From ‘Chubby Bear’ to Censored Content: Vietnam’s Double Standard Approach to TikTok

In the world of social media, bears have become unlikely emblems of digital control — one erased, the other embraced. In China, Winnie the Pooh, the honey-loving cartoon icon, vanished online after memes comparing him to President Xi Jinping went viral, alarming censors who saw the satire as a threat. South of the border, Vietnam offers a different bear story. On TikTok, wildly popular with youth, pro-leader accounts affectionately call Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh “Gau U” (“Chubby Bear”), lavishing praise on his leadership.

But the “Chubby Bear” story masks Vietnam’s heavy-handed control over its leaders’ online personas. Over the past two decades, crackdowns on anti-state content have shaped Vietnam’s internet laws, chiefly targeting material that allegedly undermines national prestige, besmirches the ruling Communist Party’s image, or defames its leaders.

Examples abound. In early December, an influential TikToker was fined VND30 million (US$1,181) for “insulting national leaders” by comparing Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam’s most revered leader, to other celebrities. In August 2024, a Facebook user in Bac Giang Province faced a VND7.5 million (US$300) fine for defaming Party chief To Lam in a comment. Earlier still, in March 2024, a former Miss World contestant was fined VND37.5 million (US$1,500) for Facebook livestreams mentioning “Uncle Ho” controversially alongside showbiz gossip.

This dynamic highlights Vietnam’s ability to leverage foreign platforms while maintaining control. Its relationship with TikTok reflects a pragmatic strategy: enforcing strict censorship to protect leaders’ reputations while exploiting the platform’s youth-centric trends to amplify its narrative. TikTok has become a space where pro-leader content thrives, showcasing the regime’s calculated grip on the digital sphere.

In a country of nearly 100 million, Facebook dominates Vietnam’s social media landscape (nearly 73 million users), followed by TikTok (68 million) and YouTube (63 million). TikTok has notched up rapid growth among younger users but faced an uncertain future just a year ago when authorities launched a sweeping investigation, threatening an outright ban. But as predicted, the investigation became a tool to enforce stricter censorship, aligning with Vietnam’s strategy of controlling online narratives by compelling content removal.

For the first time, and as recently as last November, Vietnam claims TikTok has joined Facebook and YouTube in its “over 90 per cent club”, a statistic Hanoi touts as proof of its grip on global platforms. According to most recent government figures, Facebook complied with 94 per cent of censorship requests, YouTube followed with 91 per cent, and TikTok matched 93 per cent. Such high compliance rates were largely tied to the removal of content deemed “anti-state” by Vietnamese authorities.

There are often two differing accounts of Big Tech’s compliance rates in Vietnam: the government’s figures underscore impressive percentages, while platforms’ transparency reports provide a more nuanced picture. One constant, however, remains: the growing submission of Big Tech and the predominance of anti-state content among the material removed.

What sets TikTok apart is its ripple effect: As pro-leader content gains traction, organic influencers mimic the trend to align with popular topics or boost engagement.

For instance, TikTok’s transparency reports reveal fluctuating compliance rates — rising from 74 per cent in the second half of 2022 to 89 per cent in the first half of 2023, before dropping to 70 per cent in the first six months of 2024, the most recent reporting period for which data are available. In absolute terms, the numbers tell a starker story. The Vietnamese government’s censorship requests grew steadily from 16 in the first half of 2022 to 216 in the first six months of 2024.

While TikTok’s overall compliance has increased alongside these requests, its approach appears increasingly selective. From 197 in the first half of 2022, the number of content items removed peaked at 355 in the first six months of 2023 before slightly declining to 303 by the first half of 2024. But meanwhile, account removals climbed consistently from zero in the first half of 2022 to 258 in the first six months of 2024.

The bottom line: even by TikTok’s own figures, its compliance with Hanoi’s demands has steadily intensified, with a clear shift toward removing accounts rather than individual content.

Given how propagandists meticulously shape the online personas of Vietnamese leaders, the proliferation of pro-leader content on TikTok likely enjoys at least the tacit blessing of the authorities, if not outright encouragement or covert involvement. Far from mere lighthearted tributes, these videos reflect a broader, consistent pattern that transcends individual administrations. A plethora of TikTok channels have profusely showcased the images of Vietnam’s “four pillars” of leadership: the Party’s General Secretary, the President, the Prime Minister, and the National Assembly Chair.

These channels rely on a uniform formula: short, flashy clips featuring trending music and effects created with CapCut, a popular video editing tool. Polished but superficial, this youth-centric and visually dynamic style mimics TikTok’s core user base, making the content appear organic while maintaining a curated portrayal of the nation’s leadership.

Judging by general benchmarks for TikTok interactions, many of these pages achieve notably high visibility. To be sure, the role of pro-government accounts and likely cyber-troop involvement in amplifying these narratives cannot be overlooked. What sets TikTok apart, however, is its ripple effect: As pro-leader content gains traction, organic influencers mimic the trend to align with popular topics or boost engagement. This blend of state-driven promotion and organic participation creates a feedback loop, amplifying both authenticity and reach.

However, in seeking to connect with youth and amplify pro-leader narratives, Vietnam’s calculated embrace of TikTok also carries risks. With anti-China — and, by extension, anti-TikTok — discourse likely to intensify under the upcoming Trump administration, relying on such a polarising platform, already accused of spreading misinformation, could backfire.

Moreover, Vietnam has justified its crackdown on TikTok by citing concerns like child safety, framing it as a breeding ground for public issues. Yet, using the same platform to promote leadership images reveals a troubling double standard. If the authorities fixate on leadership image-building at the expense of addressing these concerns, they risk undermining public trust and tarnishing the very personas they seek to elevate.

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