift from “economic cooperation to full economic linkage”. He urged South Korean businesses to move beyond investment in assembly lines towards joint development of production chains, and to establish R&D centres in Vietnam to facilitate deeper participation of Vietnamese enterprises in their global supply networks.

Diversification is another key focus of To Lam’s economic diplomacy. His tour across Eurasia – Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Belarus – yielded around 60 cooperative agreements, focusing on trade facilitation, logistics and energy, and aiming to leverage Vietnam’s free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Notably, of the 16 agreements signed during his visit to Russia, five pertained to energy cooperation, including ongoing Vietnam-Russia oil and gas joint ventures in the South China Sea and Russia. Of note, Russia is poised to be Vietnam’s preferred partner for its first nuclear power plant, targeted for commercial operation by 2035. Long delayed, the project has gained new momentum under To Lam, who sees nuclear power development as essential for economic growth and values cooperation with Russia in this sector.

Balancing Act among Major Powers

For Vietnam’s ambitious domestic reforms to be successful, it needs to secure stable and favourable international conditions. However, these conditions are under mounting strain. Particularly, the Trump administration’s aggressive efforts to reshape global trade and roll back globalisation through sweeping tariffs have posed a direct challenge to Vietnam’s export-oriented model, which relies heavily on Chinese inputs and on the US as the largest export market.

So far, To Lam has walked a fine line.

Sustaining a stable and constructive relationship with Beijing remains the foremost priority. Unlike Nguyen Phu Trong – a party ideologue who presided as general secretary for nearly three terms and cultivated a notably warm personal rapport with Xi Jinping, To Lam rose to power under very different circumstances. His ascent was swift, coming in the wake of Trong’s passing and a wave of corruption scandals that toppled key rivals, a sequence over which Beijing had limited influence. Furthermore, right after assuming power, To Lam undertook bold institutional reforms that could have taken Beijing by surprise, including the dissolution of the Central Commission for External Relations, traditionally the main conduit for CPV’s ties with the Chinese Communist Party.

Against this backdrop, building trust and rapport with the Chinese leadership became a priority for To Lam. He chose Beijing for his first overseas trip as Party chief in August 2024 and hosted Xi Jinping in Hanoi in April 2025. Maintaining strategic stability with China is a key objective, but economic pragmatism also weighs heavily. Hanoi aims to secure access to China as the largest export market for its agricultural products while leveraging China’s cooperation in infrastructure and connectivity, as reflected in multiple agreements signed during Xi’s visit on transport, energy, seaports, logistics, and aviation. Of note is a new joint committee on railway cooperation to advance cross-border rail links between China and northern Vietnam, with the support of Chinese technical assistance and concessional loans.

Regarding the US, Donald J. Trump’s return to the White House with a radical anti-trade agenda posed a significant challenge for Vietnam, which holds the world’s third-largest trade surplus with the US. This situation also presented a critical test for To Lam to demonstrate proactive and decisive leadership. He was the first Southeast Asian leader to call Trump following the Liberation Day “reciprocal” tariff announcement on 2 April, setting the stage for immediate negotiations. Soon after, Deputy Prime Minister Ho Duc Phoc was dispatched to Washington as his special envoy – a move considered unusual since trade negotiations are typically the government’s domain. As talks dragged on and deadlines loomed, To Lam had a second call with Trump, leading to the announcement of a Vietnam-US trade deal, the second publicised after the US-UK agreement, although the details remain to be worked out. The deal lowered US tariffs on Vietnamese exports from a threatened 46% to 20%, while trans-shipped goods faced a 40% levy. Some have argued that Vietnam’s first-mover advantage may be limited, given that other Southeast Asian states such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand face slightly lower rates of 19%. This, however, overlooks two crucial points: Vietnam’s trade surplus with the US is substantially larger, and the 20% tariff remains comparatively favourable against major competitors such as China and India.

Under To Lam, Vietnam’s foreign policy towards major powers continues to rest on the longstanding principle of maintaining good relations with all. Its execution, however, has acquired a more forward-leaning and risk-tolerant character…

Through these critical episodes, To Lam projected himself as a decisive leader prepared to take high-stake gambits: offering zero tariffs on US imports, sidestepping legal strictures to allow Elon Musk’s Starlink low-orbit satellite in Vietnam, and fast-tracking approval for a joint venture project with the Trump Organization to build a US$1.5 billion golf resort in Hung Yen Province.

Under his stewardship, the tightrope between Washington and Beijing has gotten thinner but it does not necessarily diminish Vietnam’s agency to navigate it. Vietnam’s aviation diplomacy between the two powers is a case in point. On one hand, Vietnam is trying to narrow its trade surplus with the US by agreeing to major aircraft purchases – two Lockheed Martin helicopters for the Ministry of Public Security and 50 Boeing commercial aircraft. On the other hand, in April, it became the third country in Southeast Asia, after Laos and Indonesia, to put China’s homegrown C909 jetliner into commercial service on a domestic route.

Under To Lam, Vietnam’s foreign policy towards major powers continues to rest on the longstanding principle of maintaining good relations with all. Its execution, however, has acquired a more forward-leaning and risk-tolerant character, driven by a determination to pursue multi-alignment where it advances national interests in an increasingly fraught international environment.

On one hand, Hanoi has kept China and Russia close: To Lam attended Russia’s World War II Victory Parade in Moscow, while President Luong Cuong took part in China’s commemoration in September. In 2025, Vietnam became a BRICS partner country, and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh joined the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Tianjin as guest of the host.

At the same time, Hanoi continues to court US investment, trade and technology, and strengthen ties with US allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Europe. On the South China Sea dispute, To Lam largely maintains his predecessor’s strategy of backgrounding tensions while focusing on economic cooperation. Yet, Vietnam is determined to conduct a “quiet struggle” to defend its maritime interests, pursuing lawfare through its submission for an extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the central South China Sea to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, alongside extensive reclamation efforts in the Spratly Islands, reportedly moving to match the scale of China’s activities in the area.

CONCLUSION

In just one year, To Lam has redefined the role of the CPV general secretary, projecting a hands-on and proactive engagement in governance at home and economic diplomacy abroad. He has placed international integration at the heart of Vietnam’s strategy for “national rise”, and combined global representation, economic diplomacy, and strategic guidance into a single mantle through his external engagements. Guided by careful management of major-power relationships and pragmatic multi-alignment, his approach seeks to preserve Vietnam’s agency even amid intensifying global headwinds. While the country’s “national rise” is not guaranteed, To Lam’s proactive and purposeful foreign policy leadership signals a determined effort to achieve it.

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This is an adapted version of ISEAS Perspective 2025/75 published on 8 October 2025. The paper and its references can be accessed at this link.