Vietnam’s Era of ‘National Rise’: Great Expectations

Political leaders often assert legitimacy by positioning themselves at critical junctures, as exemplified by Xi Jinping’s doctrine of “socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era” and Donald Trump’s promise of a new American “golden age.” Similarly, Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) General Secretary To Lam is proclaiming that Vietnam is entering an “era of national rise” (kỷ nguyên vươn mình của dân tộc) — one of the accelerated breakthroughs aimed at transforming the country’s governance and economy. In doing so, To Lam has instrumentalised time to legitimise and advance his ambitious political agenda.

On 13 August 2024, just ten days after his inauguration, To Lam called for a unified understanding of “the new historical starting point, the new era, and the rising era of the Vietnamese nation.” He unveiled the strategy at a meeting of the CPV’s subcommittee on Documents of the 14th Party Congress. Subsequently, he systematically promoted his vision of an “era of national rise” through party meetings, public speeches, official state media and party publications, and even to foreign audiences. By September 2024, at the 10th Plenum, the CPV Central Committee had fully endorsed To Lam’s proposed temporal framework, formally marking the upcoming 14th Party Congress in 2026 as the beginning of a new era of national rise.

To Lam’s framework divides modern Vietnamese history into three periods. The first is the era of independence and socialism (1930-1975), followed by the era of reunification and Doi Moi reforms (1975-2025), and the era of national rise (2026-2045). These eras were constructed to underscore the triumph of CPV leadership in steering the country through historical and historic challenges.

This periodisation supports a linear narrative of progression: Vietnam has evolved from a colonised, war-torn, embargoed, and impoverished nation to an increasingly prosperous middle-income country deeply integrated into the global economy. To Lam substantiates this narrative with specific metrics: Vietnam’s standing among the world’s top 40 economies, its diplomatic ties with 194 countries, strategic partnerships with major powers, and a 2023 GDP that is 96 times that of 1986. He presents these achievements as evidence that Vietnam has accumulated sufficient “position and strength” to embark on the next historical phase.

In constructing the rising era, To Lam frames 2024-2030 as a decisive “sprint period” for Vietnam to build solid foundations to achieve its two major economic goals. The first is attaining upper middle-income status by 2030, which coincides with the CPV’s centennial. The second is reaching high-income status by 2045, when the Socialist Republic of Vietnam celebrates its 100th anniversary.

To Lam has synchronised Vietnam’s new era with global shifts. He describes the world as going through “era-defining changes” and characterises the period from 2024 to 2030 as “the most important period for establishing a new world order.” He points to the Fourth Industrial Revolution, particularly advances in artificial intelligence and digital technology, as presenting opportunities for developing countries like Vietnam to “leapfrog ahead.”

(To Lam’s) security background is both an asset and a liability. While it enabled his rise, To Lam needs to build broader legitimacy through concrete achievements in governance and economic development.

To Lam has been the first CPV leader since the Doi Moi era to define his tenure through such a grand historical vision. This serves several purposes. First, it positions To Lam as the architect of Vietnam’s next great transformation, following the legacies of his predecessor, Nguyen Phu Trong. Second, it creates a sense of historical momentum and inevitability around Vietnam’s continued national development under CPV leadership. Third, it establishes a sense of urgency to justify rapid and immediate changes.

These purposes are reflected in To Lam’s comprehensive reform agenda, which encompasses seven strategic priorities: innovating party leadership methods, strengthening party-building efforts, refining the rule of law, streamlining organisational structures, driving digital transformation, accelerating technological development, and combating waste and resource mismanagement.

The centrepiece of To Lam’s vision is streamlining Vietnam’s sprawling state apparatus. In a speech on 1 December 2024, he emphasised that Vietnam “can no longer delay” the “institutional revolution” and mandated that the overhaul be completed in the first quarter of 2025. This means merging several ministries, reducing the number of government bodies by 35-40 per cent, and reorganising 13 party agencies, among other tasks, within four months. The scale and compressed timeline of these reforms, which would affect around 100,000 civil servants, risk causing serious disruptions to government operations.

It is logical that To Lam seeks to quickly boost his performance-based legitimacy before the 14^th Party Congress in 2026, given the extraordinary circumstances of his ascent to power. His elevation to Vietnam’s top leadership in 2024 came through a period of unprecedented political upheaval, with several high-profile leadership changes and the passing of Trong. Previously, as former minister of public security, Lam skillfully leveraged the anti-corruption campaign to eliminate rivals while positioning himself as Trong’s successor.

His security background, however, is both an asset and a liability. While it enabled his rise, To Lam needs to build broader legitimacy through concrete achievements in governance and economic development. This explains the aggressive push for institutional reforms: by reducing bureaucratic bottlenecks that have long hindered the country’s economic growth, he aims to deliver visible results to secure a full term as general secretary in the next Party Congress.

Beyond the compressed timeline, To Lam faces two other major challenges in implementing his seven strategic priorities. First, he might face opposition from established power centres at both central and local levels who see their interests threatened by these reforms. The second challenge is implementation capacity. Driving digital transformation and technological development at a time of reorganising state institutions requires sophisticated coordination and resources that might exceed current capabilities. Additionally, expanded efforts to combat corruption and wastefulness could lead to decision-making paralysis. To Lam must strike a delicate balance between maintaining firm political control while relying on technocratic expertise to execute these complex reforms across multiple domains effectively.

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