Vietnam-Myanmar Relations: Cautious Normalisation Under Constraint

On 4 September 2026, Myanmar’s former commander-in-chief turned President Min Aung Hlaing paid a three-day state visit to Vietnam. His visit is part of a flurry of high-level visits to several countries deemed “friendly” to Naypyidaw following his inauguration in April. His diplomatic strategy seems to have paid dividends, despite doubts surrounding the military-orchestrated elections in December 2025 and January 2026 which were widely viewed as an attempt to entrench military rule. In addition to meeting Vietnamese leaders, Min Aung Hlaing visited a VinFast electric-vehicle plant and Viettel facilities, and attended a business forum.

The visit crystallises Hanoi’s current approach to Naypyidaw. Under General Secretary To Lam, Vietnam’s greater emphasis on “strategic proactiveness” — seizing opportunities rather than focusing primarily on avoiding risks — has facilitated re-engagement with Myanmar’s junta. Even so, Hanoi’s approach remains cautious, and the main driver appears to be less ideological affinity than the desire to protect and expand concrete economic and strategic interests. Hanoi also invited Min Aung Hlaing only after he had already made official visits to India, China, Russia and Belarus, as well as to two other ASEAN countries, Laos and Thailand. Vietnam’s diplomatic re-engagement with Myanmar is therefore real, but it remains transactional, calibrated and, if circumstances deteriorate, potentially reversible.

The diplomatic “thaw” started in late August, when Foreign Minister Le Hoai Trung travelled to Naypyidaw for the 10th Vietnam-Myanmar Joint Committee for Bilateral Cooperation. In Hanoi, President To Lam and Min Aung Hlaing agreed to deepen defence and security cooperation. They also discussed expanding trade, investment and technology ties, and strengthening coordination within relevant ASEAN frameworks, including those for the Mekong subregion.

Economically, however, the relationship tells a more sobering story. Bilateral trade has fallen sharply, from USD853 million in 2020 to USD590 million in 2025, with turnover reaching only USD335 million in the first half of 2026. Hanoi and Naypyidaw now aim to raise trade to USD1 billion. Vietnamese investments in Myanmar have held up better. Official Vietnamese data show that, as of June 2026, Vietnam had 107 registered projects in Myanmar with capital commitments of USD1.4 billion, concentrated in telecommunications, agriculture, food processing and banking.

The anchor asset is Mytel, the telecom operator in which Viettel, a Vietnamese military-owned conglomerate, holds an effective 49 per cent stake through a joint venture with Star High Public Company and a local consortium linked to the military-owned Myanmar Economic Corporation. Within five years of its 2017 launch, Mytel had become Myanmar’s largest mobile operator by subscriber base, making it Vietnam’s most consequential commercial foothold in the country.

Vietnam’s current posture is best understood against the longer history of its dealings with Myanmar. From the late 1980s, Hanoi maintained cordial relations with successive military governments. Senior Myanmar leaders such as Khin Nyunt and Thein Sein showed interest in Vietnam’s Doi Moi reforms as a possible model for gradual economic opening without rapid political liberalisation. When Myanmar embarked on wide-ranging reforms in 2011, Vietnam increasingly viewed the country as a frontier market with substantial commercial potential. Vietnamese firms such as Viettel and Hoang Anh Gia Lai expanded accordingly, culminating in the Mytel venture and the establishment of a comprehensive partnership in 2017.

The February 2021 coup disrupted this trajectory. Western sanctions tightened, and the junta’s disregard of ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus led to Naypyidaw’s restricted representation at ASEAN Summits. Even so, Vietnam avoided taking the hardest possible line. During its tenure as a non-permanent member at the UN Security Council (UNSC), Vietnam joined China, India and Russia in objecting to stronger condemnatory language in a March 2021 UNSC presidential statement on Myanmar and sent officials to the junta’s Armed Forces Day parade later that month, despite the military’s use of lethal force against civilian protesters.

The current thaw draws from both Hanoi’s and Naypyidaw’s calculations.  Viettel’s stake in Mytel may provide an additional reason for Hanoi to stabilise the relationship. Mytel is not merely a commercial asset, it is also embedded in institutional ties between the Vietnamese and Myanmar militaries. Protecting that investment carries both economic and bureaucratic significance. Meanwhile, for Naypyidaw, restoring relations with Vietnam — an ASEAN member of growing diplomatic and economic weight — offers a relatively low-cost route towards broader international acceptance and, eventually, fuller reintegration into the regional diplomatic mainstream.

…for Naypyidaw, restoring relations with Vietnam — an ASEAN member of growing diplomatic and economic weight — offers a relatively low-cost route toward broader international acceptance and, eventually, fuller reintegration into the regional diplomatic mainstream.

Looking Ahead

The durability of this rapprochement will nevertheless depend heavily on developments inside Myanmar that Hanoi cannot control. The 2025–26 elections did little to resolve the regime’s legitimacy problem, while the civil war continues. Estimates suggest that more than 100,000 people have been killed and around four million displaced since the coup. If the conflict intensifies further, causing more civilian casualties, Vietnam may find it difficult to continue the current pace of deepening ties. In such a scenario, Hanoi would likely seek to balance its pragmatic security and economic interests with ASEAN’s broader collective position, which links further engagement with Myanmar to more concrete progress in implementing ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus.

Closer defence cooperation also carries reputational risks. If Vietnam’s engagement is interpreted, domestically or internationally, as tacit support for intensified repression of opposition groups and ethnic armed organisations, the diplomatic costs could begin to outweigh the commercial and strategic benefits Hanoi is seeking to preserve. Vietnam is therefore likely to continue calibrating the pace of engagement against Myanmar’s internal trajectory rather than committing itself irreversibly to full normalisation.

Gradual, interest-driven engagement is not necessarily unreasonable. If Min Aung Hlaing’s current diplomatic offensive improves Myanmar’s economic prospects, they could, in principle, induce a willingness to consider compromise and reform. The challenge, however, lies in Myanmar’s history; the military’s determination to preserve its political role and prerogatives provides little reason to expect major concessions in the near term.

Vietnam’s approach is therefore best understood as a cautious bet rather than a strategic embrace. Hanoi is seeking to protect economic interests, preserve military and diplomatic channels, and position itself for a possible future normalisation of Myanmar within ASEAN. Whether that approach helps stabilise the relationship or leaves Vietnam more deeply entangled in an unresolved conflict remains an open question.

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