China’s Global Security Initiative: Not About Picking Sides

Since the launch of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in 2022, China has identified Southeast Asia as a key region for its actualisation. Yet, the GSI has been met with a degree of caution in the region. According to The State of Southeast Asia: 2023 Survey Report, among those respondents expressing concerns about the GSI, 33.1 per cent feared it would exacerbate US-China tensions, and 32.9 per cent worried it would force ASEAN to choose sides (the 2024 and 2025 editions of the survey did not feature the question on the GSI). This reflects a gap between regional perceptions and China’s strategic intent. Far from coercing alignment with China or fueling great power rivalry, the GSI is positioned by Beijing as a complementary platform to the existing regional architecture — one that targets shared, transnational security challenges through practical cooperation.

To begin with, positioning GSI as guideline for a group of formal military allies will neither yield tangible outcomes nor serve Chinese interests, given the region’s complex geopolitical landscape as a juxtaposition of major power influences. A security alliance presupposes a shared threat perception against a third party — yet ASEAN member states hold divergent views towards major powers, shaped by differing strategic priorities and national threat assessments. Some, like the Philippines under the Marcos Jr administration, tilt more closely towards the US. Others adopt a hedging posture or seek to maintain a careful balance among competing powers. They also attach different levels of importance or hold disagreements on key regional issues such as the current situation in Myanmar or the South China Sea issue.

It would thus be implausible and impracticable for any country — including China — to forge Southeast Asian countries into a formal alliance or a bloc-based confrontation against a third party. Moreover, as a longstanding advocate of non-alignment, China’s commitment to an amicable and inclusive diplomacy towards the region also underscores its full acknowledgement of the complexity and sensitivity of Southeast Asia’s geopolitics. Therefore, showing support or being cooperative on the GSI does not in any way signify participation in or assistance for a China-led alliance.

Far from bloc-building or forcing geopolitical alignment, China’s implementation of the GSI in Southeast Asia has focused on fostering practical and mutually beneficial security governance. For example, China has ramped up joint efforts with Mekong countries to combat transnational organised crime, including cyber scams, drug trade, and arms trafficking. Notably, China has undertaken joint patrols along the Mekong River with Laos, Myanmar and Thailand. It has launched joint operations with the Thai police to crack down on cyber scam hubs operating in northern Myanmar.

In addition, China has been supporting Cambodia’s demining efforts through a combination of grant aid, training courses and expert assistance. It has even deployed boots on the ground in joint demining operations. In Myanmar, China has played a constructive role in conflict mediation. It has hosted and brokered several rounds of ceasefire negotiations between the military junta and ethnic armed groups, particularly alongside its southwestern border. These operational, issue-based collaborations reflect China’s focus on practical cooperation in non-traditional areas to improve the overall security situation of the region.

As outlined in its concept paper, a primary objective of the GSI is to support ASEAN-centred regional security cooperation mechanisms. Strengthening ASEAN’s strategic autonomy —  including through collective capacity-building to enhance regional responses to emerging security challenges — has been a consistent feature of China’s approach. In line with this commitment, China actively engages in ASEAN-led security frameworks, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), and ASEAN-China Defence Ministers’ Informal Meetings.

It is also worth underscoring that China does not intend the GSI to operate as an exclusive framework in competition with or confrontation against established systems of security governance.

China has been an active member within various ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs). It recently hosted the 20^th meeting of the EWG on Peacekeeping Operations in Nanjing, and participated in drills alongside the US and Russia during the 9^th meeting of the EWG on Cyber Security. It has continued to support the efforts of the EWG on Humanitarian Mine Action. China also regularly attends ARF and EAS Foreign Ministers’ Meetings, as well as the EAS Leaders’ Meeting. It has also played its part in building consensus in priority areas of cooperation within various ASEAN inclusive frameworks.

It is also worth underscoring that China does not intend the GSI to operate as an exclusive framework in competition with or confrontation against established systems of security governance. As a global trading power that has thrived within the existing international system, China’s continued prosperity and projection of influence depends on a stable, peaceful, and inclusive global community. This orientation is reflected in China’s recent diplomatic efforts, including its active participation in a historical trilateral meeting with ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council in May, underscoring its commitment to preserving multilateral cooperation.

Consistent with this approach, China has sought to manage tensions with other major powers, particularly with the US, through engagement rather than confrontation. This approach has endured across US administrations. During Biden’s term, channels of communication remained open. Under the Trump 2.0 administration, signs of pragmatism persist even as Beijing faces pressure from an increasingly coercive Washington. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently held a “constructive and positive” meeting with his American counterpart Marco Rubio on the sidelines of the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meetings in Malaysia. In June, Chinese leader Xi Jinping invited President Trump to revisit China during a phone call, for which the latter “expressed heartfelt appreciation”.

Being a relatively new security governance concept, the GSI is at a preliminary stage of implementation. ASEAN countries still harbour concerns about China’s commitment to uphold international law (including those related to negotiations of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea), to properly approach regional security governance, as well as to maintain dialogue and enhance mutual trust with all parties.

Still, it is important to emphasise that China’s fundamental interests in Southeast Asia lie in the region’s continued peace, stability, and prosperity — principles that have long guided China’s policies towards the region. The GSI is a natural extension of this approach. Its emphasis on common security, openness, inclusiveness, and practical cooperation resonates with ASEAN’s ethos of dialogue, inclusivity, and cooperative security. With time, consistent implementation, and sensitivity to the region’s strategic complexities, the GSI will prove its value and meaningfully contribute to a more secure and resilient region.

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