Trump 2.0 and the US-Philippines Alliance: Consistency and Change

The 2024 United States presidential election, pitting former president Donald Trump against Vice President Kamala Harris, was watched closely by all states within the US-led alliance system, but the Philippines remained ambivalent because both candidates have pledged their commitments to the alliance. 

The key difference would be in how each candidate approaches the alliance and pushes it forward. In the lead-up to the elections, the Philippines only sought clarity on their positions. Harris was supportive of the alliance and was seen as bringing strategic continuity. Likewise, Trump has a history of support for the alliance. Most notably, it was under his leadership that the alliance blossomed into having concrete deterrence measures. The US-Philippines alliance’s foremost concern is China, and this remains a bipartisan issue within the US political establishment.

Trump 2.0 is a welcome development for the Philippines for two reasons. First, there is a sense of familiarity as the Philippines already has experience managing relations positively with the previous Trump administration (2017-2020). The second reason is that many of the nominations for the Trump cabinet are hawkish on China in disposition. 

There are several changes that the Philippines foresees in US foreign policy under Trump. The chief of these is the internal dynamics of the alliance. Trump’s “transactional” approach may necessitate discussions about burden-sharing, specifically on the provisions of defence assurances and assets. Alliance cooperative activities such as the Balikatan and Kamandag exercises, joint civilian patrols (for example, Task Force Ayungin), and the expansion of the deterrence umbrella against China are all expected to increase in intensity and volume.

Meanwhile, third-party entities such as the EU are expected to be more engaged in the region as the US will be more vocal in calling for their participation. The challenge in this will be in how individual states such as France and Germany will harmonise this with their own respective policies towards China. Despite the split European disposition on Trump and his policies, some EU officials have hewed close to Trump’s position by welcoming the anti-China stance. The Philippines shares in that stance and therefore expects a wide degree of continuity in alliance dynamics.

During a congratulatory call to Trump in November last year, President Bongbong Marcos Jr. revealed the incoming US president’s support for the alliance. Neither the Trump nor Marcos administrations have given any sign of backpedalling on this front. Thus, high-level exchanges will continue, as well as frequent and vocal support for Philippine positions (for example, the 2016 Arbitration Award on the South China Sea and the Maritime Zones Act). The broad economic and military support for the Philippines will be framed as deterring, and in a sense challenging, China. 

There is a pressing need to delineate the involvement of the US in regional contingencies. At this, individual approaches should be pursued first; it should be clarified that the Mutual Defense Treaty should be for joint issues only.

The Philippines also expects to attain key strategic objectives for the alliance that should materialise in the next four years. There is the broad aim of modernising the alliance, as outlined in the 2023 Bilateral Defense Guidelines (BDG). The goal of modernisation began during the Biden and Duterte administrations. There are three overarching aims. Firstly, the institutionalisation of the alliance through deeper engagement through channels, talks, positions, and defence posture. Secondly, greater military cooperation via lobbying for a bigger slice of the defence budget (US$500 million in foreign military financing recently approved by the US Congress could materialise in the next few years under Trump 2.0). Lastly, the alliance will leverage different non-traditional security issues, such as safe uses of nuclear energy, maritime domain awareness, and cybersecurity and cyberdefence. 

The Philippines is optimistic as the US has been active in its alliance strengthening in recent years. Achievements include the two allies finally signing the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2024. Together with Japan, Washington has been deliberate in integrating Manila into a wider network of countries ostensibly set up to promote the so-called rules-based order. Established in 2024, the historic Japan-Philippines-US (JAPHUS) trilateral is intended to develop integrated deterrence. Japan and the Philippines inked a Reciprocal Access Agreement in July 2024, following the inaugural 2+2 Ministerial Meetings the previous year. In 2021, the Australia-UK -US (AUKUS) Trilateral Security Agreement was established to share key nuclear power propulsion technologies.

Nevertheless, the Philippines has concerns that it hopes the Trump 2.0 administration will address. As outlined in the BDG, specifically the items Foundation No. 19 and Guideline No. 6, ASEAN centrality and inclusion in security fora are essential and must continue to be respected by the US. The Philippines expects follow-throughs on economic policy pronouncements. There is currently no direction on the Luzon Economic Corridor nor on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (it is highly likely that Trump will jettison the latter).

Further clarity on the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) should be a priority. There is an increasingly urgent need to clarify exactly what actions committed against the Philippines (or against the US) would trigger the MDT, including so-called grey zone activities and cyber-attacks. Several US secretaries of defense, most recently Lloyd Austin, said that they stand ready to fulfil their commitments under Article 5.

There is a pressing need to delineate the involvement of the US in regional contingencies. At this, individual approaches should be pursued first; it should be clarified that the MDT should be for joint issues only. The involvement of either the Philippines or the US will need to be synchronised. For example, the Taiwan issue is primarily a US issue and the Myanmar a solely ASEAN one. Yet the South China Sea is a joint US-Philippines issue. These distinctions are necessary to solidify where alliance commitments begin and end.

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