Will Thailand Become More Democratic After the Vote?

On 8 February, Thai voters will do two things at once. They will elect a new House of Representatives and decide, via referendum, whether to begin drafting a new Constitution. Yet Thailand’s recent politics rarely runs in a straight line from ballots to a functional ruling government The question is whether the next government can loosen the unelected constraints that shape who governs and what elected governments can do.

Despite two elections since the 2019 transition from military rule, the pattern remains worrisome for the state of democracy in Thailand. V-Dem’s 2025 Democracy Report classified Thailand as an electoral autocracy in 2024. Freedom House similarly rated Thailand “Not Free” in its 2025 report, pointing to major setbacks that include the dissolution of the Move Forward Party and the Constitutional Court-ordered removal of Pheu Thai Party (PT) Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin in August 2024. The same Court also removed another PT premier, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, in August 2025.

Indeed, these episodes reflect the reach of Thailand’s veto architecture under the military-drafted 2017 Constitution. The charter embeds a number of unelected controls across the political arena, which in turn shape government formation, discipline elected officials, and raise the hurdles for constitutional changes. For the first five years after 2019, for instance, an appointed Senate had to vote jointly with the House to select the prime minister.

That particular lever has ended for this cycle, yet other veto chokepoints remain. The Senate still has political weight, through confirmation powers and amendment rules that can make constitutional change difficult. It also helps shape the key “referee” institutions that can block or undo electoral outcomes. For instance, Constitutional Court judges require Senate approval, and election commissioners are appointed upon the Senate’s advice. Together, this structure has repeatedly reshaped the balance between electoral mandate and elite gatekeeping through party dissolution petitions, bans, and removals from office.

In this sense, a “more democratic” Thailand after February must mean more than another competitive election. It requires change in the rules and constraints that determine whether popular mandates can be exercised, contested, and renewed. Two tests matter. First, can the next government implement its mandate without being overridden or removed by unelected bodies? Second, if the referendum passes, will it produce a clear, significant, and time-bound drafting route that can credibly narrow the veto structure’s reach?

This is why the referendum matters as much as who gets the most seats. It is the first required step in a multi-step charter rewrite process. A “yes” is necessary, but this alone does not guarantee change. A full rewrite must still clear a chain of steps and institutional hurdles. The 8 February referendum is the first of the three referenda that the Constitutional Court requires to start the rewrite process. If the “yes” votes win, Parliament will have to pass an enabling constitutional amendment under Section 256. This will face high thresholds, including support from at least one-third of senators. The enabling amendment must also specify who drafts and under what rules; it will also be constrained by the Court’s ruling barring a direct election of drafters. Once the drafting route is legally set, voters will be asked in a second referendum to endorse the rewrite’s approach and key content. After the draft is completed, a third and final referendum is held to ratify the text, with avenues for delay or derailment through legal and procedural challenges. Whether these hurdles will be cleared will depend on coalition arithmetic after the election.

The lasting significance of the vote, therefore, will be whether it yields a government that reflects the voters’ choice and a drafting process with enough force to change the balance between electoral mandates and unelected veto power.

Recent polls put the reformist People’s Party (PP) ahead in a three-way race, with the Bhumjaithai Party (BJT) and PT slightly behind. This makes coalition bargaining unavoidable. PP has already signalled it would not back a second term for BJT’s Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul and would not join hands with the conservative Kla Tham Party (KT). PT and BJT, by contrast, have kept their options open, which keeps multiple coalition pathways in play.

On one hand, a PP-PT coalition, which is likely with smaller partners, would offer the clearest route to a rewrite agenda aimed at reducing the leverage of veto institutions. PP energetically backs a “yes” vote and argues that any subsequent rewrite must reduce Senate-linked veto points. Likewise, PT backs a “yes” vote and frames the referendum as the first step toward drafting “a genuinely people’s constitution.” However, two risks stand out. First, the parties harbour unresolved mistrust from the post-2023 fallout, when PT broke ranks with the reformist PP-led bloc and formed a coalition government with pro-establishment parties. This may potentially strain coalition bargaining and discipline. Second, external pushback is also plausible through institutional chokepoints. These include the Constitutional Court tightening the rewrite route through procedural rulings or review of the enabling amendment, independent agencies such as the Election Commission pursuing cases that lead to disqualifications or party dissolution petitions, and the Senate using Section 256 thresholds to block or dilute the enabling amendment.

On the other hand, a BJT-PT coalition, which is also likely with smaller partners, may point toward a different trajectory. Here, if the referendum passes, it is more likely to be translated into a bounded process, with tighter limits on scope, sequencing, and who gets to draft the new Constitution. Several status-quo leaning parties have framed constitutional change as partial amendment under clear red lines. BJT and KT, for instance, have backed rules that keep institutional brakes in place, including the Senate’s one-third leverage over future amendments. Under this settlement, constitutional change may still proceed, but it is more likely to be narrow in scope and leave the reach of the veto structure intact.

In sum, if Thailand is to move beyond electoral autocracy, the February vote must do more than reshuffle parties in parliament. Understandably, the referendum could fall short; that said, even a “yes” can be limited through procedural design and coalition tactics that narrow or delay institutional reform. The lasting significance of the vote, therefore, will be whether it yields a government that reflects the voters’ choice and a drafting process with enough force to change the balance between electoral mandates and unelected veto power. Otherwise, the vote will still matter, but mainly as a record of voter preferences set against constraints that remain largely unchanged.

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