The ‘Malay Unity’ Narrative: A Bridge Too Far?”

Some Malays have warmed to the “theories” of a Malay academic who has espoused a mythical Malay civilisation that supposedly predated Mesopotamian civilisation by thousands of years. The resonance underscores a deeper sentiment: some Malays feel that they have lost their privileged position in Malaysia. That said, the collective hope that a united Malay political coalition will emerge is as chimerical as the academic’s “theories”.

The author attended a talk in Kuala Lumpur by the controversial Dr Solehah Yaacob. The absence of authoritative academic proof for any of her “theories” did not bother the 150 or so people who packed the room and the thousands who watched the livestream on Facebook and TikTok. The event’s main theme was about strengthening Malays’ self-worth by reconnecting with their past glories. There was certainly a palpable feel-good sentiment among the rapt listeners, no matter how outlandish Dr Solehah’s claims might be.

Why do such “theories” resonate with a broad swathe of the Malay community? Since the collapse of the Barisan Nasional (BN) government in 2018, there has been a shared feeling among conservative Malays that the community is too fragmented. This was exemplified by numerous Malay and Islamic political parties that split the Malay vote. In turn, this has allowed non-Malays to seize more political power and has gradually eroded special privileges long enjoyed by the Malays. Some prominent Malay leaders, such as Mahathir Mohamad and Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, have publicly said that Malay unity is a first step towards these goals.

After the 2018 General Election, the Malay nationalist party United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) found itself in an unfamiliar position of being in opposition alongside Islamist party Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS). Conversely, the Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP) became part of the federal government for the first time when Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition took the reins of power in May 2018. DAP returned to federal power against after the general election in November 2022. Currently, the party holds the most seats within the PH coalition.

As the thinking goes, Malays must unite against DAP’s growing political influence to preserve their privileges and reclaim their past glories. Conservative Malays saw the political rise of DAP as an existential threat to the special position of Malays and Islam in Malaysia and argued that it was the Malays’ own divisiveness that allowed this to happen.

On 14 September 2019, UMNO and PAS agreed to formally establish the Muafakat Nasional (MN). It was meant as a symbol of Malay-Islamic unity (penyatuan ummah) against a common enemy: the PH government, particularly the DAP. Six months after the founding of MN, the PH government crumbled and MN took over, which was later joined by Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu), a PH component party. MN disintegrated not long after UMNO and PAS took over the federal government in 2020. The common communal agenda took a back seat to party rivalries and self-interest, particularly when Bersatu joined the newly formed Perikatan Nasional (PN) government despite UMNO’s vehement protest.

The real test of Muafakat Nasional 2.0 becoming sustainable in the long run centres on seat negotiations.

Currently, many Malay-Muslims continue to feel that their privileges are fast being eroded. The issues include economic uncertainties and bleak employment prospects coupled with political disunity and fragmentation. This is despite the fact that university placement, scholarships and civil service jobs continue to favour of the Malays. The Madani government has also rolled out numerous programmes that benefit Malays in the bottom 40 per cent.

The same MN prime movers are now calling for Malay unity and have termed it Muafakat Nasional 2.0. They still see DAP as the bogeyman, but Malay-Islamic parties are still divided and in competition with each other. Primarily due to decades of gerrymandering and malapportionment practices by the former BN government, more than half of the seats in Parliament are Malay-majority. Since 2018, UMNO has been losing its hold on many of these seats, making them open for electoral competition among five main Malay-Islamic parties: PAS, UMNO, Bersatu, Parti Wawasan Negara (Wawasan) and Parti Amanah Negara. Malay-Islamic parties believe they will lose out in the 16th general election if they engage in multi-cornered contests, while the DAP maintains its seats due to near-unanimous support from Chinese voters. As seen in the electoral results in Johor and Negeri Sembilan recently, there is an urgent need for Malay-Islamic parties to compete as one to increase their chance of maximising their seats and limit the DAP to only Chinese-majority areas. However, in recent state elections in Johor and Negeri Sembilan, efforts to form a unified front have been complicated at best.

The real test of MN 2.0 becoming sustainable in the long run centres on seat negotiations. At the time of writing, PAS, UMNO and Wawasan (a splinter party from Bersatu) are in intense discussions over seat allocation for the upcoming Melaka state election. UMNO is adamant that it would not relinquish any of the 21 seats it holds. This leaves PAS and Wawasan with barely any seats to contest in. Melaka has 28 seats in its state legislature.

Similar tensions might play out in Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu and Perlis, where PAS holds near total dominance. Will it be willing to give up some of its seats to UMNO and Wawasan? Malay-Islamic parties will have to choose between their own ambitions or set aside their differences for the sake of a common cause. One PAS politician recently stated that PAS and UMNO need to set aside their deep-seated enmity to confront the DAP, which poses a greater threat (mudarat besar).

As a rallying cry, the Malay unity agenda resonates with a large segment of the Malay community. Dr Solehah’s views, however outlandish, are being propagated with purpose. Her talk was organised by the ultra-nationalist Gabungan Nasionalis, a group strongly affiliated with Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia (ISMA), which is well-known for its Malay and Islamic supremacy stances. While many Malays might not agree with ISMA’s extreme views, the same people believe that the Malay community is riven by intracommunal rivalry. This puts Malay and Islam’s special positions at risk, which necessitates the call for unity. For now, this call remains in the realm of the aspirational.

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