Troubled Waters Ahead for Philippine-Vietnam Strategic Partnership on the South China Sea

Editor’s Note: This article is the most viewed commentary on Fulcrum in 2023. It was first published on 24 August 2023.

Vietnam and the Philippines are working on a strategic partnership on the South China Sea to avoid maritime spats and put up a united front against China. As Hanoi and Manila enforce their respective claims in the maritime area, this leaves them vulnerable to a wedge strategy, allegedly by China or parties aligned with Beijing.

On 13 August, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. told Hoang Huy Chung, Vietnam’s outgoing ambassador to Manila, that the Philippines had begun talks with Vietnam on a maritime agreement which would make it easier for the two ASEAN states to face common challenges in the South China Sea. Marcos stressed that such a pact would “bring an element of stability to the problems we are now seeing in the South China Sea”. This is likely a reference to the recent incident involving a Chinese coast guard vessel firing a water cannon at a Philippine supply boat.

In May, Marcos had conveyed to Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh the need for the two governments to agree to avert conflicts in contested waters. There have been several incidents of the Philippine Coast Guard arresting and pursuing Vietnamese vessels in the disputed Spratly Islands for illegal fishing. A deadly clash occurred in 2017 when a Filipino Coast Guard ship opened fire on a Vietnamese fishing boat. A maritime agreement on rules of engagement and maritime law enforcement is crucial for the two South China Sea claimants to better manage maritime disputes and incidents.

Philippine-Vietnam bilateral negotiations on a maritime agreement align with their growing strategic partnership on the South China Sea, driven by shared concerns over China’s grey-zone tactics. At the 10th meeting of the Philippine-Vietnam Joint Permanent Working Group on Maritime and Ocean Concerns in May, the two sides expressed serious concerns over unilateral activities that undermine peace and stability in the region — a subtle reproach of China’s conduct. In early August, when the Philippines’ Secretary for Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo visited Vietnam, both countries agreed to strengthen information sharing and coordination to tackle maritime challenges and combat illegal fishing.

However, troubled waters lie ahead for the burgeoning de facto partnership.

In response to China’s maritime assertiveness, both the Philippines and Vietnam appear to be reinforcing existing claims. Their efforts, however, may inadvertently stoke diplomatic tensions and nationalist sentiments.

In May 2023, Vietnam protested that the Philippines was violating its sovereign rights by placing navigational buoys in five areas in the Spratlys. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, nationalist and Beijing-friendly voices have increasingly depicted Vietnam’s reclamation and militarisation efforts as a serious threat to the country.

Moreover, third parties such as China could exploit Philippine-Vietnam maritime disputes and tensions to drive a wedge between the two countries.

A possible instance of such a wedge strategy unfolded in late July. It began with the publication of two articles on Vietnam’s militarisation of the South China Sea by the generally pro-China Manila Times. The first article, published on 16 July with the title “Vietnam beefs up militarisation in WPS”, mentioned a leaked document by Vietnam Ministry of Defence (MOD) indicating that Vietnam hired a private company to fortify contested features in the Spratly Islands (WPS refers to the West Philippine Sea, which is Manila’s official name for parts of the South China Sea in the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone). The second article, published on 27 July, details Vietnam’s alleged militarisation plan.

South China Sea and Vietnamese experts scrutinised the leaked document obtained by the Manila Times and have raised doubts over its credibility due to the inaccurate and inconsistent use of Vietnamese official formats and language. Among other issues, the document was not classified despite being a highly sensitive militarisation plan and it has basic grammatical errors that would not be overlooked in an MOD document. The experts further noted that the Manila Times inaccurately portrayed Vietnam’s reclamation of the South China Sea as a recent secret plan. In reality, such activities have been ongoing and acknowledged by Vietnam for some time.

Further evidence of this wedge strategy was provided in a recent article by the Philippine Daily Inquirer. It reports that prominent Philippine maritime security experts were contacted by suspicious individuals, who urged them to write about Vietnam’s alleged militarisation of the South China Sea. The experts suspected that this was a Chinese attempt to drive a wedge between the Philippines and Vietnam. The article also mentions that several Philippine reporters received suspicious emails claiming access to classified information on Vietnam’s island-building plans in the Spratly Islands. Notably, one of the email senders sought “to put pressure on the Vietnamese government through the media to stop its island-building activities.”

China or China-sponsored groups are likely behind this attempt to undermine Vietnam-Philippine growing strategic partnership on the South China Sea. Influencing international public opinion is part of China’s official ‘three warfares’ — seeking to influence public opinion as well as psychological and legal warfare — against other South China Sea claimants.

All these events suggest that in July, a public opinion warfare campaign was deployed to pit the Philippine public against Vietnam, aiming to sow discord between the two countries. If true, this campaign has yielded some effects.

On 1 August, shortly after the Manila Times articles were published, a group of Filipinos tore up a Vietnamese national flag in front of the Vietnamese embassy in Manila to protest the alleged militarisation. In response, Vietnam requested the Philippines “to strictly handle the case” and prevent such behaviour from reoccurring. Hanoi also suggested that similar incidents “could affect the development of the strategic partnership between the two countries”.

China or China-sponsored groups are likely behind this attempt to undermine Vietnam-Philippine growing strategic partnership on the South China Sea. Influencing international public opinion is part of China’s official ‘three warfares’ (san zhong zhanfa) — seeking to influence public opinion as well as psychological and legal warfare — against other South China Sea claimants. It is in China’s interest to keep ASEAN countries divided on the South China Sea, thereby preventing them from forming a united front against Beijing.

Given this context, Hanoi and Manila must remain vigilant and study any potential wedge strategy that may be employed against them. As strategic partners, the two should also devise coordinated responses to counter these tactics before bilateral ties endure significant damage.