China’s Supposed “Change” in Policy Towards Chinese Overseas: Nothing to See Here

For decades, China sought to blur the distinction between foreign nationals of Chinese descent (huaren) and Chinese nationals living outside China (huaqiao). This was understandable, given Beijing’s desire to tap on the former to pursue China’s national interests. Recently, a senior Chinese official appeared to indicate, at least theoretically, that Beijing has had a change of heart. But there is more than meets the eye.

Liu Jianchao’s remarks received a lot of mainstream Chinese media coverage that raised expectations of a change in China’s overall policy towards Chinese overseas. Liu, the Minister of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party of China and a prospective foreign minister, touched on the topic during a Future China dialogue chaired by Lee Huay Leng, the Editor-in-Chief of the Chinese Media Group (which is owned by SPH Media).

At the dialogue, Lee enquired if China recognised that Southeast Asian Chinese regarded cultural identity (wenhua rentong) and political identity (zhengzhi rentong) differently. Liu answered that China understands that Southeast Asians of Chinese descent (often called huaren or huayi) possess separate identifications. Their political identification lies with the Southeast Asian country where they have acquired citizenship. Hence, the Southeast Asian country is their “fatherland” (zuguo). However, they possess some cultural identification with China as the country is their ancestral land (zujiguo). He stated that China views political loyalty as separated from cultural links. However, Liu noted that these ethnic Chinese can serve as a bridge between China and Southeast Asia. He added that there are Chinese nationals living overseas (huaqiao). These huaqiao possess both political and cultural loyalty to China. He noted that huaqiao should abide by the laws of the country they reside in and that their legal rights will be duly protected by China.

The discussion about the loyalty of Southeast Asian Chinese is significant due to the recent case of businessman Philip Chan, a Singapore citizen of 30 years who was classified as a “Politically Significant  Person” because he was assessed by Singapore authorities to have shown susceptibility to being influenced by foreign actors, and willingness to advance their interests. In 2023, Chan was a “representative of overseas Chinese” at China’s National People’s Congress and had remarked to the Chinese media after the Congress that it is the responsibility of Chinese overseas “to tell China’s story well” and serve the interests of China because their futures are linked to China. As a “Politically Significant Person”, Chan would need to report the political donations he receives and explain his association with a foreign country. Indeed, with the rise of China, some huaren have identified with Beijing, forgetting their political loyalty to their adopted country.

Chan could be, as defined by Liu, playing the role of a bridge (qiaoliang). But it is not easy to be a bridge between a Southeast Asian state and China. Citizens of a Southeast Asian state can (and should) only serve the national interests of the country that they belong to. This national interest includes national security, territorial integrity, economic benefits and welfare of the people, and national values or ideology. While the national interests of China and some Southeast Asian states can sometimes converge, they can also be in conflict at times. In the case of the latter, huaren should defend the interests of their Southeast Asian country.

“ … under Xi, there appears to be a stronger momentum to appeal to Chinese overseas to support China. This is evidenced by the OCAO being placed under the United Front Work Department since 2018, the practice of inviting huaqiao and huaren to Chinese business association conventions, and the annual invitations to huaqiao and huaren as representative of overseas Chinese at China’s Two Sessions parliamentary meetings.”

Liu’s reference to loyalty to citizenship-country — the country that huaren have adopted the nationality of — appears to differ from the policy introduced when Hu Jintao came to power. Hu sought to blur the distinction between huaren and huaqiao. Subsequently, the administration of Xi Jinping appealed to Chinese overseas in Southeast Asia and beyond to assist China economically and serve the national interests of China. To both Hu and Xi, Chinese overseas, regardless of their citizenship, are regarded as a part of the Chinese nation. This indicated that Beijing sought to blur the distinction between huaqiao and huaren.

There are many instances of such appeals. They can be found in this author’s The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas. In April 2012, Li Yinze, the chairman of the Beijing Branch Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO, or Qiaoban) delivered a speech at the Indonesian Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Jakarta, appealing to young Chinese Indonesians to learn Mandarin “to strengthen their identification with the Chinese Nation”. He also noted that Chinese Indonesians should not be afraid as there is a strong China backing them. In September 2014, Qiu Yangping, the chairperson of OCAO, made a speech at the Indonesians of Chinese Descent Association (INTI) conveying a similar message. In June 2014, President Xi talked about a “Big Chinese Family” (zhonghua da jiating), thus including foreign citizens of Chinese descent (huaren)  at the 7^th Conference of World Federation of Huaqiao Huaren Associations.  

 While Mr Liu might appear to be taking a different line from Hu and Xi, Beijing’s policy of blurring the distinction between huaqiao and huaren remains unchanged. In fact, under Xi, there appears to be a stronger momentum to appeal to Chinese overseas to support China. This is evidenced by the OCAO being placed under the United Front Work Department since 2018, the practice of inviting huaqiao and huaren to Chinese business association conventions, and the annual invitations to huaqiao and huaren as representatives of overseas Chinese at China’s Two Sessions parliamentary meetings. Most recently, the 2024 “Chinese New Year Gala Performance” (“四海同春”全球华侨华人春节大联欢) constituted an event that was specifically directed at huaqiao and huaren globally. In view of the above, Liu’s remarks should be seen in context. It does not constitute a change in China’s policy towards Chinese overseas. In fact, he was merely responding to a question with a politically correct answer.

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Editor’s Note: The term “overseas Chinese”, according to Professor Wang Gungwu, is the direct translation of huaqiao, referring to Chinese nationals who live outside China. Prof Wang suggests that “Chinese overseas” be used to refer to “all Chinese living abroad, both Chinese nationals and ethnic Chinese” (i.e. huaqiao and huaren, or foreign nationals of Chinese descent).