ASEAN-Japan Relations at 50: Taking a Harder Edge

ASEAN and Japan celebrated the 50th anniversary of their diplomatic relations on 17 December in Tokyo. This follows the establishment of the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Strategic Partnership at the 26th ASEAN-Japan Summit in September in Jakarta. Fifty years on, Japan’s role has moved from a focus on economics and development into the realm of hard security, especially maritime security.

In its inimitable understated style, Japan prefers to let the facts of its relations with ASEAN members speak for themselves. Japan has a long list of nearly 90 bilateral projects with ASEAN in four key areas under the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP): maritime and economic cooperation, connectivity, and sustainable development. Japan’s Official Development Finance (ODF) to ASEAN and its member countries has been significant, amounting to US$4 billion annually for 2015-2021.

At the summit, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced more exchange programmes, scholarships, and other initiatives to co-create an economic future with ASEAN countries such as the next-generation auto industry. He also defended the most fundamental aspect of Japan’s foreign policy: a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) based on the rule of law.

Looking ahead, the FOIP concept, first introduced by the late Japanese premier Shinzo Abe in 2006, will be the operative term underpinning Japan’s approach to ASEAN and its member states.

In the face of China’s assertive behaviour in hotspots including the South China Sea (SCS), Tokyo has sought to beef up the maritime and military capabilities of Southeast Asian countries. A clear example of this is Japan’s Official Security Assistance (OSA). Tabled in Japan’s National Security Strategy published in December 2022, the OSA would provide materiel, equipment, and assistance for the development of infrastructure to meet the security needs of recipient countries. This would include non-lethal aid in the form of radars and satellite systems.

The shift in emphasis is clear. Previously, Japan packaged the transfer of weapons systems and naval vessels under its Official Development Assistance (ODA) scheme, which is typically used for economic development and strictly limited to civilian agencies. In contrast, OSA seeks to help Southeast Asian states to defend their territories. Japan wants to empower claimant states to defend against China’s aggression in the SCS, which would be in line with its own security interest of balancing China.

Under the OSA scheme, the Philippine Navy will get US$4 million worth of coastal surveillance radars. It has been reported that Malaysia – another SCS claimant – would be another potential recipient.

Japan has been consistent in helping Southeast Asian countries to arm and defend themselves, amid Chinese attempts to encroach on their maritime territories. In 2013, Japan delivered 10 multi-role response patrol vessels to the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG); another two patrol ships were delivered in 2022. Japan has delivered six second-hand fishery patrol vessels to Vietnam, with six more to be transferred by 2025. Japan has also agreed to sell Indonesia eight Mogami-class stealth frigates; the deal was categorised as a “joint development” project to sidestep Tokyo’s arms export ban.

At a time of increasing geopolitical contestation between China and the U.S., Japan is also acting as a linchpin to connect U.S.-led security frameworks such as the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.) with ASEAN.

ASEAN member states are wary of the Quad: there are fears that the grouping would undermine ASEAN centrality and serve to effect the pseudo-containment of China. That said, ASEAN countries are open to working with Japan and other Quad members in flexible plurilateral arrangements provided these activities serve their national interests. This is especially in areas such as maritime domain awareness, climate change, infrastructure, emerging technologies, and supply chains.

The shift in emphasis is clear.

Recent developments attest to the emergence of so-called Quad-lite interactions between Southeast Asian countries and members of the Quad. While these collaborations do not have the Quad brand, they provide a basis for cooperation and interoperability.

As opposed to using navies, the employment of coast guards is deemed less threatening while demonstrating countries’ intent to police their maritime territories and claims. In June, the American and Japanese coast guards conducted maritime drills and joint search and rescue operations with the PCG and helped with a maintenance manual for patrol vessels in August.

Japan has also participated in Quad-lite naval activities involving Southeast Asian countries. In August, navies from Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the U.S. carried out a joint exercise in the SCS near Manila. Last year, Indonesia conducted the Garuda Shield exercises with Australia, Japan, and the U.S. (Singapore was an observer). Separately, the Talisman Sabre exercises in August involved Australian and American soldiers, with soldiers, marines and aviators from Japan, the Republic of Korea and the UK. Military personnel from the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand attended as observers. Amid growing Sino-U.S. contestation, Southeast Asian countries have repeated ad nauseam that they do not want to choose sides. Instead, Southeast Asian countries will “choose” to uphold their national interests, whether they work with the U.S. (such as on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework), with China (such as on the Belt and Road Initiative), or with both. This is where Japan could extend the strategic options for these countries in hedging against the uncertainties of great power rivalry while playing a greater balancing role in the region.

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