Japan’s “Silent Diplomacy” in Myanmar: A Partner for ASEAN’s Peace Process?

Japan is widely known for pioneering pioneered various regional mediation efforts. In 1990, for example, Japanese officials successfully mediated between Cambodia’s warring factions, supplementing the international efforts to end the conflict. Tokyo is seeking to strengthen its mediation capacity through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ International Peace Mediation Unit, established in March, and the Parliamentary Association for Peace Mediation launched in May 2026. Separately, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation established its Centre for Mediation Support around the same time, providing another channel through which Japanese actors can engage in mediation efforts.

These developments are relevant to Myanmar. Japan remains engaged with Myanmar despite its relatively low-profile approach following the coup, reflecting what Yohei Sasakawa, a well-connected Japanese philanthropist, described as Japan’s “silent diplomacy”. Japan participated in the Oslo Forum’s roundtable on Myanmar in June, while Mr Sasakawa visited Naypyidaw in August and two Japanese parliamentarians visited the Myanmar capital in September.

Japan has engaged in dialogue and offered to mediate peace in Myanmar for years. For instance, when Western nations condemned Myanmar for the violent crackdown on the Rohingya in 2017, Japan sought to promote human rights in Rakhine through private actors. Mr Sasakawa mediated an informal humanitarian ceasefire between the military and the Arakan Army (AA) in November 2020. This was despite the fact that the AA was classified as a terrorist organisation by the civilian government in 2020. After the 2021 coup, he continued to mediate between the military and the AA. He successfully brokered another informal ceasefire in November 2022. The ceasefire lasted for about a year; thereafter, the AA launched a new offensive in 2023 and participated in Operation 1027 as part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance alongside the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). In late 2023, the AA started to capture townships in Chin and Rakhine States, contributing to significant territorial losses for the military.

For the Myanmar military, the collapse of the ceasefire with the AA had a lasting impact on its perceptions of international mediation. The junta had sought to build a better international reputation and rehabilitate its image in Rakhine through the ceasefire, especially after its 2017 crackdown on the Rohingyas. The 2022 ceasefire allowed the AA to consolidate its local support, mobilise forces and later, renege on the agreement to resume its offensive following Naypyidaw’s abysmal performance in northern Shan State. The breakdown significantly undermined Mr Sasakawa’s mediation efforts and appeared to lead the regime to view ceasefires as increasingly ineffective in advancing its interests. Moreover, the AA’s distrust of external mediators also grew. China’s mediation led to the transfer of Lashio from MNDAA to the junta in 2025. The transfer of the economic hub in northern Shan State might have further reinforced the AA’s scepticism toward externally brokered arrangements and reduced its willingness to return to the negotiating table.

Despite the junta’s reservations about another internationally brokered ceasefire, Mr Sasakawa’s recent visit to Naypyidaw suggests that the Myanmar military has not entirely ruled out externally facilitated deals. Compared with other major powers, Japan is also viewed as a more trusted and less coercive actor. This gives it greater credibility as a mediator acceptable to both sides in a civil war. As Japan intensifies its engagement in peace diplomacy, ASEAN could find Japan an effective partner in addressing the Myanmar issue. On 21 July, ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to develop benchmarks for measuring progress in Myanmar. This underscores a need for practical experience in mediation and conflict assessment. Japan’s long experience of engaging Myanmar through its kakehashi (bridging) approach, including its previous ceasefire efforts, could serve as a useful case for ASEAN as it develops these benchmarks. There are some potential entry points: Japan and the Philippines agreed in May 2026 to strengthen cooperation on peace mediation expertise and capacity, and some representatives from the Singapore Embassy in Tokyo attended the inaugural meeting of the Parliamentary Association for Peace Mediation held in Tokyo.

ASEAN countries put a relatively high level of trust in Japan to “do the right thing” for peace, security and prosperity. This will help it to remain a consistent and reliable partner regardless of which member state holds the ASEAN chair.

Given China’s growing role as an important external actor in the Myanmar peace process, Tokyo also remains attentive to China’s expanding influence in the process. But Japan offers a different model of mediation compared to China, which has been expanding its peace mediation role in Southeast Asia, as demonstrated through its shuttle diplomacy during the 2025 Thailand-Cambodia conflict. While China has played the most prominent external role in Myanmar’s ceasefires, its approach has largely favoured bilateral engagement over supporting ASEAN-led efforts. Japan’s approach to peacebuilding has a strong Official Development Aid (ODA) component. This stresses the importance of human security for long-term conflict prevention and providing material benefits for the regional partners. Japan also maintains significant investments in Myanmar, with around 300 Japanese companies still operating in the country. This gives Tokyo potential economic leverage.

ASEAN countries put a relatively high level of trust in Japan to “do the right thing” for peace, security and prosperity (see Table 1). This will help it to remain a consistent and reliable partner regardless of which member state holds the ASEAN chair.

Table 1. How confident are you that Japan will “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity and governance?

Japan’s decades-long engagement in the Mindanao peace process also demonstrates its ability to sustain long-term peacebuilding efforts. Japan also has long institutional experience working with ASEAN mechanisms for humanitarian and emergency response assistance. For example, Japan provided material support for ASEAN observer teams during the Thailand–Cambodia dispute through its Official Security Assistance (OSA) scheme. Tokyo thus knows how to support an ASEAN-led process without taking ownership. A similar model could make Japan a quiet partner for ASEAN’s Myanmar engagements, providing mediation experience and resources while supporting ASEAN as it seeks to steer the dialogue process in Myanmar.

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