The Enduring Relevance of Vietnam’s “Three Nos” Policy

On 2 May 2014, China deployed the oil rig Hai Yang Shi You 981 within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone, which triggered a major bilateral crisis between the two countries. The standoff called into question the effectiveness of Vietnam’s South China Sea strategy, particularly the “Three Nos” policy (no military alliances, no aligning with one country against another, and no foreign military bases). Despite this, ten years later, the doctrine still constitutes a cornerstone of Vietnam’s strategic thinking.

At the onset of the oil rig crisis, Vietnam swiftly adopted a tough stance against China. Notably, then-Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung threatened to take legal action, and several members of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Central Committee called for the abandonment of the “Three Nos” policy. The crisis also sparked a debate among Vietnamese strategists and scholars as to whether the policy had become irrelevant and whether Vietnam should cultivate stronger defence ties with major powers to better deter China’s maritime aggression. Some commentators even explicitly advocated for Vietnam to form an alliance with the United States.

However, Vietnam has not only remained committed to the “Three Nos” policy. It has even introduced the fourth “no” — not using or threatening the use of force — in its 2019 Defense White Paper. In fact, Vietnam has opted for a low-key approach towards the South China Sea in the past few years, despite facing frequent Chinese maritime incursions, including the serious 2019 Vanguard Bank incident.

Vietnam has consistently pushed back against China’s nine-dash line claim and violations of its maritime sovereignty. It has also quietly fortified its occupied features in the Spratlys. However, Vietnam refrains from proactively challenging Chinese actions and courting external military and diplomatic support, like the Philippines has done in recent months.

While enhancing maritime security cooperation with the US and its allies, Vietnam is at pains to reassure that these efforts are not aimed at containing China. Vietnam has been deepening maritime security ties with the U.S. in a cautious manner and at a measured pace to avoid provoking China. Vietnam’s decision to upgrade its relations with the US to a comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) last year was driven more by economic interests rather than strategic calculations in the South China Sea. Shortly after the landmark upgrade, Vietnam agreed to build a “community of shared future” with China and reaffirmed its ‘Four Nos’ policy.

Vietnam’s continued commitment to these four principles since the oil rig crisis is driven by both external and internal factors.

Externally, Vietnam is wary of becoming the battlefield for great power conflict amid rising geopolitical tensions. China’s 1979 border war against Vietnam in response to the former’s alliance with the Soviet Union is a painful historical experience that has informed Vietnam’s current non-alignment posture. From Vietnam’s perspective, the Russia-Ukraine war also reinforces the lesson that a small country should not take sides in great power rivalry.

Moreover, China has employed a wedge strategy to ensure that Vietnam stays neutral. Specifically, Beijing has sought to put some distance between Hanoi and Washington. It has repeatedly warned Vietnam of US interference in the South China Sea and discouraged Hanoi from siding with the United States. Beijing has also leveraged political and economic ties to convince Hanoi of the benefits of a stable bilateral relationship. As a smaller power, Vietnam pays close attention to China’s concerns due to the fear of potential negative reactions from its northern neighbour.

Amidst intensifying great power competition and China’s continued grey-zone tactics to assert its maritime claims, however, Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy will face significant headwinds.

Internally, the victory of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong over then-Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, a critical voice against China, at the 12th National Congress in 2016 had important implications for Vietnam’s foreign policy. In the same year, Trong proposed the concept of “bamboo diplomacy” which has become a hallmark of Vietnam’s official foreign policy discourse. Broadly speaking, bamboo diplomacy is about balancing Vietnam’s relations with all great powers to maintain its autonomy and interests. This necessitates commitment to the “Four Nos” policy.

Trong himself has been walking a tightrope between Beijing and Washington — in effect, operationalising “bamboo diplomacy” in Vietnam’s foreign policy approach. In 2015, a year after the oil rig crisis, Trong made history as the first CPV General Secretary to visit the White House. Last year, he invited US President Joe Biden to Vietnam on the occasion of the CSP upgrade. At the same time, Trong’s rapport and ideological alignment with Chinese President Xi Jinping have been key in maintaining amicable Vietnam-China relations.

Amidst intensifying great power competition and China’s continued grey-zone tactics to assert its maritime claims, however, Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy will face significant headwinds. Recently, in light of the war in Ukraine, some observers have questioned Hanoi’s ability to uphold the “Four Nos” policy in striking a delicate balance between Moscow, Beijing, and Washington. Moreover, the current positive state of Vietnam-China relations does not mean that another major standoff is unlikely. After all, the oil rig crisis in 2014 was unexpected; at the time, Vietnam-China relations was on an upward trajectory.

Vietnam does recognise the potential need for greater flexibility in its defence policy. The 2019 White Paper introduces a caveat to the “Four Nos” in the form of “One Depend,” which suggests that Vietnam may consider developing necessary defence and military relations with other countries depending on specific circumstances. According to Senior Lieutenant General Vo Van Tuan, Former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army, the “One Depend” allows Vietnam to join a bloc or group to counter an immediate threat. Applying this to the South China Sea, Vietnam could leverage strategic ties with the US and its allies to actively pursue hard balancing should the current policy of assuring China fails. This would likely take the form of flexible minilateral mechanisms instead of institutionalised military arrangements so Vietnam could still back down from hard balancing to pursue détente with China. However, until the next major crisis tests Vietnam’s resolve, the “Four Nos” principle remains central to its South China Sea strategy.

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