Trump 2.0 and Thailand: Transactional Realism

There are concerns that the return of US President Donald Trump will lead to significant fissures in US-Thailand relations. But these fears can be overdone, given that Trump’s approach to Southeast Asia is informed by his focus on China. That said, however, Thailand will have to sustain its hedging strategy with possible pressures from Trump, particularly in the fields of economics and trade. Biden’s liberal internationalism saw the US bolstering US-led alliances and partnerships, global institutions, open markets, and liberal democracy. In contrast, Trump appears to view the world through the prism of what might be called transactional realism. This prioritises state security in terms of optimal relative gains, neo-mercantilist dollar diplomacy, winning deals, and decoupling from interdependence (especially with China). Overall, it translates US security into maintaining trade and financial advantages over smaller countries while keeping China down.

Biden built multilateral linkages with ASEAN states. These included the 2022 Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), an environment and worker-friendly arrangement with 13 Asian states including Thailand, and a 30-year civil nuclear cooperation deal with Thailand. It is still unclear to what extent Trump might withdraw the US from these accords; an exit from IPEF will echo his withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017. Thailand’s support for IPEF is based on its interest in balancing Washington against Beijing, given the latter’s extensive influence in Southeast Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Judging by Trump 1.0, trade will be a key part of Trump 2.0’s policy toward Thailand. In 2020, Trump put Thailand on the US Currency Manipulation Watch List. In that year, he suspended Thailand’s Generalized System of Preference benefits (worth US$1.3 billion) because Thailand had not given the US reasonable “market access” for pork products (Thailand had banned the pork because of chemicals injected into it). Since 2007, Thailand has been on the US Watch List for intellectual property and enforcement. For the 12 months ended October 2024, Thailand’s trade surplus with the US stood at US$32.8 billion.

Thai officials have argued that the surplus arose because US companies invested in Thailand and exported goods back to the US. But the Trump administration may nevertheless increase import tariffs against Thailand. Their perceptions are aggravated by Thailand’s high tariffs on US products, and there are also concerns that Thailand allows Chinese companies to relocate to Thailand to escape US tariffs directed against Beijing.                                              

Geopolitically, Trump 2.0 will likely view threats from China as paramount in Southeast Asia. The US and China are locked in a strategic competition in the region with Cambodia, Laos, and parts of Myanmar having slipped under Beijing’s sway. While Thai-US relations have been close, Chinese economic and military connections with Bangkok, alongside Chinese soft power in Thailand, have rapidly intensified. Beijing’s burgeoning influence has been partly factored into Thailand’s decision to be a hedger, whereby it maintains a balance between the two superpowers. 

In this context, Trump 2.0 should engage more with Bangkok, if only to keep Thailand from falling further under China’s sphere of influence. He should build on Biden’s 2022 US-Thailand Communique on Strategic Alliance and Partnership (which sought to expand the bilateral relationships in key aspects such as defence, economic revitalisation and public health). He should avoid putting Thailand on the “back burner” (in Thailand’s view, the Biden administration had prioritised relationships with Singapore, the Philippines and Vietnam).

Ultimately, the advent of Trump 2.0 will likely involve small and incremental changes in US-Thai relations because of Trump’s focus on great powers, specifically China. 

Washington is concerned that Thailand might tilt its military procurement closer to China, a possibility exemplified by Thailand’s impending purchase of a Chinese submarine. In a 2024 demonstration of hedging, Bangkok purchased Swedish Gripen aircraft over more US F-16s (or Chinese aircraft). One should expect Trump to be more demanding of a deal whereby Bangkok purchases more US military equipment, similar to Trump 1.0’s 2019 sale of Stryker infantry carriers to Thailand.

It is surprising that Trump, who has vowed to scale down the size of the US’ bureaucracy, has selected Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State. Unlike Trump, Rubio enjoys bipartisan support as an anti-authoritarian  “institutionalist” who will execute the administration’s foreign policy while not “taking a sledgehammer” to its foreign service.

Though Rubio seemed to reluctantly support Trump’s suspension of humanitarian assistance to refugees in the region, Rubio’s take on human rights in Southeast Asia and China would likely gel with Trump’s approach to Beijing. Rubio has criticised the human rights practices of Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar. He has pledged to pressure Thailand not to deport 48 Uyghur people (held since 2014) back to China where they face ethnic and religious persecution. Rubio’s castigation of China’s human rights record might also help with Trump’s bashing of Beijing. As evidenced by his nomination hearings, Rubio has demonstrated a measured approach to ASEAN (and Thailand), focused on maintaining the grouping’s centrality, economic cooperation and multilateral engagement (the latter being quite different from Trump’s transactional approach). This might be beneficial to Thailand, a founding member of ASEAN.

Ultimately, the advent of Trump 2.0 will likely involve small and incremental changes in US-Thai relations because of Trump’s focus on great powers, specifically China.  Trump 2.0 could take a three-pronged approach: taking out his ire against perceived unfair trade practices by Bangkok; demonstrating his geopolitical displeasure at Thailand’s hedging and intermittent tilting toward China; and exercising more pressure on Thailand to move against the Chinese government.

That said, Trump and Rubio should be mindful of walking a fine line. Compared to its neighbours which have tilted towards China, Thailand has gained security and aid by hedging between China and the US. The expansion of Chinese influence across Southeast Asia could lead to fear in Bangkok and tilt Thailand closer to the US. But Trump needs to take care not to initiate excessively hardline economic policies toward Thailand. If he goes above specific thresholds, this might disrupt Thailand’s delicate strategy of hedging and push it closer to Beijing.  The question remains as to what those thresholds might be.

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