Youth’s Solidarity Beyond Borders: What Encourages Indonesian Muslim Students to Boycott Israel?

INTRODUCTION

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has influenced various forms of resistance, including economic boycotts at the grassroots level. This form of political consumerism involves consumers boycotting businesses or states they perceive to be acting unethically. Traditionally run by civil society organisations, the boycott movement has expanded and evolved as social media alters its mobilisation patterns. Social media has transformed political consumerism into a type of digital activism, allowing people to share information, interact with like-minded consumers, and link private buying or boycotting decisions to public concerns.

As a form of digital activism, political consumerism has been increasingly popular among youths; it is simple in execution and  simply involves consumers avoiding products from producers they consider morally problematic. This sense of activism is achieved by ethical evaluation of the behaviour of corporations and governments and then integrating the conclusion into everyday life. Youth political participation increases with political consumerism; they are able to use their purchasing power to voice their concerns about political affairs and their ethical implications. Moreover, the utilisation of social media platforms expands political consumerism from an individual purchasing choice into worldwide boycott movements.

Indonesia, which has the largest Muslim population in the world, has long been committed to supporting Palestine. Historically, it has shown strong solidarity with the Palestinian cause through both diplomatic and civil actions. The Indonesian public is frequently exposed to discourses on Palestine through news, state policies, and even religious sermons. The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), for instance, has released rulings to support Palestinians, such as the reminder to include Palestine in the Friday sermons. Using both surveys and interviews, this study examines Indonesian Muslim youth’s motives for boycotting Israel. Existing literature on youth political participation often focuses on domestic contexts. The motives they themselves express for engaging in global issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have so far received very little attention.

INDONESIA’S STANCE ON BOYCOTTING ISRAEL

In Indonesia, the Palestinian issue constantly influences its official stance and grassroots initiatives. The country has always regarded Palestine’s struggle for independence as similar to its fight against colonialism. Therefore, the government had refused to recognise Israel as a state and had instead shown support for the Palestinians. The official stance is largely supported by the public and complemented by humanitarian assistance from both the state and society through non-governmental organisations. The solidarity with Palestine has remained over generations, though it is now expressed differently in the digital age. Indonesian youths today have organised online campaigns and fundraising as well as orchestrated consumer boycotts.

The most prominent is the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, which imposes economic sanctions against Israel over its policies towards the Palestinians. In 2005, Palestinian civil society had launched the BDS movement as a strategic nonviolent campaign with the primary objective of demanding that Israel adhere to international law and respect Palestinian rights. It demanded three key outcomes: (1) a termination of Israel’s occupation and colonisation of Arab lands, (2) a complete equality for Arab-Palestinian citizens within Israel, and (3) respect and acknowledgement of Palestinian refugees’ right to return, as stipulated by UN Resolution 194.

BDS extended across continents, receiving support from prominent individuals and institutions. As a Muslim-majority country with recognition of Palestinian independence dating back to 1988, Indonesia expectedly supports the BDS movement. Indonesia’s BDS movement (Gerakan BDS Indonesia) was officially established to adapt the global BDS framework to the local context. The grassroots boycott movement in Indonesia does not always affiliate with the BDS movement, however, and those participating in the boycott are also not always familiar with the movement. The boycott received support from the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), which issued Fatwa No. 83 of 2023, declaring that support for Israeli aggression is haram (forbidden) and urging Indonesians to boycott Israeli-affiliated products. The survey by Social Research Populix with 1,058 respondents from the middle- and upper-class of Millennials and Gen Z has shown that this fatwa received the approval of 94 per cent of Indonesians, Muslim and non-Muslim, with 65 per cent of respondents seeing it as a humanitarian act of solidarity.

At the legislative level, the Indonesian Parliament introduced the RUU BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Bill) in July 2025 to institutionalise economic and trade sanctions against products from states that abuse human rights. At the executive level, Prabowo emphasised both moral commitment and national objectives, indicating a careful balance between sympathy for Palestine and local economic considerations. Despite boycott demands, direct foreign investment from Israel remained strong. Additionally, data from the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) show that Indonesia’s imports from Israel from January to August 2024 increased by 205.06 per cent, reaching US$40.96 million, compared to the US$13.42 million between January and August 2023, with organic and inorganic chemicals as the highest products. In this regard, some have questioned the determination of the government’s stance on Gaza.

BOYCOTTING ISRAEL AMONG INDONESIAN MUSLIM UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

Movements boycotting Israel now utilise social media to facilitate action and disseminate information to their supporters. In the case of BDS, its social media campaigns are publicly accessible but are often targeted at youths, particularly university students. In the West, the BDS movement has become the fastest-growing activist movement on college campuses.

Figure 1. Indonesian Muslim Students’ Participation in Boycotting Israel

Our online survey conducted from 19 September 2024 to 2 October 2024 of 427 Muslim university students aged 17-24 years old in one Islamic university in Jakarta had 54.10 and 29.27 per cent of respondents reporting that they “very often or always”, and “sometimes” participate in boycotting Israel, respectively (see Figure 1 above). Meanwhile, 12.18 and 4.45 per cent “rarely” and “never” participate, respectively. These figures indicate a high engagement of Indonesian Muslim students in boycotting Israel. Our interviews also show that their engagement in boycotting Israel does not mean that they know about or affiliate themselves with the BDS movement, but rather that they do so due to their knowledge of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, particularly from social media.

Figure 2 below presents the OLS regression analysis of the youths’ likelihood of participating in boycotting Israel. Positive values indicate increases in likelihood, while a negative value means decreases in likelihood. Respondents who understand local political issues are significantly less likely to participate in boycotting Israel (β = -0.12). This is also true for those who participated in political parties, even though the effect is not statistically significant. This might result from the fact that local politics and formal participation in political parties are mostly concerned with domestic political issues. Conversely, those interested in what is happening in society are more likely to participate in boycotting Israel (β = 0.23). Individuals’ interest in what is happening in society shapes their social awareness and empathy. Additionally, what is happening in society may also extend to a more global context, allowing youth to engage in non-formal political participation, such as boycotting.

In terms of motives for social media use, individuals who use social media with the intention of raising awareness about socio-political issues and advocating social goals are significantly more likely to participate in boycotting Israel (β = 0.17). On the other hand, motivations in using social media are for building social networks and self-impression and achievement are not significantly associated with boycotting Israel. These findings also highlight the implications of echo chambers and algorithmic patterns on polarisation between politically active youths using social media, and the more ‘practical/functional’ youths.

Figure 2. What Motivates Indonesian Muslim Students to Boycott Israel

This study focuses on three specific motivations for using social media: political engagement, relationship maintenance, and self-promotion. The findings confirm that youths’ social media motives for political engagement do play a role in encouraging them to participate in political consumerism, such as boycotting Israel. Meanwhile, motivations that are solely for the purpose of maintaining relationships and self-promotion are not strong enough to motivate youths’ participation in boycotting Israel.

In terms of social media activities, both reading and sharing socio-political issues online show positive and significant associations with participation in boycotting Israel. As modes of political engagement, reading about socio-political issues from social media can be categorised as a search for political information, while sharing socio-political issues online can be considered political interaction. These findings suggest that individuals who actively consume or disseminate socio-political content online are more likely to engage in boycotts of Israel. These findings also confirm that a large part of social interaction in social media coincides with engagement in political information gathering and interaction, and these social interactions have clear effects on political engagement, including political consumerism like boycotting Israel. These findings highlight the importance of political reasons behind Indonesian Muslim youth participation in boycotting Israel.

In terms of participation in civic organisations, Muslim students’ engagement in volunteering and philanthropic (β = 0.09) and religious organisations (β = 0.08) has positive and significant associations with participation in boycotting Israel. This implies that youth engagement in these types of organisations may better encourage them to engage in collective action like boycotts. On the other hand, Muslim undergraduate students involved in non-campus organisations are less likely to participate in boycotting Israel (β = -0.09). Furthermore, Muslim youth participation in campus organisations and political parties is not significantly associated with engagement in boycotts.

This study also confirms that civic engagement and political consumerism are interrelated, in which the frequency of participation in social meetings and civic organisations is associated with political consumerism. Among different types of civic organisations, only those who participated in volunteering/philanthropic and religious organisations are positively associated with a higher level of participation in boycotting Israel. This study confirms that youth participation in humanitarian organisations may enhance public awareness of human suffering and other types of grievances. Additionally, youth participation in boycotting Israeli products or companies supporting Israel can be driven by political, ethical, and religious motives. Youth participation in religious organisations provides them with exposure to these motives, and boycotting becomes their expression of sympathy and political engagement. We find that ethical and moral reasons based on humanitarian and religious values, as well as political activism, drive youth participation in boycotting Israel. 

The interview data also show that youth participation in religious and humanitarian organisations increases their exposure to boycott campaigns. Humanitarian considerations were prevalent in informants’ narratives, as many considered their participation as an act of humanitarian solidarity that extended beyond strictly defined religious or political identities, even though some also considered religious and political reasons for their boycott action. The interviews also reveal that the boycott takes a few forms. Active participation includes engagement in boycott campaigns both online and offline, taking part in offline demonstrations, and refraining from purchasing Israeli-affiliated products. Passive engagement, on the other hand, refers to the avoidance of such products as part of individual consumption practices, rather than direct involvement in online or offline campaigning or street protests.

CONCLUSION

Religious and ethical reasons are often considered key to Muslim engagement with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This study reveals that Muslim youths tend to utilise social media more frequently and over longer periods of time than the older generations; in fact, 79 per cent of all social media users in Indonesia are between the ages of 13 and 34. Social media blurs the boundaries between private and public spaces, modes of engagement, and political and non-political activities, challenging traditional political engagement thresholds. These porous boundaries promote exposure to political information, participation in public discussions, and involvement in various political activities.

However, not all youths’ motivations and activities on social media can necessarily encourage them to participate in the boycott of Israel. Only those who use social media to raise social and political awareness are likely to do that. Also, online social interactions, especially those related to political information and interactions, play a significant role in encouraging Muslim youths to engage in the boycott of Israel. These findings highlight the idea that the use of social media not only helps youths amplify their voices, connect with a wider audience and transcend traditional boundaries in political participation, but also enables them to engage in global political activism and link online to offline activism. Muslim youth involvement in humanitarian and religious organisations also plays a role in encouraging them to participate in the boycott. In short, we find that both humanitarian and religious reasons, as well as political motives, play significant roles. 

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This is an adapted version of ISEAS Perspective 2026/17 published on 11 March 2026. The paper and its references can be accessed at this link.