China-U.S. High-Level Dialogues: A Welcome Uptick but a Long Road Ahead

High-level exchanges and dialogues between China and the United States, which hit a nadir in 2020, appear to be showing some improvement. These interactions reduce the risk of crisis and inadvertent escalation and should be encouraged. However, there is still a long way to go given deep-seated differences.

Ms Xanthi Carras, principal director in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for China, Taiwan and Mongolia led the U.S. delegation to the Xiangshan Forum — China’s analogue to the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD). The last time a senior U.S. official attended the Forum in-person was in 2019. This was Chad Sbragia, deputy assistant secretary of defence for China. China froze military-to-military exchanges in August 2022, after Nancy Pelosi, then speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, visited Taiwan.

Last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and President Joseph Biden. Mr Wang said that both sides would work to achieve a meeting between Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings in San Francisco in November. Wang added that both countries needed to “return to Bali” but warned that they could not rely on “autopilot” to do so. (Biden and President Xi Jinping last met at the G-20 meetings in Bali, Indonesia, in November 2022, where they discussed the Taiwan Strait, competition and communications.)

On 25 October, President Xi rhetorically held out an olive branch, saying China stood willing to cooperate with Washington to manage their differences and to work together to respond to global challenges. He had delivered a letter to participants at the annual dinner of the New York-based National Committee on United States-China relations.

In addition, the apparent sacking of Chinese defence minister Li Shangfu, who was under U.S. sanctions for buying Russian arms for the PLA, might pave the way for the restarting of high-level dialogue. In June 2023, General Li had refused to meet U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on the sidelines of the SLD because of these sanctions.

Since June, three U.S. cabinet secretaries – trade, treasury, and commerce – have visited China. Mr Sullivan, by one count, has spent 20 hours speaking to Mr Wang in the past few months.

High-level dialogue between Beijing and Washington has hovered at such new lows in the past three years that any improvement would be seen as progress. In 2014, military-to-military interactions, comprising high-level dialogues, academic exchanges and functional meetings, totalled 39. This dropped to four per year in 2020 and 2021. In 2022, this improved slightly to 7 exchanges or meetings (see table below).

U.S.-China Military Exchanges: Ticking Up But from a Low Base

U.S. officials are quick to point fingers at the Chinese for the chill. In the latest Chinese Military Power Report, they noted that China’s penchant for terminating military-to-military interaction “suggests the PRC views military channels of communication as a tool to punish or reward the United States for its perceived behaviour, versus being inherently valuable to maintaining peace and stability”.

To the Chinese, they see the U.S. as using high-level exchanges to mask tensions created by American “provocations” of China, such as Washington’s arms sales to Taiwan and intelligence and reconnaissance missions carried out near China’s coastline. “What is the point of dialogue in such a context?” a retired PLA officer told the author.

The Biden Administration appears to have caught on to China’s calculus to probe and test American resolve and bandwidth in Asia.

There are more systemic obstacles at work. President Biden is effectively pursuing a full-court press vis-à-vis China, with measures such as “friendshoring” and decoupling. In addition, the U.S. has done a creditable job in corralling a network of allies and partners to manage the rise of China. These measures are seen by the Chinese as an overt American attempt to contain China.

Last, the ensuing conflict between Israel and Hamas may provide the Chinese with another avenue through which to undermine America’s power and presence in Asia. The Chinese had quietly watched the botched U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, its substantive reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and more recently, its commitment to Israel after the Hamas attacks on civilians on 7 October 2023. Taken together, these crises might reduce American bandwidth to act in Asia, where it has remained primus inter pares for 70 years after the end of World War Two.

The Biden Administration appears to have caught on to China’s calculus to probe and test American resolve and bandwidth in Asia. In his strongest statement yet on tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, President Biden stressed that he wanted “to be clear…that the U.S’ defence commitment to the Philippines is ironclad”. Biden’s statement came days after two collisions between Filipino and Chinese vessels in the disputed area. Some observers note China, Russia, and North Korea could be seeking to “probe, test and attack” the U.S. and its allies while they are distracted by events in the Middle East. This is plausible: China could be testing whether Washington would be able to manage crises on three fronts (Europe, the Middle East, and Asia).

In short, the resumption of Sino-U.S. dialogue is an encouraging sign. That said, one swallow does not a summer make.

2023/261