Vietnam’s War Against Corruption Needs to Address Root Causes

On 2 May, Vuong Dinh Hue, Chair of Vietnam’s National Assembly and a senior member of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s (CPV’s) Politburo, joined a growing list of high-ranking officials forced to resign due to corruption scandals. This recent wave of resignations included two state presidents, two deputy prime ministers and dozens of Central Committee members. It highlights the struggle within the Party to address systemic corruption while maintaining political stability and sustaining robust socio-economic development.

Although these changes at the highest levels of the Party are unprecedented, their significance and relation to Vietnam’s institutional development are not widely understood. Much of the analysis surrounding the resignations has centred on speculation about the power dynamics within the Politburo and analysis about which individuals or factions will come out on top in the lead-up to the Party Congress in early 2026. However, such an approach overlooks two vital issues: the systemic roots of corruption and how the Party’s approach to addressing it threatens to harm Vietnam’s governance and development.

It is important to acknowledge that the resignations of high-ranking officials, while significant, are only a small part of the larger issue of corruption within Vietnam. The Politburo, currently led by 79-year-old CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, is responsible for shaping the direction of the country, but in the past three years, corruption-related resignations have reduced the number of Politburo members from 18 to 13. Notably, these resignations included three potential successors to Trong. All remaining members are reaching the age limit for serving another term.  

The anti-corruption drive and attendant resignations have also played out within the CPV’s Central Committee, a body of 160-200 high-ranking officials drawn from the central and provincial levels. While subordinate to the Politburo, the Central Committee plays an important role in national politics as its members shape and limit the decisions of the Politburo and government. The Central Committee also controls key levers of national and local economic development. Mirroring the depletion in ranks in the Politburo, the Central Committee has also seen its numbers thinned out. In the past few years, over 30 members have been removed, disciplined, or charged with corruption-related crimes. In some provinces, including Phu Yen, Bac Giang, Binh Thuan, and Vinh Phuc, both provincial party secretaries and governors have been removed.

Corruption within Vietnam’s political institutions and efforts to identify and penalise it goes beyond these high-profile cases. In 2023, there were 839 new corruption cases with over 2,270 individuals charged, triple the amount from the previous year.

While there is much consensus about Vietnam’s need to address systemic corruption, the manner in which anti-corruption is being pursued is not without problems and risks.

Some allege, for example, that as Vietnam’s powerful security establishment is prosecuting the anti-corruption campaign, the campaign can provide cover for a political purge that would mostly benefit the security establishment itself. While Vietnam certainly needs a cleaner government, it also needs competent and responsive leadership across key sectors. However essential, security and national development should not be a trade-off.

A major consequence of the anti-corruption drive is system-wide political paralysis and, in particular, a massive slowdown in public investment that has negatively impacted the country’s GDP growth. In 2023, only 63.4 per cent of the annual capital budget allocation for public investment was used due to officials’ caution and fear of scrutiny. The effect is not merely diminished growth. The government slowdown has resulted in delays in key infrastructure projects, affected job creation, and led to a decrease in the economy’s efficiency.

Owing to the unpredictability of the anti-corruption campaign, fear and inaction have become prevalent at national and local levels of government, and this has been further reinforced by the CPV’s Directive 24. The directive, which is championed by the security and intelligence establishment, requires the entire CPV infrastructure and all its cells to rigorously examine and limit cooperation with foreign organisations and individuals. While anti-corruption and national security are essential, efforts to achieve them threaten to weaken international cooperation and undermine Vietnam’s ability to address important development challenges.

It is important to acknowledge that the resignations of high-ranking officials, while significant, are only a small part of the larger issue of corruption within Vietnam.

One intriguing development of late has been the repeated public reappearances of former Prime Minister and State President Nguyen Xuan Phuc. While he was generally regarded as competent and relatively well attuned to Vietnam’s development needs, Phuc was forced to resign in early 2023 owing allegedly to corruption among his direct family members. While it is unclear whether Phuc and other competent ministers felled by corruption allegations might somehow be rehabilitated, Phuc’s appearance nonetheless evidences an apparent need among Vietnam’s elite to steady the keel.

It is clear that corruption in Vietnam is a serious problem, but focusing solely on punishing individual officials will not solve the root causes of the issue. This approach does not address the systemic weaknesses in Vietnam’s institutions, which have been created by specific ways in which the CPV has instituted the economy. Vietnam is a market economy subordinated to Leninist political institutions within which political and economic power is exercised informally, non-transparently and, very often, in an unaccountable manner.      

There is no doubt that Vietnam needs to address corruption. But it also needs competent leadership. Rather than waiting for 2026 and likely beyond, the Politburo and Central Committee need to transition the country toward more transparent institutions of governance. In the process, the party must take measures to prevent continued political paralysis and paranoia from incapacitating state action. This could include, for example, a court of regulatory adjudication that could reduce government paralysis by offering decision-makers avenues to act responsibly. Whatever the mechanism, timely action is required. Vietnam cannot afford continued distractions from addressing pressing national development challenges. The country’s people deserve better.

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