Uncertainties Cloud Trump’s Security Strategies to Asia

Many countries in Asia have concerns about a possible victory for former President Donald Trump in the 2024 US presidential election. They are anxious about his likely protectionist economic policies, especially those directed against China, which could cause direct or collateral damage to third countries, including those in Southeast Asia. There are also concerns about his geostrategic posture (the focus of this commentary). At this point, nobody knows what Trump’s specific policies will be.

Broadly, there are two views about the thrust of his strategic posture based on interpretations of Trump’s thinking, and his policies and behaviour during his first term as president. 

First, there is the view of the sceptics who have serious concerns about his strategic policies. Their doubts arise from Trump’s unpredictability and his transactional and isolationist inclinations.  They note that politicians in Japan and South Korea are unsettled about the future of their alliances with America as Trump will demand that these allies stump up more resources to maintain them.

On a broader canvas, Japan would be particularly concerned about his commitment to defend Taiwan. This is because Tokyo would regard a Chinese invasion of the island as a grave danger to Japan’s security and a blow to confidence in the American alliance system in Asia. Many in Japan also worry that a deal with Russia by a Trump administration at the expense of Ukraine will embolden China in Asia and cause it to be more aggressive.

Taiwan would have doubts whether Trump will help to defend it in the event of a military attack from China. Unlike President Joe Biden, Trump has never said that he would.   

Southeast Asia would be less affected than America’s allies, yet not entirely. Fundamentally, ASEAN countries want a rough strategic/military power equilibrium between the great powers in this region so that none is too dominant. They will be very concerned if this balance is seriously disturbed by a more disengaged and isolationist America. Many have been hedging, but their options may be limited if this occurs. The Philippines, like Japan and South Korea, is already doubling down on the side of the US, trying to lock in American support through further strengthening and institutionalisation of the bilateral relationship if Trump becomes president.  

…there remains considerable unease in Asia because of the perception of Trump’s unpredictability and transactional disposition and his failure to spell out in more detail what his security policies will be.

However, there is a less sceptical view of Trump which believes that he will strengthen deterrence and balance of power in the Indo-Pacific because he understands that China is the greatest strategic challenge to the US. Advocates of this view include former Trump official Elbridge Colby and the America First Policy Institute, founded by former Trump advisers. They believe that the US policy line to China is set for a generation to come and will not change. This is ensured by the strong bipartisan support for it in the US Congress, among foreign policy officials in Washington, and in the conservative wing of the Republican Party — all of whom believe that an “engagement” policy towards China has failed and must be replaced by a policy of strategic competition and preparedness for war. Above all, continuity is ensured by a fundamental shift towards a more critical view of China among Americans.

The Trump advocates remind critics that it was during Trump’s first term as president that the historic shift from engagement to competition with China took place. And it was under Trump that the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue first met at the foreign ministers’ level. The Trump administration also continued to maintain a strong military posture in Asia, including increasing freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea. So Trump will be focused on deterring armed conflict with China through a strategy of peace through strength but will keep the US out of wars in which vital US interests are not at stake, such as the war in Ukraine.  

Trump advocates argue that Trump understands Taiwan’s vital importance to US strategic interests. However, he is unwilling to commit himself to the defence of Taiwan because that would disincentivise Taiwan and Japan from strengthening their own militaries, which the US  would need on its side for any war over Taiwan. Trump also wants Taiwan to help re-establish chip-making in the US. Trump’s transactional approach is reflected in his interview responses to the Taiwan question. During an interview with Fox News in July 2023, Trump was asked if the US should go to war with China to help defend Taiwan. He said,  “If I answer that question, it will put me in a very bad negotiating position. With that being said, Taiwan did take all our chip business. We used to make our own. Now they’re made in Taiwan.”

This means that Trump will likely pursue the traditional US policy of strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan. It serves as a lever to get Taiwan and Japan to do what the US wants and keeps China guessing as to how the US will respond if it invades Taiwan. More recently, in an interview in July 2024 with Bloomberg Business Week, Trump said that “Taiwan should pay us for defence… You know we are no different from an insurance company.”

But Trump sceptics are not entirely persuaded by such arguments. They note that such positions were likely crafted by conservative security and military advisers in the first Trump administration. Trump’s unpredictability and the substantial powers of the American presidency in foreign affairs would enable him to override the established bureaucracy’s objections to his preferred policies.  Moreover, it is known that he regrets appointing the security and military advisers that he had during his first term as president because they curbed his freedom of action. This time around, he can be expected to appoint advisers whose thinking accords more with his own.

There remains considerable unease in Asia because of the perception of Trump’s unpredictability and transactional disposition, and his failure to spell out in more detail what his security policies will be. This uncertainty can affect the calculations of countries in the region.

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