The State of Southeast Asia Survey 2025
Beijing Retains Considerable Weight in Regional Perceptions
Published
Despite some apprehension about its actions, Beijing continues to retain considerable weight among Southeast Asian elites. This should improve if China learns to temper its assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea.
Southeast Asia has long been a priority in China’s strategic calculus as Beijing’s strategic backyard and a key target of its neighbourhood diplomacy. Despite the US besting China on a forced binary question, China retains considerable weight in regional assessments. Looking further, it will do well in regional perceptions if it addresses Southeast Asia’s apprehensions about its behaviour, particularly in the South China Sea.
In the latest State of Southeast Asia Survey 2025, 52.3 per cent of regional respondents chose to align with the US at the expense of China (47.7 per cent) when forced to choose between the two great powers. This marks a swing from 2024 when the region chose China at 50.5 per cent over the US at 49.5 per cent. The fact remains, however, that the region has consistently preferred to align with the US throughout the course of the survey’s run from 2020 to 2025.
The US’s unwavering support for Israel in the Gaza conflict may have been a factor driving the region’s preference for Beijing last year. This year, however, other security considerations, particularly the disputes with China in the South China Sea, may be a factor. While China may have again lost out in the forced binary question, it has performed surprisingly well in other aspects. Still, the perception of US President Donald Trump as a strong leader and a dealmaker, with a strategy to refocus Washington’s attention back on the Indo-Pacific, could have resulted in an expression of greater alignment with the US.
Inclined Towards Uncle Sam

Despite the US gain in the forced binary question, China retains significant weight in respondents’ eyes. To start, ASEAN member states again ranked it as the region’s most strategically relevant dialogue partner (mean score 8.80). Of the 10 member states, six countries that placed China first, namely Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, all have deep economic ties with it or have benefited from Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects.
Furthermore, no country has been able to unseat China as Southeast Asia’s topmost influential economic power (56.4 per cent) and pre-eminent political-strategic power (37.9 per cent). Notably, the region’s elevated concerns about Beijing’s seemingly insurmountable economic and political-strategic influence have been falling since 2020. The gradual decrease in negative sentiments towards China in the economic sphere (compared to the political-strategic sphere) could be due to the tangible benefits of China-led infrastructure and investments, and an acknowledgement of economic interdependence with it.
China Continues to Loom Large


Likewise, trust levels in China, according to the latest survey, rose from a low of 19.0 per cent in 2021 to 36.6 per cent. Concurrently, distrust levels dropped from 50.1 per cent in 2024 to 41.2 per cent this year (the lowest level since 2021). Although it is a long way from enjoying high trust levels like Japan, the fact that they have improved may be a reflection of a growing appreciation for China’s role globally. The 36.6 per cent of respondents who expressed confidence in China “to do the right thing” in contributing to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance point to the country’s vast economic resources and strong political will to demonstrate global leadership. Another 20.1 per cent say that China is a responsible stakeholder that respects and champions international law.
Doing Right by the Region

Given the across-the-board improvement to China’s image in the region, it begs the question as to why it continues to trail the US as Southeast Asia’s preferred power between the two to align with. In part, it may have lost some of its economic lustre as Beijing continues to muddle through domestic economic reforms. However, digging deeper into the results reveals more pertinent concerns among Southeast Asian countries about China.
Southeast Asia has enjoyed the benefits of economic progress and development in tandem with China’s own growth story. Yet, Beijing’s increasingly assertive behaviour towards its smaller neighbours has remained a cause for concern. China’s soft power dominance has indeed grown through various avenues, including the provision of developmental aid to the region (which has been declining more recently). But survey respondents are still cognisant of concerns about China: the fear of interference in countries’ domestic affairs, its strong-arm tactics in the South China Sea and the Mekong, and its use of economic tools and tourism to punish countries’ choices.
Notably, the South China Sea dispute remains a Gordian knot standing in Beijing’s way of developing closer relations with Southeast Asia.
Notably, the South China Sea dispute remains a Gordian knot standing in Beijing’s way of developing closer relations with Southeast Asia. Respondents to the survey have consistently expressed that their most significant reason for distrusting China stemmed from the concern that it could wield its substantial economic and military power to threaten countries’ interests and sovereignty. This continues to be the case in 2025 (47.6 per cent). Further, when asked what China could do to improve relations with their countries, respondents consistently chose the peaceful resolution of all territorial and maritime disputes according to international law as their top choice.
Chinese Power a Source of Concern

Still, all is not lost for Beijing. In a recent qualitative study of youth elite opinions in the region, Southeast Asian participants, aged between 18 and 35, expressed a pragmatic approach to engaging with Beijing even though they were cognisant of the potential security risks and threats to their countries’ sovereignty. The geographic proximity of China and the benefits of prospering with it meant managing these risks as part of “the cost of doing business with China”. This did not mean the region would completely embrace China as participants emphasised that their predilection for pragmatism ultimately hinged on Beijing’s restraint from crossing certain “red lines”.
China has made considerable gains with Southeast Asia, even as it continues to trail the US as the region’s choice strategic partner. To bolster its image, it would have to address Southeast Asia’s apprehensions effectively. This would apply in particular to the South China Sea disputes. This would be challenging, given its relatively rigid approach to the disputes. If done correctly, however, there is a strong likelihood that China will see an improvement in its regional standing.
2025/119
Sharon Seah is a Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
Eugene R.L. Tan is a Research Officer with the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.










