Vietnamese President To Lam (fourth from left) and his wife, Ngo Phuong Ly (third from right), arrive in Guangzhou, China, on 18 August 2024 for a state visit. (Photo by Deng Hua / XINHUA / Xinhua via AFP)

Vietnam’s New Helmsman: What to Expect from To Lam?

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Vietnam has a younger, more energetic leader who appears to be covering all bases, domestic and international. What might the future hold for him and his country?

Two months after his unexpected ascent to the top of Vietnam’s political hierarchy as both general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and state president, To Lam has hit the ground running. He has chaired preparation meetings for the 2026 CPV Congress, reassured business communities, met party elders from different factions, and overseen key personnel reshuffles. On the international stage, he has visited China, hosted the General Secretary of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party Thongloun Sisoulith, and engaged with numerous foreign diplomats. These early moves offer intriguing glimpses into Vietnam’s potential direction under his leadership.

Lam inherits a mixed legacy. Vietnam’s economy, while resilient, has underperformed expectations in recent years. An overzealous anti-corruption drive has negatively impacted the bureaucracy, hampering decision-making and economic dynamism. The country’s reputation for political stability has been tarnished by drastic leadership changes. Natural disasters have added to these woes, with Typhoon Yagi’s devastation of northern Vietnam further complicating the new leader’s agenda. In foreign affairs, Hanoi must navigate treacherous waters. Rising tensions in the South China Sea and regional initiatives like Cambodia’s Funan Techo Canal threaten to upset Vietnam’s delicate balancing act between major powers and to compromise its national interests.

Facing this daunting to-do list, Lam has swiftly installed trusted allies in key positions. His protégés, Public Security Minister Luong Tam Quang, 59, and Chief of Party’s Central Committee Office Nguyen Duy Ngoc, 60, have been promoted to the Politburo and the Secretariat respectively. Another associate, General Vu Hong Van, 48, now serves as Vice Head of the Central Inspection Commission. Tran Luu Quang, 57, a close ally, leads the Central Economic Commission, potentially setting him up for future advancement after 2026. Other officials from Lam’s home province of Hung Yen, including new Justice Minister Nguyen Hai Ninh, 48, have also been promoted. In a country where hometown favouritism often prevails, this helps form a new, formidable power base around Lam.

Yet Lam is not oblivious to the need for balance. He was quick to meet party elders, particularly those from the South, to gain their support and foster the narrative of solidarity. Lam met former PM Nguyen Tan Dung – considered the “godfather” of the Southern faction – at least twice in his first month in office. The south, despite being Vietnam’s economic powerhouse, saw its political representation diminished during the anti-corruption campaign. The message of regional balance is clear in the recent appointment of three new deputy PMs, each from a different region.

At the central level, the National Assembly announced plans to elect a new president in October, suggesting Lam will relinquish his dual role. While Lam could retain both positions given his immense power, he likely wants to avoid perceptions of consolidating personal power at the expense of collective leadership. The leading candidate, Luong Cuong, while part of the military apparatus, is not as influential as Defence Minister Phan Van Giang. Luong Cuong’s appointment, if it happens, would restore the “Four Pillars” mechanism – Vietnam’s collective leadership arrangement comprising the country’s top four leaders: the general secretary of the CPV, the president, the prime minister and the chair of the National Assembly – without creating a potential challenger to Lam in 2026.

Lam’s emerging leadership style appears pragmatic rather than ideological, focused on economic development and political stability over doctrinal campaigns.

Economically, Lam is positioning himself as a champion of technology-led “high-quality” growth and an ardent supporter of private businesses. In his first meeting as chair of the Central Steering Anti-Corruption Committee, he emphasised, “The fight against corruption must not hinder economic growth”. While publicly committing to continue anti-graft efforts, there is a growing sense, based on his speeches, that the new leadership may prioritise economic goals over ideological purity. The slight recovery of Vietnam’s property market, previously a major anti-corruption target, suggests the business community is relieved with this signal.

In foreign policy, Lam adheres to Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy”. His first foreign trip as party chief was to Beijing, acknowledging China’s importance. Yet he is also visiting the US for the UN General Assembly from 21-27 September, underscoring Vietnam’s desire to maintain equidistance between superpowers. As a younger, healthier party chief at age 67, Lam might travel more extensively to strengthen Vietnam’s broad network of friends and partners, a task his predecessor, Nguyen Phu Trong, was unable to fulfil in the later stages of his term due to health issues.

Lam’s emerging leadership style appears pragmatic rather than ideological, focused on economic development and political stability over doctrinal campaigns. Reading from his public statements, Lam seems to have genuine ambitions to boost Vietnam’s economic and political position, with a strong determination to realise them. This could bode well for Vietnam’s economic prospects, potentially reviving entrepreneurial energy and attracting more foreign investment.

However, challenges abound. Lam’s rapid consolidation of power may ruffle feathers within the party, especially among those who fear a drift away from collective leadership. His background in the security apparatus also raises questions about the future of civil liberties in a country already known for its tight control of dissent. While Lam may push for more economic and administrative reforms, his lack of governance experience causes implementation concerns. As public security minister, he successfully restructured this “super-ministry”, streamlining over 30,000 positions in 2018. Yet he made policy missteps, including an uneven digital transformation of population data and abrupt fire safety regulations that disrupted businesses.

To Lam’s first two months in power reveal a leader poised to reshape Vietnam’s political landscape. While he treads carefully between reform and continuity, Lam’s actions hint at a bolder, more assertive leadership style than his predecessor’s. What is clear is that To Lam’s tenure marks a pivotal moment in Vietnam’s development that could define the country’s trajectory for years to come.

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Nguyen Khac Giang is Visiting Fellow at the Vietnam Studies Programme of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He was previously Research Fellow at the Vietnam Center for Economic and Strategic Studies.