Has China Changed its Policy Towards Chinese Overseas?

INTRODUCTION

In March 2024, Liu Jianchao (刘建超), Minister of the International Department of the Communist Party of China (CCP) and a senior diplomat, visited Singapore at the invitation of Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan. During his visit, Liu met with then-Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Minister Balakrishnan, and delivered a public lecture hosted by Lianhe Zaobao, Singapore’s leading Chinese-language newspaper. The lecture featured an intensive dialogue between Liu and Lee Hwee Leng (李慧玲), Editor-in-Chief of the Chinese Media Group at SPH Media Group Singapore. Liu’s remarks received extensive coverage in mainstream Chinese media.

During the dialogue, Lee asked whether China recognises the two distinct forms of identification for Southeast Asian Chinese: cultural identification (wenhua rentong 文化认同) and political identification (zhengzhi rentong 政治认同). Liu responded that China understands that Southeast Asians of Chinese descent, often referred to as Huaren (华人) or Huayi (华裔) in Chinese, have two distinct identities. He emphasised that China recognises that their political loyalty lies with the Southeast Asian state where they hold citizenship, which they regard as their “fatherland” (zuguo 祖国), while their cultural identification remains connected to China, considered their ancestral land (zujiguo 祖籍国). He further added that China considers political loyalty to be separate from cultural ties.

Liu pointed out that the ethnic Chinese community can nevertheless serve as a bridge (qiaoliang 桥梁) between China and Southeast Asia. He also addressed the role of Chinese nationals overseas (Huaqiao华侨), emphasising that while living abroad, they should respect the laws of their host countries and that their legal rights would be safeguarded by China.

VARIOUS TERMS FOR CHINESE ABROAD

Before proceeding further, it is useful to clarify the various terms used when discussing “overseas Chinese.” The English term “overseas Chinese,” according to Professor Wang Gungwu, is a direct translation of the term Huaqiao (华侨), which refers specifically to Chinese nationals living abroad. The term does not include foreign citizens of Chinese descent, referred to as Huaren (华人) in Chinese. Professor Wang therefore suggests the use of the term “Chinese overseas” to encompass “all Chinese living abroad, both Chinese nationals and ethnic Chinese.” In other words, “Chinese overseas” includes both Huaren and Huaqiao, although the term Huaren was not explicitly used in his article.

In usage by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), however, the term Huaqiao typically refers to Chinese nationals sojourning overseas, while Huaren refers to ethnic Chinese overseas who have acquired foreign citizenship, and Huayi refers to foreigners of Chinese descent. In this article, the definition of “Chinese overseas”, as proposed by Professor Wang, is adopted to refer to all Chinese abroad, regardless of their nationality. 

ISSUES ON LOYALTY

Liu’s discussion on the loyalty of Southeast Asian Chinese with Lee is particularly significant in light of a recent case involving businessman Philip Chan (陈文平). Chan, originally from Hong Kong and a naturalised Singapore citizen of 30 years, was classified by Singaporean authorities as a “Politically Significant Person” under the Foreign Interference Countermeasures Act (FICA) due to his role as a “representative of overseas Chinese” in China’s People’s Congress. As a result of this designation, Chan was legally required to report any political donations he received and provide details about his connections with foreign entities. Following a meeting in China, Chan was interviewed by the Chinese press during which he stated that it was the responsibility of Chinese overseas “to tell China’s story well” and to serve China’s interest, as their futures are linked to that country. This reflects a broader trend, where some Chinese overseas have increasingly aligned themselves with Beijing, sometimes overlooking their political loyalty to their adopted countries.

While there may be instances where the national interests of China and some Southeast Asian states align, there are times when they can also be in conflict. In such cases, Huaren must defend the interests of their Southeast Asian country.

Chan, as defined by Liu, could be seen as playing the role of a bridge (qiaoliang) between Southeast Asia and China. However, fulfilling this role is fraught with challenges. Citizens of Southeast Asian states can—and should—serve only the national interests of their adopted country. These national interests include national security, territorial integrity, economic prosperity, welfare of the people, and upholding the country’s values and ideology. While there may be instances where the national interests of China and some Southeast Asian states align, there are times when they can also be in conflict. In such cases, Huaren must defend the interests of their Southeast Asian country.

COMPARING LIU JIANCHAO’S STATEMENT AND ZHOU ENLAI’S POLICY ON CHINESE OVERSEAS

Liu’s recent remarks on Beijing’s policy towards Chinese overseas bring to mind the policies of Zhou Enlai and those of earlier Chinese leaders. Shortly after the Asia-African conference in 1955, then-Prime Minister Zhou Enlai encouraged local Chinese to become citizens of Southeast Asian states, urging them to be loyal to their adopted countries and to integrate into local societies. Zhou also addressed Huaqiao–Chinese nationals living overseas—stressing that while they should respect the laws and customs of their host countries, they should also learn local languages to facilitate integration and acceptance by the local people. Indeed, Liu’s recent statements share notable similarities with Zhou’s policy, particularly regarding the emphasis on political loyalty to the country of citizenship. However, in Liu’s remarks, one key difference lies in the absence of any mention of integration into local society. While Zhou saw integration as critical, Liu’s focus remained on political loyalty. Why do they have such differing views? This can be attributed to the different eras in which these leaders lived. Zhou lived in an era when China was still weak, whereas Liu lived in a period when China had risen. 

In 1955, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had been in existence for only six years, and the Korean War had just concluded. At that time, Beijing was still recovering from the war and was eager to secure the support of Third World countries with large Chinese overseas populations. These countries, however, often harboured prejudices against overseas Chinese who were not only seen as economically strong but also “exclusive” in their lifestyles, along with political alignments that usually favoured China. In fact, many non-communist and anti-communist countries in Southeast Asia and beyond considered these overseas Chinese as a “fifth column”. To win the hearts and minds of these Third World countries, China needed to drop the historical baggage associated with overseas Chinese populations. At that time, China also lacked the cultural confidence to appeal to foreign populations. Thus, encouraging the integration of overseas Chinese into their local societies became a strategy to garner support from Southeast Asian countries.

This idea of integrating overseas Chinese with local society soon became an official policy of the PRC, although one can maintain that the reality on the ground was likely more complex than a simple policy shift would suggest. Notably, during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1974), the so-called Red Guard diplomacy was introduced, which led to the perception of overseas Chinese as “anti-revolutionary” and “unwelcome elements”. They were viewed as enemies of the People, resulting in the temporary abandonment of Zhou’s policy. Only after the resurgence of Deng Xiaoping did Zhou’s policy see a revival. In 1980, the first Nationality Law of the PRC was promulgated, marking a significant development in Chinese nationality law. The law states that China only recognises one citizenship. Consequently, once an overseas Chinese becomes a foreign national, they lose their citizenship of China, and their loyalty and obligations have been clearly defined. It is worth mentioning that during this period, China had yet to rise to its current global stature, and it still needed the support and cooperation of Third World countries.

BEIJING’S NEW POLICY TOWARD CHINESE OVERSEAS

Beijing’s policy towards Chinese overseas, however, began to change following the rise of China as it recognised the potential of leveraging soft power to enhance its foreign policy. This period of rising influence coincided with a significant exodus of Chinese from mainland China. The new wave of Chinese migrants was driven not only by the economic growth in China but also by the desire of some mainland Chinese individuals to improve their economic status. According to Professor Zhuang Guoto (庄国土) of Xiamen University, by the late 20^th and early 21^st century, about 7-8 million mainland Chinese had emigrated. The majority (about 80%) went to Western developed countries (including Japan), while a minority (about 20%) came to Southeast Asia. These new migrants are classified as Huaqiao in PRC nomenclature, although they prefer to be called xin yimin (新移民), or “Chinese new migrants.” 

Under Xi, ethnic Chinese—regardless of their citizenship—were regarded as a key component of the “Chinese Nation”.

Particularly, China’s policy towards Chinese overseas began undergoing significant changes during Hu Jintao’s (胡锦涛) presidency (2002-2012). Hu blurred the distinction between Huaren and Huaqiao, as observed during the 2008 Beijing Olympics when he attempted to unite Chinese people both inside and outside China by encouraging pride in the country’s achievements and urging them to help modernise the nation. Hu’s successor, Xi Jinping (习近平), continued this policy, appealing to ethnic Chinese worldwide (including those in Southeast Asia) to contribute economically and serve China’s national interests. Under Xi, ethnic Chinese—regardless of their citizenship—were regarded as a key component of the “Chinese Nation.”

For instance, in April 2012, Li Yinze (李印泽) chairman of the Beijing Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (Qiaoban), met the Indonesian Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Jakarta and urged young Chinese Indonesians to learn Mandarin to strengthen their connection with the Chinese Nation. Li also reassured them that they should not be afraid to express their Chinese identity, emphasising the support of a strong China behind them.

Additionally, in 2014, President Xi Jinping himself spoke of a “Big Chinese Family” that included overseas Chinese. In 2015, many Huaqiao and Huaren from Southeast Asia and beyond were invited to China to participate in its economic transformation and development. They were considered by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (李克强) as Chinese Xinlijun or “new effective forces,” to support China’s development.

CONCLUSION

Interestingly, despite the aforementioned developments, in 2024, senior Chinese diplomat Liu Jianchao made a clear distinction between Huaqiao and Huaren, emphasising that they possess different political loyalties. Huaren’s political loyalty, he noted, is only tied to the country of citizenship. While Liu’s comments may appear to diverge from the positions of Hu and Xi, Beijing’s policy of blurring the distinction between Huaqiao and Huaren remains unchanged.

In fact, under Xi, there appears to be a stronger momentum to appeal to Chinese overseas in supporting China. This is reflected in the integration of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) under the United Front Work Department since 2018, as well as the ongoing practice of inviting Huaqiao and Huaren to Chinese business association conventions. Furthermore, they are regularly invited as representatives of overseas Chinese to China’s annual Two Sessions parliamentary meetings. Most recently, the 2024 “Chinese New Year Gala Performance” (“四海同春”全球华侨华人春节大联欢) was specifically organised to reach out to Huaqiao and Huaren globally.

Liu’s remarks should be understood within this broader context. His comments do not constitute a change in China’s policy towards the Chinese overseas; rather, he was merely providing a politically appropriate response to a specific question.

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This is an adapted version of ISEAS Perspective 2024/89 published on 25 October 2024. The paper and its references can be accessed at this link.