With Trump’s Coercive Tariffs Paused, Will ASEAN Collective Action Work?

Among the many Trump tariff fallouts “the world has never seen before”, to borrow the “Instigator-in-Chief’s” trademark phrase, is the scramble of multiple countries to cut a deal with the White House. Southeast Asian countries, hit with some of the harshest “reciprocal” tariffs, have joined the purported 75 seeking an audience with the Trump administration. Although the opportunity for ASEAN to act collectively may be limited, current circumstances demand that boundaries be challenged.

Naturally, the countries facing the greatest pain have been keenest to get relief. On 2 April, US President Donald Trump declared 49 per cent tariffs on Cambodia, 48 per cent on Laos, 46 per cent on Vietnam and Myanmar, 36 per cent on Thailand, 32 per cent on Indonesia, and 24 per cent on Malaysia.

With enforcement looming on 9 April, Vietnam announced some offerings, including zero tariffs on US imports and military and liquefied natural gas purchases in exchange for reductions in Trump’s punishing levy (only for Trump advisor Peter Navarro to dismiss the overture while lambasting “non-tariff cheating” as Vietnam’s main offence). Cambodia offered to cut import duties from 35 per cent to 5 per cent on selected US goods; Thailand and Indonesia also indicated possible concessions.

Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim repudiated the “fundamentally flawed” tariff calculations while committing to negotiations with the Trump administration without revealing his bargaining hand. Malaysia was issued a lower levy than its neighbours, and semiconductors, which comprise about half of Malaysia’s exports to the US, are exempted (for now) from the “Liberation Day” target list.

Malaysia has also championed an ASEAN-coordinated response. Facing less duress and showing firm resolve, ASEAN’s 2025 chair seems poised to drive regional collective action.

It remains uncertain whether and how ASEAN and its member states can concurrently deal with the US. Nonetheless, Trump’s 9 April announcement of a 90-day pause on the full-blown tariffs — with a baseline 10 per cent on all countries except China — brings welcome reprieve and presents a window for ASEAN to strategise its moves.

Could ASEAN deliver a better outcome for the region? The scope for collective action might be narrow but the times call for pushing boundaries.

ASEAN could facilitate communication channels to share strategies and information about each country’s negotiations with the US and establish baselines…

ASEAN should be mindful of the best-case scenario — negotiating as a bloc with the US — while finding ways to coordinate so that countries are not weakened by acting in isolation. Ideally, ASEAN would summon the collective weight of representing 700 million people, US$4 trillion in GDP, and solidarity through closing ranks to reduce the concessions made and secure better terms overall, especially for the weakest and hardest-hit economies, Cambodia and Laos.

Of course, that is a wishful scenario given ASEAN’s limited authority to conduct such bargaining, and the greater speed and urgency of individual countries’ efforts. Vietnam and the US have agreed to commence trade talks, Indonesia dispatched its delegation to Washington DC, and countries are separately preparing their US missions.

But it is not too late for ASEAN to foster solidarity and pursue common interests. ASEAN could facilitate communication channels to share strategies and information about each country’s negotiations with the US and establish baselines (for instance, in keeping US import deals to certain timeframes or aligning possible sectoral tariff rates, say, on garments and apparel exports to the US).

ASEAN’s role could grow sequentially, from taking a back seat while countries negotiate their way out of the current morass to stepping forward later to drive longer-term cooperation with the US. Policy messaging so far vaguely hints at such an approach. The ASEAN Economic Ministers meeting on 10 April declared a “common intention to engage in a frank and constructive dialogue with the US to address trade-related concerns”, affirming ASEAN’s belief “that an enhanced, robust and forward-looking ASEAN-US economic cooperation framework will contribute to the prosperity of [the region] and the broader global economy.” ASEAN would also “remain steadfast in deepening regional economic integration”.

Whether these lofty articulations suffice to draw the US into an ASEAN-US summit meeting, as requested by Malaysia on 11 April, remains unclear. ASEAN could enhance its case for collective engagement with the US by placing negotiations over non-tariff measures (NTMs) under its purview. The US has raised non-tariff “barriers” as a sore point beneath the US trade deficit. Countries undoubtedly protect domestic interests through other means besides tariffs, which can breed inefficiency, opacity, and corruption.

But the reality is mixed — NTMs can also safeguard policy autonomy and serve constructive purposes, such as sanitary standards, environmental policy, food security, and domestic industry.

Deliberating the reform of NTMs is complex and challenging in a multilateral context, but at the same time, eliminating them in a bilateral manner and as a concession to one country might not be optimal. ASEAN is invested in regulatory integration and harmonisation that help facilitate trade within ASEAN, and between ASEAN and other trading partners. These prospects arguably make NTMs a suitable subject of deliberation in an ASEAN-US setting.

ASEAN could also rouse the US into accepting its pitch by showing progress in its formalised relations with multiple trade partners. The conclusion of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 14-18 April tour of Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia might afford ASEAN more grounds to underscore its deepening ties with China and enhance the appeal of ASEAN-US economic cooperation. Trump’s bluster that bilateral dealings with China are conspiring against the US requires a tactful response from ASEAN but also presents an opportunity to reaffirm the region’s neutrality and continual openness to good relations with the US.

Global uncertainty and an erratic superpower complicate ASEAN’s role. For the same reason, the bloc must find ways to deliver the benefits of collective action.

2025/146