Türkiye’s Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: The New Kid on the Block

INTRODUCTION

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2020 and 2024 global defence spending increased by 9.4 per cent compared to the previous five-year period, rising to US$2.7 trillion, the highest amount ever recorded by the Swedish think tank.

Defence spending was up in every region of the world. In Southeast Asia it rose by 7.5 per cent to hit US$55 billion, a three-fold increase since 2015. This increase was higher than in South Asia (1 per cent) and Oceania (1.5 per cent) and only slightly lower than in East Asia (7.8 per cent). Defence spending in Southeast Asia has risen due to a combination of factors, including the need to replace ageing equipment, escalating tensions over maritime disputes, and growing strategic uncertainties arising from US-China rivalry.

While Southeast Asia’s arms market is dominated by US, European and increasingly South Korean companies, Turkish defence firms are becoming important players and look set to increase their market share. They offer technologically advanced military hardware at cheaper prices than their Western counterparts, and also provide an important alternative to countries in the Global South that seek to insulate themselves from the vagaries of great power strategic and economic competition. In addition, although Türkiye is officially a secular state, its status as a Muslim-majority country appeals to decision-makers in Indonesia and Malaysia. This article examines Türkiye’s role in the global arms market, its interests in Southeast Asia and its defence sales to Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

TÜRKIYE AND THE GLOBAL ARMS INDUSTRY

According to SIPRI data for 2020-24, the five biggest defence exporters in the world were the United States (with 43 per cent market share), France (9.6 per cent), Russia (7.8 per cent), China (5.9 per cent) and Germany (5.6 per cent). Türkiye was ranked 11^th. Its share of global defence sales was only 1.7 per cent, but this was up from 0.8 per cent in 2015-19, a 103 per cent increase in the volume of total arms exports per exporter. Turkey’s defence exports increased from US$2 billion in 2020 to US$7 billion in 2024.

Over the past decade, Türkiye has emerged as an important player in the global arms market, especially for Muslim-majority countries. Of Türkiye’s top ten export markets, nine are fellow Islamic countries (the tenth is Ukraine). Ankara has successfully positioned itself as a serious player in the sale of defence equipment for two main reasons. First, its companies produce state-of-the-art defence technologies that are comparatively cheaper than their Western counterparts, but which are also NATO-compatible. Türkiye is also willing to transfer technology to enable equipment to be assembled or manufactured in the customer’s home country, thus helping to develop their domestic defence industries and enhance their strategic autonomy. Second, countries in the Global South view Türkiye as an attractive alternative arms supplier to defence companies in the US and Europe, and even China and Russia. By buying from Türkiye, countries hope to avoid becoming entangled in major power competition and avoid US sanctions.

For Türkiye itself, its arms exports provide a lucrative revenue stream and also reduce the country’s dependence on foreign suppliers. Ankara has supported the development of the country’s arms industry since the 1970s, but the pace of expansion has increased considerably since President Recep Erdogan took office in 2014. According to SIPRI, between 2015-19 and 2020-24, Türkiye’s arms imports fell 33 per cent, from 1.7 per cent of global arms imports to 1.1 per cent. Türkiye reduced its reliance on foreign suppliers from providing 70 per cent of its needs in 2002 to 30 per cent in 2020. Defence sales have also allowed Ankara to grow its geopolitical influence in regions it considers of key importance, especially the Middle East and the Caucasus.

The country’s defence industry’s signature export is Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones. The Bayraktar TB2, a medium-altitude, long-range UAV which first entered service in 2016, in particular helped put Türkiye on the global military map. In 2020, Azerbaijan’s armed forces used the TB2 to achieve military successes against Armenia in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. In 2022 the TB2 helped Ukraine’s armed forces slow Russia’s military invasion. Türkiye also has an advanced naval shipbuilding industry capable of designing and building corvettes, frigates, destroyers and submarines. Türkiye also plans to build its own aircraft carrier.

While UAV production remains important to Türkiye, its hopes to increase its share of global defence sales by entering the lucrative market for fast jets. Ankara plans to achieve this goal with the Kaan. This fifth-generation air superiority stealth fighter is being developed by state-owned Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) in collaboration with the UK’s BAE Systems. The project was established in 2016 to provide replacements for the Turkish air force’s fleet of ageing US-made F-16s. Türkiye planned to operate the Kaan alongside the US-made F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation stealth fighter. However, in 2019 Washington suspended Türkiye from the F-35 programme because it had procured Russia’s S-400 surface-to-air missile system – the US was concerned that the S-400 would enable Moscow to collect sensitive operational and technicial information on the F-35. Following Türkiye’s suspension from the F-35 programme, Ankara ordered TAI to accelerate the development of the Kaan.

The Kaan’s maiden flight took place in February 2024. TAI expects to begin serial production of the Kaan in 2028. Although the aircraft is currently powered by two US-made General Electric F-110 engines, Türkiye’s TUSAS Engine Industries is developing a domestically produced engine, the TF-35000, which it hopes will be ready to power the Kaan by the early 2030s. TAI is promoting the Kaan to potential overseas customers as a cheaper but more capable alternative to the single-engined F-35 as its two engines give the aircraft a larger payload (10 tons versus 6 tons) and  longer range. The Turkish air force plans to operate 100 Kaans. TAI is also developing a naval version of the Kaan for use on Türkiye’s proposed 60,000-ton aircraft carrier. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia (both of which were refused permission to buy the F-35 by the United States due to objections from Israel which argued the fifth-generation aircraft would erode its air superiority in the Middle East), as well as Egypt, Pakistan and Azerbaijan, have expressed interest in joining the Kaan programme. However, as described below, in 2025 it was Indonesia that became the Kaan’s first overseas customer.

TÜRKIYE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia is not a priority area for Türkiye. However, the region is of growing interest to Ankara, primarily for economic reasons. Türkiye has embassies in all ten ASEAN member states and in 2010 it acceded to the organisation’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. In 2017, Türkiye became a Sectoral Dialogue Partner of ASEAN. Ankara has ambitions to become a full Dialogue Partner but will have to wait until ASEAN lifts the moratorium on new Dialogue Partners. Türkiye’s trade with Southeast Asia has been growing steadily: from US$6.9 billion in 2010 to US$13 billion in 2023. Ankara views defence sales as a key means to strengthen its ties with Southeast Asia.

… countries in the Global South view Türkiye as an attractive alternative arms supplier to defence companies in the US and Europe, and even China and Russia. By buying from Türkiye, countries hope to avoid becoming entangled in major power competition and avoid US sanctions.

As noted earlier, Türkiye is able to offer regional states advanced defence technology at cheaper rates than the US and Europe can. In addition, Türkiye is increasingly viewed by the Muslim-majority states of Indonesia and Malaysia as an important defence partner. In February 2025, when President Erdogan visited both these countries, defence cooperation was high on his agenda.

INDONESIA AND TÜRKIYE

Under Prabowo Subianto, first as defence minister in the Jokowi administration (2019-24) and since taking office as president in October 2024, Indonesia has embarked on an ambitious multi-billion dollar defence modernisation programme. The focus of this programme is the acquisition of naval vessels and fighter aircraft from a range of countries including the United States, France and South Korea. But Türkiye has also figured prominently in Prabowo’s plans to upgrade the operational capabilities and lethality of Indonesia’s armed forces.

Technology, price, and the establishment of joint manufacturing plants in Indonesia are not the only reasons Jakarta values Ankara as a defence partner. The two countries have similar characteristics, shared experiences, and geopolitical outlooks. Both countries have Muslim-majority populations and fought against colonial powers to gain independence. Indonesia and Türkiye are middle powers that seek to expand their influence in their respective regions, i.e. Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Jakarta and Ankara are members of the G20 and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, as well as several lesser-known multilateral economic cooperation forums, including the D-8 (established in 1997 by Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Türkiye, Malaysia, Pakistan and Nigeria, and joined by Azerbaijan in 2025) and MIKTA (Mexico-Indonesia-Korea-Turkey-Australia). Both governments have strongly criticised Israel’s invasion of Gaza.

Indonesia-Türkiye defence cooperation dates back to 2015, when the Turkish company FNSS and Indonesia’s Pindad agreed to jointly develop Harimau medium-weight tanks to be built in Indonesia. The Indonesian army currently operates 18 of the tanks, but has plans to acquire several hundred more. In 2022, Jakarta ordered two KCR fast-attack missile boats from Türkiye’s TAIS shipyards as well as an undisclosed number of Khan short-range ballistic missiles from the Turkish weapons manufacturer Roketsan at a cost of US$528 million. Deliveries of the Khan began in mid-2025 and the first batteries were deployed to East Kalimantan, close to Indonesia’s proposed new administrative capital Nusantara and the strategically important Lombok-Makassar Strait. The Khan provides Indonesia with the most advanced long-range precision strike capabilities in Southeast Asia. In 2023, Indonesia purchased 12 ANKA-S surveillance drones from TAI for US$300 million and a year later, 45 ATMACA anti-ship missiles from Roketsan. The ATMACA has a longer range (250 kilometres) than the US Harpoon (200 kilometres) and the French Exocet (130 kilometres) anti-ship missiles.

In 2025, Indonesia and Türkiye marked the 75^th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties. In February, President Erdogan visited Indonesia, and in April, President Prabowo travelled to Türkiye. In Jakarta, Erdogan and Prabowo pledged to strengthen defence cooperation. To that end, on the sidelines of the two leaders’ meeting, Türkiye’s Baykar and Indonesia’s PT Republikorp agreed to establish a joint production facility in Indonesia to manufacture up to 60 Bayraktar TB3 UAVs (an upgraded version of the Bayraktar TB2) and nine Bayraktar AKINCI high-altitude drones. In a joint press conference with Erdogan in Türkiye, Prabowo announced that Indonesia wanted to participate in the Kaan programme, the first Southeast Asian country to express interest in the fifth-generation fighter. As with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Indonesia’s request to buy F-35s had been rejected by the United States. Moreover, Indonesia’s participation in South Korea’s development of a fifth-generation fighter jet, the KF-21 Boromae, has been reduced, apparently due to budgetary constraints.

In June and July 2025, Indonesian and Turkish defence companies signed a series of landmark industrial cooperation agreements. In June, at the Indo Defence Expo and Forum (IDEF) in Jakarta, Roketsan and PT Republik Defence Indonesia signed a co-production agreement to manufacture ATMACA anti-ship missiles in Indonesia. At the expo, it was also announced that a consortium of Turkish companies, including Roketsan, would provide the combat systems for the two Merah Putih-class frigates currently under construction in Indonesia. The following month, at the International Defence Industry Fair (IDEF) in Istanbul, TAI and PT Republik Aero Dirgantara signed a framework agreement for the production of 48 Kaan fighters for the Indonesian air force. The deal includes technology transfer, engineering support and long-term defence industrial collaboration. According to the CEO of TUSAS, Mehmet Demiroglu, the value of the contract is US$12-15 billion (other estimates put the contract at around US$10 billion). Demiroglu also stated that the Kaans for Indonesia would be powered by the TF-35000 engine. The delivery timeframe is expected to be ten years, suggesting that the Indonesian air force will start to receive its first Kaans in the mid-2030s. In addition to the Kaan deal, two other important agreements were signed at IDEF. Roketsan and PT Republikorp agreed to produce the Cakir cruise missile to arm Indonesian naval vessels. Indonesia and Türkiye also signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the construction of two 3,100-ton Istif-class frigates armed with ATMACA missiles for the Indonesian Navy for US$1 billion. This makes Indonesia the first overseas buyer for the Istif-class. There have been suggestions that Indonesia may partner with Türkiye to co-manufacture submarines.

MALAYSIA AND TÜRKIYE

In 2024, Malaysia was Türkiye’s seventh-largest defence partner and its oldest in Southeast Asia. In the early 2000s, Kuala Lumpur purchased 267 AVC-300 Adnan Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) for the Malaysian army, as well as other military vehicles, some of which were assembled in Malaysia. In 2022, Malaysia followed up with an order for 20 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) for use by Malaysian peacekeeping forces in Lebanon. In 2025, Malaysia bought three ANKA-S surveillance drones from TAI for US$85 million. The drones, which are expected to be delivered in 2026, will be based at the Royal Malaysian Air Force’s (RMAF) Labuan Air Base in East Malaysia. The drones will be used primarily for reconnaissance missions over the South China Sea, where Malaysia and China have overlapping maritime claims. In May 2025, Malaysia’s G7 Aerospace and Türkiye’s Savunma Teknolojileri ve Mühendislik (STM) entered an agreement to co-produce tactical UAVs in Malaysia.

In addition to military vehicles and drones, Malaysia has also turned to Turkish shipbuilders for naval vessels to strengthen its presence in the South China Sea. In June 2024, Malaysia signed a US$520 million contract with STM for the construction of three Ada-class corvettes (smaller versions of the Istif-class), which will be armed with ATMACA anti-ship missiles. The first of the three warships is due to be delivered in 2027. All three ships will be home ported at a new naval base at Muara Tebas in Sarawak, construction of which is slated to begin this year. The Muara Tebas base will be situated close to the Kasawari Gas Field in Malaysia’s 200 nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Since 2021, Malaysian-chartered survey ships and drilling rigs have been subjected to repeated harassment by China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels as the gas field falls within China’s nine-dash line. The new vessels are the second batch of Malaysia’s Littoral Mission Ship (LMS) programme. The first batch of four was built by China and Malaysia, all of which are now in service. However, Malaysia has not opted to buy the second batch from China, presumably due to rising tensions between the two countries in the South China Sea since 2020.

In February 2025, during a visit to Malaysia by President Erdogan, the two countries signed an MOU for the construction of a Multi-Purpose Mission Ship (MPMS) for the coastguard, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA). Five months later, the US$68 million contract was signed at the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition. According to MMEA Director-General Admiral Datuk Mohd Rosli Abdullah, “Once the vessel is completed, its primary focus will be surveillance operations in the South China Sea, particularly in addressing foreign vessel intrusions, illegal fishing activities, smuggling and human trafficking.”  Later this year, STM is likely to tender for the construction of three Multi-Role Support Ships (MRSS) for the RMN. STM faces stiff competition from shipbuilders in South Korea, Indonesia and Italy.

TAI has reportedly offered the Kaan fighter jet to Malaysia. Under Prime Minister Najib Razak (2009-18), Malaysia planned to acquire new fast jets to replace its ageing fleet of US- and Russian-made fighters under the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) programme. Due to the country’s economic problems, however, in 2019 the MRCA was suspended by then-Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. As a stopgap measure until economic conditions improved, in 2023, Malaysia purchased 18 FA-50 light attack aircraft from South Korea. A heavier, multi-role fighter for the RMAF remains an aspiration. Kuala Lumpur will undoubtedly consider the Kaan as a serious contender when the MRCA programme is restarted.

In Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia are Türkiye’s most important defence partners. Both countries have looked to Türkiye for the supply of UAVs, missiles and naval vessels.

THE PHILIPPINES AND TÜRKIYE

As part of the third phase of its Horizon defence modernisation programme, the Philippines has ambitious procurement plans that include new missile systems, offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), fighter jets and submarines. As part of phase three, Manila will likely purchase additional supersonic BrahMos cruise missiles from India (and possibly OPVs), subsonic Typhon missiles from the United States, Swedish Gripen fighter jets and French submarines. Türkiye has not figured prominently in the Horizon programme thus far, though the Philippines’ contracts with Turkish defence companies make it the country’s twentieth largest overall customer and third largest in Southeast Asia.

The Philippines’ largest contract with Türkiye’s defence sector was signed in 2020. The order included six Kunduz armoured engineering bulldozers, six Saber IFVs and six T-129B ATAK combat helicopters armed with CIRIT air-to-air missiles worth US$270 million. The T-129B is based on an Anglo-Italian AugustaWestland design and was selected by the Philippine Air Force (PAF) over US-made alternatives－including the Bell AH-1Z Viper and Boeing AH-64 Apache－because the unit price and operational costs were deemed to be much lower. All six helicopters are now in service with the PAF. Earlier this year, the Philippine Navy signed a US$641,000 contract with Türkiye’s oldest and largest arms company, Sarsilmaz, for the supply of 16 heavy machine guns for two Landing Platform Dock naval ships currently under construction in Indonesia and scheduled for delivery in 2026-27.

CONCLUSION

Türkiye is increasing its share of the global arms market, including in Southeast Asia, for several reasons. The first is the move by countries in the Global South to diversify their arms procurement to reduce dependence on the major powers. In particular, Türkiye appeals to Muslim-majority countries. Second, the country’s defence sector has developed advanced military technologies which it markets at competitive prices. Ankara’s willingness to transfer technology to overseas customers helps strengthen their strategic autonomy at a time of major power competition. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia are Türkiye’s most important defence partners. Both countries have looked to Türkiye for the supply of UAVs, missiles and naval vessels. Most significantly, Indonesia has become the first overseas customer for Türkiye’s fifth-generation Kaan fighter jet. In the near future, Malaysia could well become the region’s second customer for the Kaan. 

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This is an adapted version of ISEAS Perspective 2025/70 published on 19 September 2025. The paper and its references can be accessed at this link.