Vuong Dinh Hue (C) taking an oath during the National Assembly's spring session in Hanoi. (Photo by AFP / Vietnam News Agency / STR)

Vietnam’s Deepening Leadership Crisis: More Instability on the Horizon?

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With the “resignation” of the chair of Vietnam’s National Assembly, the country is facing a leadership crisis.

On 26 April, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) announced the approval of Vuong Dinh Hue’s “resignation” from his position as Chair of the National Assembly, the fourth highest-ranking position in Vietnam’s political hierarchy. Hue’s dismissal, which occurred just over a month after President Vo Van Thuong’s resignation, highlights the leadership crisis in Vietnam and holds significant implications for the country’s political future.

Unlike the sudden fall of Thuong, Hue’s removal was widely anticipated as rumours had been circulating for weeks. These rumours were confirmed when the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security announced the arrest of Pham Thai Ha, Deputy Head of the National Assembly Office and a long-time close aide to Hue, on 22 April. Ha’s arrest was part of a larger investigation into the Thuan An Group, a construction company that had been awarded various public infrastructure projects across the country. While Thuan An faced accusations of bidding violations and bribery, Ha was arrested for “abusing position and power for personal gain”, a euphemism often used to refer to accepting bribes. It was alleged that for every project won through the influence of Ha (and ultimately his backer), Thuan An had to pay Ha a kickback of about 5 per cent of the project value.

With the CPV Central Committee’s acceptance of Hue’s resignation, the National Assembly will soon convene to formally vote on his dismissal and elect his successor. The Assembly will also elect a new state president, a position that has remained vacant since Thuong’s resignation. It is currently unclear who will be chosen for these positions. Online rumours suggest that Tran Thanh Man, Standing Vice Chair of the National Assembly, is the top candidate to replace Thuong. Truong Thi Mai, Standing Member of the CPV Secretariat, is in the running to replace Hue.

if the retirement age of 65 for Politburo members is strictly enforced, 10 out of the remaining 13 Politburo members will have to retire in 2026. This means that Vietnam’s leadership crisis and political instability may continue beyond 2026 unless the Party adds new and younger members to the Politburo.”

The election of Thuong and Hue’s successors, however, will not bring an immediate end to Vietnam’s leadership crisis. The removal of Hue, just one month after Thuong, has left two of the country’s top four political offices vacant. This has caused a sense of deepening turmoil, especially as Hue was considered a top candidate to replace General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, who is currently serving an unprecedented third term despite his advanced age and health issues. With Hue’s dismissal, the Party must start from scratch in its search for a replacement for Trong, which could prove to be a challenging task given that the Party’s next national congress is due in less than two years. In the unlikely event that Trong suddenly passes away or becomes incapacitated due to health issues before a successor is chosen, Vietnam will be plunged into a severe political crisis.

There is also a more serious problem: the depletion in the ranks of the Politburo. Over the past 15 months, Vietnam has witnessed the dismissal of five out of 18 Politburo members, two presidents, one National Assembly chair, and two deputy prime ministers. However, the Party has not added new members to the Politburo, shrinking the pool of potential candidates for top leadership positions not only for the current term but also for the next term starting in 2026. It is worth noting that if the retirement age of 65 for Politburo members is strictly enforced, 10 out of the remaining 13 Politburo members will have to retire in 2026. This means that Vietnam’s leadership crisis and political instability may continue beyond 2026 unless the Party adds new and younger members to the Politburo.

For investors, another major concern regarding Vietnam’s leadership crisis is not only the limited pool of eligible candidates but also the Party’s tendency to prioritise political loyalty and personal integrity over capability. If Man and Mai are elected as successors of Thuong and Hue, this will further validate their concerns. The two leaders maintain low profiles and are not known for their professional track records or political leadership qualities, especially in the economic domain. They may instead be selected by the Party as “safe choices” to mitigate the current crisis due to their relatively clean backgrounds and neutral political leanings. This may help them to serve out their terms without any unforeseen hiccups. Should the Party fail to introduce more talents into the country’s top political structures, the current crisis may linger on in the form of inefficient leadership and constrain Vietnam’s economic prospects, even after all top positions have been filled.

That said, there may be some silver linings in the dismissal of Hue. Firstly, it sends a strong signal that the CPV is highly committed to fighting corruption even when exposing widespread corruption among the Party’s highest ranks may cause major public embarrassment. In the long run, less corruption means an improved business environment and better economic prospects for the country.

Secondly, while Hue’s removal may delay the CPV’s search for General Secretary Trong’s successor, it may help prevent an even more serious crisis in the future. In addition to allegations that he is the ultimate beneficiary in the Thuan An bribery scandal, Hue is also rumoured to have engaged in multiple extramarital affairs, including one with a well-known pop singer. Electing a corrupt and immoral politician as the Party’s top leader could seriously jeopardise the CPV’s political legitimacy and even its survival.

Finally, with Hue and Thuong’s departure and the CPV’s likely decision to appoint “safe choices” as their replacements, investors can expect a relatively calm period in Vietnamese politics for the next two years. Although political jockeying will continue, especially for leadership positions to be elected in 2026, the Party will likely avoid further top-level replacements. This is because the Party needs a stable period to focus on preparing for its 14th National Congress, particularly in terms of personnel. Failing to do so could lead to an even larger political crisis for the Party in two years’ time.

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Le Hong Hiep is a Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Vietnam Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.