A Political Settlement in Thailand’s Deep South: Three Steps Forward, Two Steps Back

In the new year, the longstanding conflict in Thailand’s Deep South has seen signs of hope and despair: negotiations intensified six months into the Srettha Thavisin-helmed Pheu Thai government, yet violence, persisted, albeit at low levels. While there appears to be some reasons for improved prospects, the durability of any long-term agreement is likely to be held hostage by the country’s conservative military.

January 2024 marked the twentieth anniversary of the violent upsurge of Thailand’s Deep South insurgency, which has been a festering lower-intensity conflict for more than a century. The fourth of January witnessed an insurrectionist raid on a Thai army camp involving the slaying of sentries and theft of multiple weapons.  Since January 2004, incidents of violence have totalled more than 22,296 (over 7,547 dead and 14,028 injured), including army massacres of Muslims at Krue-Se mosque and Tak bai township.  In 2012, annual incidents of violence (1,850 in 2012) began to decline, and have continued to decline every year since 2012.

Thailand’s Deep South refers to the provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala, as well as four districts of Songkhla province. The roots of violence include ethno-religious frictions (Malay-Muslims are the local majority); repression by Buddhist Thailand; and high-level regional poverty compared to most other provinces.

In 2004, thousands of people died after fresh violence erupted between Thai security forces and insurgent elements. Post-2004, the conflict has been a blessing and a curse for Thai security forces, offering it a security role as well as a reason for continuing high armed forces budgets and related opportunities to extract rent.  However, the conflict has pinned down troops (with over 70,000 troops occupying the Deep South) at a time when they are needed along the Thai-Myanmar border. The deployments have also taxed the state financially: 2005-2023 counterinsurgency spending totalled 492 billion Thai baht (US$14 billion).

From 2013 until 2023, the dialogue process between successive Thai governments and the insurgents sputtered along. This was hindered by mutual suspicions, violence against locals by state security forces and insurgents, a lack of unity among the insurgents, as well as changing Thai governments (which appointed new Thai dialogue partner representatives).

As violence in the south abated, dialogue between Thailand’s elected government and the dominant rebel group commenced in 2013. Following Thailand’s 2014 General Prayut Chan-o-cha-led coup, the junta restarted the dialogue, negotiating with MARA Patani, representing six insurgent groups instead of only BRN. Malaysia acted as dialogue “facilitator” though it was distrusted by Thailand and MARA Patani. By 2019, twenty rounds of meetings had produced little. In 2020, representatives of the BRN replaced MARA, resulting in six talks, producing an agreement on renewed dialogue and a Ramadan Peace Initiative during the Muslim holy month. Following the sixth meeting in February 2023, the BRN left the dialogue process in suspension until after the May 2023 Thai elections.

Two events have converged to improve the chances for meaningful dialogue.  First was the November 2022 ascension to office of Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, whose eagerness in ending the conflict gave the dialogue a shot in the arm. Unlike Anwar’s predecessors, who relied on Malaysia’s Special Branch (known for sympathy toward the BRN), Anwar appointed ex-Defense Forces Chief General Zulkifli Zainal Abidin as Malaysia’s dialogue facilitator. Abidin saw “light at the end of the tunnel” for peace in the Deep South because he sensed that both the BRN and the Thais were increasingly committed to the peace process.

Second was the appointment of Srettha Thavisin as the kingdom’s premier in September 2023. Srettha seemed more committed than his predecessor, Prime Minister General Prayut, to make dialogue matter. Srettha placed civilians in charge of Deep South policy. He even gave Pheu Thai’s coalition partner, the Phalang Prachachart Party, led by Deep South Malay-Muslim politicians, enormous authority over Deep South development and reconciliation. Deputy Prime Minister Somsak Thepsuthin advocated greater investments in the region for Malay-Muslims. The government’s commitment to dialogue reflected national exhaustion with counterinsurgency: Thailand’s largest party Move Forward, for example, favours demilitarising the Deep South.

Thailand’s Deep South in 2024 may be the most stable since before 2004. But in an interview with Prince of Songkhla University’s Dr Srisompob Jitpiromsri, a leading expert on the conflict, peacefully resolving it remains elusive because Srettha “has compromised with the military on Deep South policy.”

But Srettha has weaknesses. New Thai negotiator, Chatchai Bangchuad (a civilian previously on Prayut’s National Security Council), and the latest National Security Council Secretary-General, Police General Roy Ingkhapairoj, are not Pheu Thai loyalists.  Army Commander General Jaroenchai Hintao, Permanent Defense Secretary General Sanitchanok Sangkachantrand and Secretary to the Ministry General Nattapol Nakpanich are all Prayut’s men. Since they are not beholden to any peace policy of Srettha but are more steadfast hardliners, these officials could monitor and sabotage the talks.

Meanwhile, the army-dominated Internal Security Operations Command has charged university students supporting Deep South self-determination with violating the Criminal Code. To apparently appease the army, Srettha’s Defense Minister Suthin Klangsaeng has promised to apply the Emergency Decree in the Deep South until 2027, when Srettha completes his term as PM. Moreover, government prosecutors seem ready to allow the Tak Bai case to lapse in 2024, meaning that military perpetrators of that massacre will escape punishment.

In December 2023, Bangchuad, the BRN, and Abidin agreed to work towards two goals: further reducing violence and involving the public in negotiations.  Talks planned for January 2024 stressed these goals. Nevertheless, the Deep South insurgency persists. During each month of 2023, at least one insurgency-linked killing or injury occurred. May 2023 even began to see an upsurge in BRN-instigated Deep South violent incidents following the suspension of talks until after the election.

Thailand’s Deep South in 2024 may be the most stable since before 2004. But in an interview with Prince of Songkhla University’s Dr Srisompob Jitpiromsri, a leading expert on the conflict, peacefully resolving it remains elusive because Srettha “has compromised with the military on Deep South policy.”  Even if civilian governments in Thailand and Malaysia pressure the military and BRN towards a middle-ground settlement, these governments have but a temporary lifespan. Meanwhile, Deep South violence, albeit at lower than pre-2013 levels, continues.  It is hard to imagine an end to such violence anytime soon.  Given the overwhelming power of the military in terms of civil-military relations vis-à-vis the conflict, perhaps the most reasonable and sustainable course of action for Srettha is one also acceptable to military moderates.

2024/26