Why Thailand’s Constitutional Reform May Stall

The constitutional referendum held concurrently with Thailand’s general election (GE) on 8 February 2026 demonstrated that a majority of Thai voters support drafting a new constitution. The result shows that approximately 19.97 million voters (59.77 per cent) voted in favour, 10.55 million (31.58 per cent) opposed, and 2.89 million (8.65 per cent) abstained. Although this reflects a clear popular mandate for constitutional change and appears to mark a significant step toward reform, it does not necessarily mean that a new constitution will be drafted soon.

Thailand’s current constitution was drafted in the aftermath of the 2014 coup and promulgated in 2017. It is the country’s twentieth constitution since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932. The existing charter was explicitly designed to preserve the political order established by the coup. It weakens party politics, constrains elections’ capacity to produce meaningful political change, and grants expanded oversight authority to the courts and independent agencies.

Amending the constitution is exceptionally difficult, requiring not only a parliamentary majority but also the support of at least one-third of the Senate. Moreover, drafting a new constitution requires prior amendment of the constitutional amendment provisions. In 2021, the Constitutional Court further complicated the process by ruling that a referendum must be held before and after the drafting of any new constitution; subsequent rulings in 2025 clarified that three referendums are required to initiate a new constitution, approve the drafting process, and ratify it.

Thailand’s political record reflects these structural constraints. Between 2020 and 2022, there were 26 attempts to amend or rewrite the constitution, but only one succeeded: a 2021 amendment altering the electoral system, which passed with the ruling party’s support. Two additional attempts in 2025, in February and between October and December, also failed. In practice, the constitution is amended only when changes align with the governing establishment’s interests; otherwise, it remains highly insulated from structural reform.

During government formation negotiations in September 2025, the Bhumjaithai Party entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) with the People’s Party. One key provision stipulated that Bhumjaithai would push forward a constitutional referendum, while the People’s Party would remain outside the governing coalition. An attempt to amend the referendum framework to allow the first and second constitutional referendums collapsed in December 2025, however, amid disagreements with the Senate over the removal of its veto power. Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul dissolved Parliament and called a GE. The government subsequently proceeded with the first constitutional referendum.

During the campaign, most major parties publicly endorsed a “Yes” vote in the referendum. The People’s Party was the strongest advocate, framing the referendum as a necessary step to dismantle the legacy of the coup and initiate comprehensive reform. Bhumjaithai, Pheu Thai and the Democrat Party also expressed support, but with clear red lines: Sections 1 (General Provisions) and 2 (the Monarchy) must remain unchanged. In contrast, three staunchly conservative parties, Thai Pakdee, Rak Chart and the United Thai Nation Party strongly opposed constitutional change, arguing that it is unnecessary, costly and destabilising.

…The government’s priority is to address economic problems, not to embark on contentious constitutional restructuring.

Despite the approval of the first constitutional referendum, the path to meaningful reform remains uncertain because the referendum is non-binding. A draft amendment that fails to pass before the House’s dissolution may be reintroduced within 60 days of the first parliamentary session; otherwise, a new draft must be submitted.

The prospects for advancing reform, therefore, depend on Bhumjaithai’s political will.

Following the GE, Bhumjaithai emerged as the largest party with 192 seats and is expected to lead a stable, conservative coalition government. However, it has shown little genuine commitment to comprehensive constitutional reform. Although the party supported the amendment process and campaigned for a “Yes” vote in the referendum, this stance appears strategic rather than principled, aimed at responding to public sentiment and gaining votes.

Another major challenge lies in political reality. Bhumjaithai has emerged as the new vehicle of conservative and establishment interests. It now dominates the House of Representatives and exerts significant influence over the Senate, often referred to as the “Blue Senate“. Control of the upper house carries long-term institutional implications, notably for appointments to independent agencies and veto power over constitutional amendments. This consolidation of power suggests a broader trajectory toward preserving the status quo rather than advancing structural constitutional reform.

As the largest party, Bhumjaithai is likely to prioritise pragmatic economic measures to stimulate growth and alleviate hardship among grassroots constituencies. These policies will serve as its flagship agenda and a means of consolidating political legitimacy. By foregrounding economic recovery and everyday cost-of-living concerns, the party can frame constitutional reform as secondary or even unnecessary. The implicit message is clear: the government’s priority is to address economic problems, not to embark on contentious constitutional restructuring.

The constitutional referendum can be seen as an important first step toward reform in Thailand. Although the reform agenda remains formally on the table, the road ahead is far from straightforward. Procedural constraints, combined with limited political will and a strong inclination among key actors to preserve the status quo, make meaningful constitutional change unlikely in the near term.

2026/95